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ARTICLE
UNiTED STATES V. JONES: BIG BROTHER AND THE
"COMMON GOOD"
VERSUS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND YOUR RIGHT TO
PRIVACY

By Melanie Reid*
I.

Introduction

In the center of the town of Siena, Italy, lays the
Palazzo Publico which was built between 1297 and 1310.
Inside the Palazzo Publico is the Sala della Pace, the Hall
of Peace, which houses an early piece of Italian secular arta fresco that illustrates the effect government has on the
city, its people, and the countryside.' The painter,
Ambrogio Lorenzetti, depicted the "Common Good" as a
king, sitting tall and strong above a line of smaller-sized,
everyday people who are slowly making their way towards
the "Common Good."2 This picture represents the
subordination of private interest to the common good.3
Lorenzetti, who painted the fresco between 1338
and 1339, was one of the first of many who began to
ponder what makes a good government; 4 he concluded that
all citizens must make personal sacrifices for the common
Assistant Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan
School of Law. I want to thank the participants at the Sixth Circuit
Judicial Conference in Lexington, Kentucky, where I presented
Trespass and the Expectation of Privacy: The Impact of United States
v. Jones on Law Enforcement and Private Entities, a precursor to this
article. I would like to thank Victoria Herman, Barbara Bavis, Mary
Laflin, and Bob Reid for their invaluable assistance on this article.
*

' MARIA LuISA MEONI, UTOPIA AND REALITY
LORENZETrI's GOOD GOVERNMENT 9 (2005).

IN AMBROGIO

2 Id. at 16.
3 Id.
4Id. at 13.
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good of the town.5 Most modem day democracies struggle
with the concept of the rights of individuals versus the
needs of the state. In light of rapid technological
advancement of the past fifty years, one of the biggest
issues citizens of the world face today is whether to
sacrifice some right to privacy for the common good, so
that the scales of Justice may remain in balance and to
promote the order Lorenzetti painted centuries ago.
In 1787, the United States Constitution was drafted
to establish mechanisms for an effective federal
government, which would become the "Common Good".
However, the Constitution contained few guarantees as to
what private interests would be protected in this new
government. Without the protection of individual rights,
this new central government had the potential to create
tyranny and transform into a police state of some sort.
James Madison stated that a declaration of rights would
help install the judiciary as "guardians" of individual
rights. 6 And so, in 1789, the first Congress proposed 12
amendments to the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment
was the most important of these for the protection of
privacy rights.
This article will trace the evolution of Fourth
Amendment law, what constitutes a "search" which
evolved from English property law and notions of trespass,
to the reasonable expectation of privacy under United
States v. Katz. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Jones,8 which relied upon historical
property law, impacts law enforcement's future ability to
exigent
especially
when
use tracking devices,
'Id at 16.
6 John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70
S. CAL. L.
REv. 1311, 1394-95 (1997) (citing James Madison, Remarks to the
House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY REVIEW (1971)).
7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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circumstances exist. 9 The Jones case forces law
enforcement and the courts to reevaluate the extent of an
individual's right to privacy in the age of new technology
and the complications this may have on the ability of law
enforcement to utilize warrantless electronic monitoring,
technical surveillances, and other investigative techniques.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Jones
based its decision on early Fourth Amendment law;
therefore, Part II of this article will provide a brief
overview and history of the Fourth Amendment and the
concerns of the Framers. It is important to review what
constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment and
provide a history of how the Court has viewed tracking
devices and other law enforcement tools that enhance
criminal investigations.
Part III of this article will examine the Jones
decision and its impact on law enforcement, as trespass is
now considered an additional argument towards what is
considered a "search." The Jones decision raises legal and
ethical issues for law enforcement working with companies
such as OnStar, which allow for monitoring without
installation, any type of factory- or owner-installed tracking
device, or GPS-enabled smartphones and raises issues for
law enforcement who find themselves in exigent
circumstances without the ability to place tracking devices
on automobiles and other such "effects." The Jones
decision may also have implications on other investigatory
tools, such as trash pulls, stationary cameras, open fields,
and undercover agent or informant non-consensual
recordings.
Part IV will explore private investigators' tort
liability, specifically the tort of trespass and invasion of
privacy, which can, in turn, enlighten the discussion as to
the impact of Jones on law enforcement. Post-Jones, the
Supreme Court should consider similar trespass and
9 Id.

9
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privacy laws but in the civil context. Private investigators
frequently utilize similar techniques and resources which
are the stock and trade of law enforcement, but private
investigators are governed by state licensing requirements.
Private investigators are also concerned with potential civil
tort liability and the admissibility of evidence collected by
them in any future criminal proceeding.
Previously, the rules which govern trespass in a
criminal context and civil proceeding were quite different.
The decision in Jones brings the common law tort of
trespass back into the criminal context. It can be argued
that there is an unwarranted dichotomy between what the
public, e.g., private investigator, is entitled to view versus
what law enforcement is entitled to view. The torts of
"trespass" and "invasion of privacy" used in the civil,
public context may now come into the forefront in
determining similar legal guidelines and constraints for law
enforcement. Investigative techniques such as open fields,
aerial surveillance, trash searches, undercover recordings,
and database searches may now be scrutinized under the
tort "trespass" theory.
The Court acknowledged in Jones that there may be
an "end to privacy" and the law of trespass may take its
place as society's subjective expectations of privacy are
becoming more and more reduced.' 0 This article will
discuss the relationship between Fourth Amendment law
for public officers, tort law for private investigators, and
the impact of Jones in their respective duties and
investigatory behavior. The trespass model should be
considered in the application of other methods of
investigation, and due to the ever-fluctuating state of
individual privacy expectations, an analysis similar to the
tort of invasion of privacy should supplement the Katz
analysis.

1o Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962.
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II.

The Fourth Amendment
Constitutes a "Search"

and

What

When drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers
were concerned with the exercise of discretionary authority
by public officers and abusive warrants, such as writs of
assistance and general warrants.' The Framers wanted to
ensure that the right to privacy extended to an individual's
home; they recalled the practice of British customs agents
who were authorized via the writs of assistance to search
colonists' homes for taxable goods which included small
items such as salt, soap, paper, and glass.12 The writ was
effective during the entire lifetime of the reigning
sovereign, and the delegation to the official to enforce the
writ was absolute and unlimited. Therefore, the Framers
believed the chief evil was the physical entry into one's
home without a proper warrant.13 To rectify this abuse,
henceforth, any intrusion into one's home without a
warrant, i.e., without judicial scrutiny, would constitute a
"search" and a violation under the Fourth Amendment.
The Framers decided the Fourth Amendment would
apply to "persons, houses, papers, and effects."' 4 Scholars,
over the years, determined that the Fourth Amendment
contains three separate requirements: a warrant
requirement, a reasonableness requirement, and a
particularity requirement.' 5 The Fourth Amendment does
not explicitly discuss an individual's right to privacy.
While courts may remain confident that any
warrantless, government-sponsored intrusion into the home
would violate the Framer's intent behind the Fourth
Amendment, new technologies have evolved that now
" 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 52 (5th ed. 2010).
I 2 Id.

13

Id. at 53.

14 Id.

" Id. at 50-51.
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allow law enforcement to secure evidence within the home
without physically entering the home. The question now
being considered is whether this non-intrusive government
technique qualifies as a "search" and if so, whether this
"search" triggers the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
The courts originally looked to property law and the
common law tort of trespass to frame what constitutes a
"search." In Boyd v. United States,16 the Supreme Court
quoted Lord Camden, stating "every invasion of private
property, be it ever so minute is a trespass."' 7 The Court
also used "trespass" as a trigger for the Fourth Amendment
to apply when it reviewed the case against Roy Olmstead,
who ran a large bootleg operation in the Puget Sound
area.'
Olmstead, a former police lieutenant, sold a
substantial amount of illegal liquor in the Seattle,
Washington area after the Volstead Act was passed in
1925.19 Olmstead sold his liquor out of an office in
downtown Seattle and had six telephone numbers that
buyers could use to contact his operation.2 0
Prohibition Bureau agents wiretapped the phones in
Olmstead's office and home by placing devices in the
basement of his office and in phone installations near his
and other employees' homes.2 The Ninth Circuit upheld
Olmstead's eventual conviction. 22 Justice Taft later wrote
16116

U.S. 616 (1886).

" Id. at 627.
18 Olmstead

19
20

v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1928).

Id.

Id. at 456.

21 Id. at

456-57.
Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 1927).
Justice Frank H. Rudkin dissented and wrote:
22

What is the distinction between a message sent by
letter and a message sent by telegraph or by
telephone? True, the one is visible, the other
invisible; the one is tangible, the other intangible; the

12
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the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Olmstead, Taft
relied upon the trespass precedent, stating that the
wiretapping that occurred outside Olmstead's office and
home did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment because there was no trespass or no physical
invasion of a protected location such as the home or

office. 23
one is sealed, and the other unsealed; but these are
distinctions without a difference. A person using the
telegraph or telephone is not broadcasting to the
world. His conversation is sealed from the public as
completely as the nature of the instrumentalities
employed will permit, and no federal officer or
federal agent has a right to take his message from the
wires, in order that it may be used against him. Such
a situation would be deplorable and intolerable, to
say the least. Must the millions of people who use the
telephone every day for lawful purposes have their
messages interrupted and intercepted in this way? ...
If ills such as these must be borne, our forefathers
signally failed in their desire to ordain and establish a
government to secure the blessings of liberty to
themselves and their posterity.
Id. at 850 (Rudkin, J dissenting).
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. Justice Taft explains:

23

There was no searching. There was no seizure. The
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
house or offices of the defendants.

.

. The reasonable

view is that one who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to project
his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires
beyond his house, and messages while passing over
them are not within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Here those who intercepted the
projected voices were not in the house of either party
to the conversation.
Id. at 464-66.

13
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This rationale held firm in the Goldman24 case in
1942 and the Silverman case of 1961.25 In Goldman, agents
placed a detectaphone26 against the outside wall of an
office and monitored the conversation from the outside wall
using the detectaphone.27 The Court found that there had
been no physical trespass into the office, and therefore,
there was no search or seizure.28 In Silverman, a spike mike
was inserted into the wall of an adjoining row house to
capture Silverman's conversations.29 Since the mike made
contact with the targeted row house's heating duct, the
Court found that a physical intrusion occurred which
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 30
The year 1967 began the Katz revolution, which
fundamentally altered the Court's understanding of Fourth
Amendment privacy protections. 3 1 Katz, a professional
gambler, used a bank of telephones on Sunset Boulevard to
place bets for himself and others.32 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") attached a tape recorder to the roof of
the middle phone booth, placed a microphone on the back
of two of the booths and attached an "out of order" sign on
the other booth.3 3 Since the FBI placed the listening device
on the outside of the phone booth, the government could
argue there was no physical intrusion, no trespass, inside
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
26 A detectaphone is a telephonic
apparatus with an attached
microphone transmitter used especially for listening secretly.
Detectaphone - Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/detectaphone (last visited
June 18, 2012).
27 Goldman, 316 U.S. at
131-32.
28 Id. at 134.
29 Silverman, 365 U.S.
at 506.
30
ld. at5ll-12.
3' Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
32 Id. at
348.
3 Brief of Petitioner at *5, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(No. 35), 1967 WL 113605.
24
25

14
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the booth. Justice Stewart disagreed and seemed to
overturn years of Fourth Amendment law by arguing the
Fourth Amendment protected "people, not places." 35 It did
not matter whether the device was placed inside or outside
the booth, "what a person seeks to preserve as private even
in an area accessible to the public may be constitutionally
protected." 36 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, set the
stage for future Fourth Amendment cases. The pertinent
question for future Fourth Amendment cases was to
become whether the governmental action violated the
defendant's subjective expectation of privacy and if so, was
that expectation of privacy one that society considers

reasonable. 3 7
Law enforcement's invasion of privacy in the 18 th
century was limited to physical searches of homes and
businesses. Once technology advanced, the Court seemed
to abandon the tort of trespass as the sole standard, and the
invasion of property was now possible without an
accompanying trespass. Police now have the ability to
invade one's privacy through wiretaps, informant or
undercover recordings, pen registers, aerial surveillance,
trash searches, thermal imaging, tracking devices, etc.
By the 2 0 th century, the trespass doctrine alone
provided inadequate protection of Fourth Amendment
rights because technology had reached the point that it was
now possible for law enforcement to intercept
communications and monitor individuals without the
requirement of physical trespass. The trespass doctrine was
substituted for Katz in 1967, which said that a violation of
the Fourth Amendment occurs when government officers
violate a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 38 Under

34
35
36

Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
Id. at 351.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
at 360-62 (Harlan, J. concurring).
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J. concurring).

37 Id.
3

15
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Katz, the expectation of privacy doctrine was born, and
using this new analysis, the Court decided what constituted
a "search" 3 9 under the Fourth Amendment.4 0
III.

The Jones decision and its Impact on Law
Enforcement

As the Court began to consider various
investigatory tools and whether these tools constituted a
"search" that would require a warrant, the issue of
electronic beepers and tracking devices arose. In United
States v. Knotts,4 1 police placed a radio transmitter42, also
called a beeper, in a container and traced the beeper in the
39 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 at n. 4 (2001) (use of thermal
imaging is a "search"); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300
(1987) (trespassing on curtilage is a "search"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 358
(wiretapping is a "search").
40 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (aerial surveillance is not
a "search"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (aerial
surveillance is not a "search"); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
40-41 (1988) (looking through trash is not a "search"); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) (says searches of open fields is not a
4th Amendment violation but searches of curtilage would be a
violation); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (use or
inspection of pen registers is not a "search"); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (looking at bank records is not a
"search"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1971) (use of
false friends or wired confidential informants are not "searches");
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (use of searchlights
does not create a "search" that implicates the 4th Amendment); United
States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (use of a
flashlight did not create a search, but was a plain view search); People
v. Vermouth, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (use of
binoculars to confirm what is seen with unaided observation is not a
"search").
41 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
42 A radio transmitter, which is usually battery operated, emits periodic
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver. Marshall Brian, How
Radio
Works,
How
STuFF
WORKS,
http://howstuffworks.com/radio.htm (last visited August 6, 2012).
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container to Knotts' cabin.4 3 The Court focused on the site
of the information disclosed by the beeper. 4 The Court
held this monitoring did not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment, since the beeper disclosed the location
of the container in public places and revealed nothing to the
police about the interior of Knotts' cabin.4 5
In United States v. Karo,46 the Court addressed the
issue of whether the installation of a beeper in a container
constituted a "search" if the original owner gave consent to
the monitoring yet the buyer had no knowledge of the
presence of the beeper.4 7 In this instance, the Court found
that the person who possessed the container at the time of
the installation was the confidential informant; therefore,
the police had the consent of the owner prior to installing
the tracking device. 48 This is the first mention of
installation possibly triggering the Fourth Amendment.4 9
The Court also considered the monitoring of the
container as it moved from a public area to inside a private
residence as it had in Knotts.50 Since the beeper in Karo
disclosed information not available from visual surveillance
but rather revealed critical facts about the interior of the
premises, the Court decided the monitoring violated the
Fourth Amendment.' The Court felt that requiring a
warrant to monitor private areas would have the effect of
ensuring that the use of electronic beepers or tracking
devices would not be abused.

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
Id. at 281-82.
45 Id. at 285.
46 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
43
44

47 Id. at 707.
48 Id. at 711.
49
5o

Id. at 713.
Id. at 713-14.

5' Id.
52

at 714.
Id. at 716.

17
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Knotts and Karo created the framework for law
enforcement to follow when using electronic beepers and
tracking devices. Tracking devices were divided into "slapon" devices which are battery operated and placed on the
undercarriage of vehicles, and devices that are installed or
hard wired into the car so that the device no longer needs a
battery. Monitoring also became divided into two areas:
those instances in which there would only be monitoring in
public places and those with monitoring in private areas.
Congress gave the courts the authority to review
warrants for mobile tracking devices in Title 18, United
States Code, section 3117. In instances in which the
tracking device was to be installed or hard wired into the
car and/or instances in which the tracking device was to
monitor private areas, a warrant containing probable cause
was needed.5 3 Thus, the only time law enforcement would
not be required to seek a court order would be in a situation
where a "slap-on" tracking device would be used or law
enforcement intended to monitor only public areas.
Knotts and Karo were decided in the 1980's and
much has changed in tracking device technology. Law
enforcement used to place a tracking device on a vehicle
and follow a blip on the screen as they attempted to
maintain surveillance a block or two away. The global
positioning system (GPS) tracking technology that the
Court in Jones examined in 2012 is much more
sophisticated and extensive.5 4 The Court was suddenly
faced with advanced technology and the only area of
tracking device law still in dispute was the warrantless
utilization of a "slap-on" device and the monitoring of only
public areas. Many assumed the Court would follow the
D.C. Circuit court's argument and use the mosaic theory of
privacy to justify a warrant requirement. Under the mosaic
theory of privacy, extensive monitoring of a vehicle for
53 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012).
54 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).

18
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twenty-eight days constituted more than just a day's
surveillance of a vehicle in public thoroughfares and when
all of the vehicle's movements were taken together after the
twenty-eight day period, the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sum of his movements. 5 5
Instead, the majority of the Court chose a different
route. The Court explained that it had never truly
abandoned the argument that a physical trespass triggers
the Fourth Amendment, but that the centuries-old torts of
trespass to land and trespass to chattel merely
supplemented the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis. 56 Therefore, utilizing a "slap-on" tracking device
constitutes a "search" because it is a trespass of a person's
"effect", chattel, which is protected by the Fourth
Amendment.5 7 Justice Scalia likened a GPS "slap-on"
tracking device, which is approximately the size of a credit
card, to an 18 1h century constable "concealing himself in
the target's coach in order to track its movements."58 Both
investigatory tools would constitute a trespass on a person's
effect or chattel.5 9
The majority decided not to utilize the Katz analysis
in Jones because "[the Court's] cases suggest that such
visual observation is constitutionally permissible."60
However, the majority did not close the door to further
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562-63 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(using mosaic theory to conclude that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in collective movements).
56
Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 952.
5 Id. at 953. Justice Scalia mentions in footnote 5 that "[t]respass alone
does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that what was
present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information."
Id. at 951 n.5. Since law enforcement is usually going to trespass on
land or a person's property when they are conducting an investigation,
this point that you need "trespass +" is somewhat diminished. Id. at
951.
"Id. at 950 n. 3.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 953-54.
5
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argument if this extensive monitoring by GPS tracking
devices was to arise again in a separate case under different
circumstances, "[i]t may be that achieving the same result
through electronic means, without an accompanying
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the
present case does not require us to answer that question.
And answering it affirmatively leads us needlessly into
additional thorny problems." 6 1
In a nutshell, it was questionable to the majority
whether this sort of monitoring actually violated Jones'
right to privacy. In an age of Facebook, Twitter, Google,
iPads, smartphones, etc., the Court was not ready to decide
how much government monitoring of information placed in
the public domain would trigger protections under the
Fourth Amendment. However, the majority did note that
"[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to
Katz analysis." 62 So owner- or factory-installed tracking
devices such as Onstar or GPS tracking using smartphones
would be subject to the Katz analysis since the trespass
argument would not apply.
Although Jones is a 9-0 decision, the concurrences
by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, demonstrate divergent views
as to the use of trespass and the Katz analysis in
determining which investigatory tools constitute a "search"
and which do not. Justice Alito criticized the majority's
decision to re-introduce the idea of trespass through
property law into the Fourth Amendment context and
preferred to examine the problem utilizing the Katz
analysis.63 Justice Alito first argued that the placement of a
"slap-on" tracking device on the undercarriage of Jones'

61Jones,
62
63

132 S.Ct. at 954.
Id. at 953 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring).
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64

vehicle was not a true trespass to chattel. Liability for a
trespass to chattel occurs when an actor intentionally
dispossesses another of the chattel or intermeddles with a
chattel in the possession of another.65 The elements of
trespass to chattel include an act, intent, an invasion of
chattel interest (either an intermeddling or dispossession 66),
and the plaintiff must be in possession or entitled to
immediate possession, causation, and damages. 67
In the Jones case, the placement of the GPS device
would be considered "intermeddling" as no substantial
invasion of the chattel interest occurred. As Justice Alito
pointed out in his concurrence, "there was no actual
damage to the vehicle to which the GPS device was
attached."68 Under the common law definition of trespass
to chattel, the intermeddling would not constitute a trespass
to chattel and therefore would not be a search under the
Fourth Amendment because no actual damage occurred to
the vehicle.69 Justice Alito also disagreed that the Court
should look to 18 th century law and apply it to advanced
technology.70 Referring to Justice Scalia's 18 th century
example of trespass, Justice Alito argued that a constable in
1791 could not have possibly hidden inside a stage coach to
survey the target's activities. Therefore, the Court need not
concern itself with exploring the past to provide insight on
present-day technological dilemmas. 7 ' According to Justice

64 Id.
65 Id. at 957, n. 2.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 217 (1965). A dispossession
would include a wrongful acquisition of the chattel, wrongful transfer,
wrongful detention, substantially changing the chattel, severely
damaging or destroying the chattel, or misusing the chattel.
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 218 (1965).

Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957 n. 2 (Alito, J., concurring).
69 Id. (Alito, J. concurring).
7o Id. at 958 (Alito, J. concurring).
71 Id. at 958 n. 3 (Alito, J. concurring).

68
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Alito, as technology advanced and physical intrusion was
no longer at issue trespass no longer applied.72
The issue in Justice Alito's mind was the
government's long-term monitoring of Jones' movements
in his car and whether this long term monitoring "involved
a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not
have anticipated." 73 Alito argued "the use of longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 74
impinges on expectations of privacy." 75 Justice Alito
applied the Katz analysis, rather than trespass law, in his
concurrence and arrived at the same result as Justice
Scalia 76 . However, it is interesting to note that Alito
questioned a reasonable person's set of privacy
expectations in our advanced technological age. Noting:
those
can
change
[T]echnology
expectations. Dramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately
produce significant changes in popular
attitudes. New technology may provide
increased convenience or security at the
expense of privacy, and many people may
find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the
public does not welcome the diminution of
privacy that new technology entails, they
Id. at 960 ("The premise that property interests control the right of
the Government to search and seize has been discredited." quoting
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)) (Alito, J. concurring).
Citing Oliver, Justice Alito also pointed out that it is unclear how the
placement of a tracking device constitutes a "search." Id. citing Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984).
73 Id. at 964 (Alito, J. Concurring).
74 It is unclear what offenses Justice Alito is speaking of - would longterm monitoring of a terrorist suspect be acceptable but not of a
suspected drug trafficker?
7 Id. (Alito, J. concurring)
76 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J. concurring).
72
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may eventually reconcile themselves to this
new development as inevitable.77
Alito appeared to question in an age of advanced
technology, where one's personal comments, preferences,
and behavioral information can be so easily exploited by
citizens, companies, and internet entities, whether a
reasonable person can have any expectation to the right of
privacy.
Justice Sotomayor took a different stance on the
privacy issue. While agreeing with both Scalia's and
Alito's reasoning and conclusions, she took the opportunity
in her concurrence to express her concern that "GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations."7 8 In fact, Sotomayor warned
"[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms," and this relatively
inexpensive, easy mechanism of monitoring is "susceptible
to abuse." 79 Justice Sotomayor agreed with the appellate
court's mosaic privacy theory where there is a reasonable
"expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public
movements."80

Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 962 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J.. concurring).
7 Id. at 956. James Otis made a similar expression of abuse when
British customs officials abused the writs of assistance granted by the
King. When King George II died in 1760, Otis represented a group of
colonists who opposed the writs, arguing in a Boston court that the
writs were unconstitutional and violated the right to property protected
by the British Constitution. Otis argued it infringed on colonists' liberty
because the writs allowed government officials to enter any citizen's
7
7

home

without

cause.

UNITED

STATES

http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/hl204.html
2012).
80
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956.
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While Sotomayor concurs with the majority, she
disagrees with Alito's comments that citizens should come
to terms with their diminishing right to privacy. In fact,
Sotomayor asks in light of this new digital age where
people now disclose a great deal of information about
themselves in many different venues, if the Court should
reconsider the third-party doctrine. I The third-party
doctrine allows law enforcement to request bank records,
company records, hotel records, electronic toll collection
systems, email subscriber and address information, phone
numbers dialed or received, and the like, on the premise
that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy to
information which is willingly provided to these third
parties, thus transferring the information into the public
domain. 82
Law enforcement is required to submit a grand jury
subpoena in order to receive this type of information.
However, law enforcement need only demonstrate that the
information is "relevant to the general subject of the grand
jury investigation." 83 Thus, grand jury subpoenas are
merely a tool to obtain evidentiary material that can be used
without having to worry that the Fourth Amendment
requirements of probable cause or reasonable suspicion will
not be satisfied.
Sotomayor requested a reconsideration of the thirdparty doctrine which, in a sense, was not at issue in the
Jones case. "I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection." 84 One thing is clear from
the Jones decision: the Court is re-introducing the
"Id. at 957.
82 Id.

United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 17(c).
84 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at
957.
83

See
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common-law tort of trespass as an argument to be made
under the Fourth Amendment. The standard expectation of
privacy is now under debate, and all technical investigatory
tools currently not considered a "search" will more than
likely be revisited.
The immediate impact of Jones on law enforcement
activities was minimal, or at least should have been, since
Jones only dealt with the narrow category of small, "slapon" devices monitored in public areas. The majority of the
GPS tracking devices already needed a warrant if installed
or if the monitoring was to include private areas. The fact
that so many GPS trackers needed to be pulled from
vehicles post-Jones demonstrates that many agents felt that
"slap-on" devices intended to monitor public areas were
acceptable without a warrant.
Further, many agents followed their legal counsel's
guidance, intending to remember to turn the device off
when it appeared as though the target was traveling into a
private area. It is certainly easier to slap on a tracking
device in the field rather than travel to the U.S. Attorney's
office and a judge's chamber to obtain a warrant in the off
chance the vehicle may be monitored in a private area.
Agents followed the Karo and Knotts case law to the letter
rather than take the precaution of obtaining a warrant. This
guidance was reflected when FBI General Counsel Andrew
Weismann commented that in light of Jones, over 3,000
tracking devices had to be removed from various vehicles
by the FBI."
Certain aspects of the Jones decision will negatively
impact law enforcement's ability to place a tracking device
on a vehicle when exigent circumstances arise. If agents
need to monitor an informant or undercover agent during a
Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off
(Mar. 7, 2012),
3,000 Tracking Devices, ABC NEWS
http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-ruling-prompts-fbi-turn-off-3154046722--abc-news.html.
8
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sting operation or drug buy bust, and an unexpected third
party arrives on the scene, agents will no longer be able to
follow these other unexpected targets via a tracking device
without comprising the planned operation.
Similar circumstances arise in situations where law
enforcement is listening to a target's phone conversations
via a Title III court order86 and learn that the target plans to
drive to a location to pick up contraband. Unfortunately, if
the target owns three different vehicles, and agents are
unsure of which vehicle the target plans to take; the
authorities are also unsure which vehicle they should
mention in their request to the judge for placement and
monitoring of a tracking device. In the previous scenario,
post-Jones, law enforcement will be unable to place a
tracking device on the three vehicles without a court order.
Will it be possible for law enforcement to receive
an "anticipatory" tracking order to place tracking devices
on all three cars and the monitoring of which depends upon
whether the target decides to take that particular vehicle to
his destination? Exigent circumstances will always exist for
the quick placement of tracking devices during an
investigatory operation and legislators should step forward
and create a 24-hour waiver rule that would allow for these
There should also be
unplanned contingencies.
allowances made for the quick slap-on of the device and
brief monitoring while in the field conducting surveillance,
but which would require a court order for its subsequent
monitoring hours later. This type of rule would allow law
enforcement the freedom to make quick decisions in the
field and prevent the type of long-term monitoring that
concerned the Justices in Jones.
Jones' long-term impact on future case law is
difficult to assess, since there are many unanswered
86

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.

87 This was alluded to by Justice Alito in his concurring opinion. See

Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964.
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questions about technology and privacy issues. Is Justice
Alito correct in his conclusion that as people embrace more
technology, their expectation of privacy diminishes? Or is
Justice Sotomayor correct in her argument that the increase
of private information collected by third parties should not
correlate to the government's ability to access this vast
amount of private information without due process?
Should different rules apply to the government and private
entities in their collection of our electronic information?
Such an assumption creates a false dichotomy. Yes,
government has a different motive for the analysis and
review of collected electronic data than does a company
such as Google. Since Google collects what users search
for on the Internet, what websites users visit, and what
news and blog posts users read, does this constitute an
intrusion into a user's expectation of privacy? Should
motive play a role in what constitutes trespass or
expectation of privacy?
In some instances, private entities have similar
motives to that of the government. Private investigators are
similar to law enforcement when they conduct
investigations in cases of infidelity, divorce, family,
criminal, and civil concerns. Law enforcement and private
entities should both be bound by the same constraints and
legal limitations when it comes to their access to technical
investigative techniques or third party data. Thus, civil law
that limits the actions of the private investigator should be
examined to determine how it differs from the criminal law
that applies to government.
IV.

Private Investigators,
Invasion of Privacy

Trespass, and the

Private investigators typically utilize surveillance
either using photography or video to document, database
searches, GPS tracking to locate people or assets, and
perform crime scene reviews. Private investigators are
27
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concerned with two things: licensing requirements and tort
liability. The prerequisites to become a licensed private
investigator are not difficult. For example, in Tennessee, an
applicant must be twenty-one years of age, a United States'
citizen, not been declared incompetent by reason of mental
defect or disease, not be suffering from habitual
drunkenness or narcotics addiction, be of good moral
character, possess or employ at least one person who has at
least 2,000 hours of "compensated verifiable investigatory
experience,"8 and score at least a seventy percent on a
multiple choice exam consisting of fifty questions. 89
The sparse licensing requirements do not pose
serious obstacles to private investigators; however,
potential tort liability is a problem. Not surprisingly, the
torts of trespass and invasion of privacy are at the forefront
of the investigators' concerns, invasion of privacy more so
than trespass, since trespass requires actual damages to the
land or chattel whereas invasion of privacy can be
subjective. Often, private investigators have intruded on
another's land or chattel but have not caused any actual
damage; therefore, the plaintiff cannot recover. It is when
the investigator intrudes upon a plaintiffs "seclusion,
solitude, or private affairs," 90 that the line is crossed, and
investigators begin worry about being sued personally by
the plaintiff seeking restitution.
In the civil context, many courts have defined a
citizen's right to privacy and have followed the Second
Restatement of Torts' definition of invasion of privacy.
Apprenticeships qualify under this requirement. TENN. COMP. R. &
REGS. 1175-01-.19 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-26-206 (2009);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-26-207 (2009).
89 Priometric, CanidateInformation Bulletin State of Tennessee Private
Investigation
and
Polygraph
Examinations,
https://www.prometric.com/enus/clients/Tennessee/Documents/TN25PrivatelnvestigationCIB_20120
809.pdf. See generally, TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-26-205 (2012).
88

9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652A (1977).
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The Supreme Court of Georgia described the right to
privacy as:
[A] personal right, which is not without
judicial recognition. It is the complement of
the right to the immunity of one's person.
The individual has always been entitled to
be protected in the exclusive use and
enjoyment of that which is his own. The
common law regarded his person and
property as inviolate, and he has the absolute
right to be let alone. The principle is
fundamental, and essential in organized
society, that every one, in exercising a
personal right and in the use of his property,
shall respect the rights and properties of

others.91
The intrusion upon one's seclusion, solitude, or
private affairs is described in the Second Restatement as
"[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonableperson."92 In order to recover, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant penetrated some
zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or
obtained unwanted access to data about the plaintiff, and he
or she had an objectively reasonable expectation of
seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data

source. 9 3
91 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78 (1905)
(Internal citations omitted).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (emphasis added).
93 Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharmaceuticals, 86 Cal. App. 4th 365, 372
92

(Cal. Ct. App. 2001)(citing Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955
P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
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This interference into one's seclusion must also be
substantial and result from conduct that would be offensive
and objectionable to the ordinary person. 94 In determining
the "offensiveness" of an invasion of a privacy interest,
common law courts consider, among other things: "the
degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and
circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the
intruder's motives and objectives, the setting into which he
intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is
invaded." 95 The Restatement further provides a few
examples of invasion of privacy, such as: "(1) taking the
photograph of a woman in the hospital with a rare disease
that arouses public curiosity over her objection, and (2)
using a telescope to look into someone's upstairs bedroom
window for two weeks and taking intimate pictures with a
telescopic lens." 96
In Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc.,97 "a
private investigator suggested that Mrs. Villanova place a
GPS device in one of the family vehicles regularly driven
by the plaintiff/husband in order to assist in tracking his
whereabouts." 98 The husband could not sue the investigator
for trespass because the investigator had obtained the
wife's consent, and the vehicle was joint marital property. 99
§ 652B, comt. d (1977). "The
thing into which there is intrusion or prying must be private ... on the
public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no legal right
to be alone; and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than
follow him about and watch him there." PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 808-09 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 4th ed. 1971).
9 Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994)
(quoting Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986)).
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, comment b (1977).
9 Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc. 21 A.3d 650 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2011).
98 Id. at 651.
99 Mrs. Villanova paid the vehicle's insurance premiums out of a joint
account held by her and plaintiff. Id. at 652.
94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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However, installation was not at issue. Rather, the husband
sued the investigator for invasion of privacy. The court
learned that the GPS device had remained in the vehicle for
about forty days.100 After reviewing the investigator's
invoice, which reflected that a total of twenty-seven hours
were devoted to monitoring the plaintiff via GPS for six
weeks, the court determined that the GPS device did not
capture any movements in a secluded location that was not
in public view. 10 t Since the plaintiffs movements were not
continuously monitored and no monitoring "extended into
private or secluded locations that were out of public view
and in which plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of
privacy," no invasion of privacy occurred.102
Upon review of cases in which private investigators
are sued for trespass and/or invasion of privacy, it appears
as if the invasion of privacy must be substantial in order for
the plaintiff to prevail. For example, the plaintiff prevailed
when a private investigator gained admittance to the
plaintiffs hospital room and, by deception, secured the
address of the man who had accompanied the plaintiff on a
shopping trip to Sears.103 Plaintiffs also prevailed when an
investigator peered through the plaintiffs bedroom and
bathroom windows,1 04 when a private investigator entered
the home and installed a hidden videotape camera in the
bedroom ceiling which recorded the plaintiff undressing,

10 Id.
'0 Id. at 653-55.

Id. at 656. Interestingly, the court referred to Knotts. Villanova, 21
A.3d. at 657. "[T]he placement of a GPS device in plaintiffs vehicle
without his knowledge, but in the absence of evidence that he drove the
vehicle into a private or secluded location that was out of public view
and in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy, does not
constitute the tort of invasion of privacy." Id. at 651-52.
103Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 657 (Cal. Ct.
A p. 1973).
Pappa v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, No. 3:07-CV0708, 2008 WL 744820, *2 (M.D. Pa. March 18, 2008).
102
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showering, and going to bed, 0 5 and when a private
investigator repeatedly followed a pregnant woman who
was frequently alone or with her small children,
photographing her at least 40 times, repeatedly causing her
to become frightened, resulting in her fleeing her home and
to call the police seeking help. 06
However, courts did not find an invasion of privacy
in instances where investigators placed a camera against a
pharmacy window, used spotlights to illuminate the interior
of the pharmacy, and videotaped the plaintiff talking on the
telephone inside the store for approximately thirteen
seconds,1 07 where a private investigator was across the road
from plaintiffs' property so that he could see the front and
side of the house, including plaintiffs' bedroom windows
which were not covered by curtains, os where private
105 Miller

v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). "To
prove trespass, a plaintiff must show that the defendants intentionally
and without authorization entered real property actually or
constructively possessed by him at the time of the entry." Id. There was
sufficient evidence to show that defendants intentionally entered the
premises and that plaintiff had possession at that time. As to the
invasion of privacy claim, "[p]laintiff has every reasonable expectation
of privacy in his mail and in his home and bedroom. A jury could
conclude that these invasions would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person." Id. at 354.
106Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 642 S.E.2d 105, 110 (Ga. App. Jan. 17,
2007).
107 Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1981). The place from
which the film was shot was open to the public and thus any passerby
could have viewed the scene recorded by the camera. Id. at 1095.
"Since the intrusion in the present case was a minimal one, publication
lasted only 13 seconds, Mark was not shown in any embarrassing
positions, his facial features were not recognizable, we hold there could
be no actionable claim in these circumstances." Id. Compare to
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court
found an actionable intrusion when the press gained entrance by
subterfuge to the home of an accused and photographed him there.
'os Hall v. InPhoto Surveillance, 649 N.E. 2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(finding that no trespass was committed). "In the absence of any
evidence to support the claim of actual trespass or the taking of
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investigators conducted visual surveillance while in a car
parked on the street and the plaintiff was on the balcony
and a videotape was made showing the plaintiff walking
around her apartment without the use of crutches or a
cane,109 and when a private investigator drove to a yacht
club, waited until a club member opened the gate, drove
onto the grounds before the gate closed, parked his vehicle
in a parking lot for guests and videotaped the plaintiffs
without their consent.110 In Nunez v. S. Melgar
investigations,Inc., II pretext telephone calls, pretext door

knocks, and incidents of climbing the back yard fence to
photographs, summary judgment was properly granted to defendants."
Id. at 86.
109 Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson & Assocs., No. Civ. A. 97-3623, 1999
WL 345592, at *1 (Mass. Supp. May 26, 1999). "[C]ourts are expected
to define the scope of the right to privacy 'on a case-by-case basis, by
balancing relevant factors, .

.

. and by considering prevailing societal

values and the ability to enter orders which are practical and capable of
reasonable enforcement." Id. at *2 (quoting Schlesinger v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1991)).
Visual surveillance which consists only of observing, photographing, or
videotaping a person in a public place violates no right of privacy. Id.
(citing Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 939, Since plaintiff
was in plain view of anyone on the street while on the balcony, she
enjoyed no greater right to be free of enhanced viewing than she did
while standing on the street. Id. at *5. Therefore, the observation and
photographing of the plaintiff with enhanced vision while on that
balcony did not by itself constitute an unreasonable and substantial or
serious interference with privacy under G.L. c. 214, s IB. Id. at *4.
110 Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
"Not every trespass constitutes an unreasonable search or intrusion. A
trespass 'becomes relevant only when it invades a defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy."' Id. at 586 (quoting McMilliam v.
State, 584 A.2d 88, 97 nt. 5(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)). Business and
commercial enterprises generally are not as private as a residence.
Since the surveillance was nothing more than observations while they
were on or near a yacht situated in a public waterway and in open view
of the public, there was no invasion of privacy. Id. at 587.
11 Nunez v. S. Investigations Inc., No. B 162945, 2004 WL 1926794 at
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004),.
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peer into her window created a triable issue as to whether
the defendants intruded into a private place.
V.

Applying Civil Tort Liability to Fourth
Amendment Law

Much can be learned from the development of
trespass and invasion of privacy in the civil context. First,
trespass is infrequently proven as plaintiffs can rarely
demonstrate actual damages. It is interesting to see how the
Court's reliance on trespass in Jones, which now exacts the
power of the exclusionary rule, is not as important in the
civil arena. A civil action for trespass seeks compensation
for damages to property.112 An intrusion of privacy "is a
claim that is 'broad enough to include recovery for
economic injuries, as well as mental or physical
injuries." l3 Trespass is no longer in fashion in the civil
world as it is gearing up for prominence in the criminal
context. If trespass is now in vogue, other investigatory
tools may be in jeopardy.
The FBI General Counsel commented that they
were considering the impact of Jones as it pertained to trash
pulls.11 4 If the lid of the trash can is considered an "effect"
under the Fourth Amendment, an agent's act of touching
the lid may be considered a trespass and would be a Fourth
Amendment violation without first acquiring a warrant. In
the civil context, documents which are placed in an outdoor
trash barrel no longer retain their character as the plaintiffs
personal property, the items discarded are considered
abandoned." Under the civil precedent, agents need not
112

Hawkes v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 764 A.2d 258 (Me. 2001).

"' Id. at 263.

de Vogue, supra note 83 (Weissman is quoted as saying "there is
not reason to think this is just going to end with GPS").
115Ananda Church of Self Realization v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 370, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). But See Misseldine v.
Corporate Investigative Servs., Inc., No. 1771, 2003 WL 21234928, at
114
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worry about the retrieval of the abandoned items; however,
they must wait until the trash is in a public area or face
trespass issues on private property.
The open fields doctrine may also not withstand
scrutiny under a trespass analysis. The open fields doctrine
states that people do not have an expectation of privacy in
activities occurring in open fields, even if the police drive
past a locked gate, a no trespassing sign, and owners tell
them it is private property; what a person knowingly
exposes to the public is not protected. 116 In the civil
context, a similar set of facts would clearly constitute a
trespass if damages as a result of the physical invasion of
the land were proven. 1 7 The majority in Jones provided a
preview of how the court would rule on an open field
question, stating in the opinion that "an open field, unlike
the curtilage of a home is not one of those protected areas
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment." 118 This comment is
contrary to the idea that personal property is a "place"
protected under the Fourth Amendment just as the vehicle
in Jones was considered an "effect" protected under the
Fourth as well. A trespass on the undercarriage of one's
vehicle is just as much a trespass as entering one's personal
property to conduct surveillance. Based on this premise, the
open fields doctrine is in jeopardy.

*4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 29, 2003) (holding that a trespass was
committed when the private investigator stepped out of the car, took the
garbage, and physically invaded the plaintiffs property without
invitations). However, in Misseldine v. Corporate Investigative Servs.,
Inc., No. 81771, 2003 WL 21234928 (Ohio App. May 29, 2003), a
trespass was committed when the private investigator stepped out of the
car and took his garbage. Id. at *4. The investigator physically invaded
the plaintiff's property without invitation or inducement. Id. at *5.
16 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (citing Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
117 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F.Supp.2d 602, 606 (N.D. Miss.
2004).
" Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953Icitations omitted).
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Some undercover law enforcement recordings of
criminal suspects, currently legal under the one-party
consent rule, may now be jeopardized under certain
circumstances. The Court may adopt a civil invasion of
privacy standard or consider capturing a party's words
without their knowledge through the use of a recording
device a "trespass." Federal law permits private citizens to
record unknowing third parties except if the
"communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State."I19 Various states have banned eavesdropping of
confidential communications criminally and civilly under
the invasion of privacy tort.120 While some civil cases of
119 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(d), 2520 (2012) (civil action).
120 Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 1994 WL 774531
(Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1994). Ca. Penal Code § 632(a) regarding
"confidential communications" states that
"every person who,
intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential
communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording
device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication,
whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the
presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other
device, except a radio, shall be punished . . ." The following is a list of
eavesdropping laws by state: ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-31 (2012); ALASKA
STAT. ANN. §§ 42.20.300, 42.20.310 (West 2012); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3005 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (West 2012);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9304 (West 2012); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West 2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1335 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03

(West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (West 2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 803-42 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702 (West
2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (West 2012); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-33.5-5-4 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West
2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 526.020 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15:1303 (2011); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 710 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., Interceptions,

Procurements, Disclosures or use of Communication § 10-402 (West
2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
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surreptitious recordings were found to contain a triable
issue of fact for the jury whether the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy at the place of their
employment or home,121 most of the time, courts (despite
the state ban on eavesdropping) determine that no invasion
of privacy exists when one is videotaped or recorded even
inside their own home by one party in the presence of
another. The plaintiffs simply have no reasonable
expectation that the conversation would be kept in

626A.02 (West 2012); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-533 (West 2011);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.402 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8213 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-290 (2012); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN
§§ 200.620, 200.650 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2
(2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-12-1 (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2012);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-287 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52
(West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1202 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 165.540 (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West
2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-5.1-13 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-17-470 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-21-1, 23A-35A-20
(2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (West 2012); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art 18.20 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402
(West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (West 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-lD-3
(West 2012); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 2011); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 7-3-702 (West 2012). The only state that did not have an
eavesdropping criminal or civil statute is Vermont. Vermont does
reference the United States Code's prohibition on eavesdropping, but
this is included only in the statute that prohibits disturbing the peace by
use of telephones or electronic devices. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027
121Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 1994 WL 774531 at *8 ; Hawkes v. Private
Investigation Services of Maine and New England, Inc., 2000 WL
33721625 at *4 (Me. Super. 2000). Hawkes alleges that the private
investigator twice gained access to his home under false pretenses and
without identifying himself. Id. at *1. Summary judgment on the
invasion of privacy claim was denied. Id. at*4. Summary judgment on
the plaintiffs claim of trespass was also denied because consent for
those entries was obtained by misrepresenting the identity of the visitor
and the purpose of entry.
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confidence or recorded to later share with others.122 The
invasion of privacy is found to be de minimis, especially if
the recording was made in public view in a public place.123
It would be a significant blow to law enforcement if
warrants were required to record conversations between
informants/undercover agents and potential targets. As it
currently stands in the criminal context, the Court in Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966), decided that
[t]he risk of being overheard by an
eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or
deceived as to the identity of one with whom
one deals is probably inherent in the
conditions of human society. It is the kind of
risk we necessarily assume whenever we
speak . . . no right protected by the Fourth

Amendment was violated in the present

case.124
In 1971, the Court affirmed this decision in United
States v. White and has never reverted back to the trespass
theory when revisiting the issue. 125 Comparing the federal
criminal stance to the civil stance on surreptitious
recordings, and taking the state criminal eavesdropping
statutes out of the mix, it is clear that most courts permit
surreptitious recordings in the civil context as long as it
does not rise to the level of an invasion of privacy an act
Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation that the
conversation with the ABC reporter would not be divulged to anyone
else) Id at 465.
123 Id at
466.
124 The Court clarified its decision in Heffa v. United
States, 385 U.S.
293, 303(citing Lopez v. U.S. 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)) that
surreptitious recordings by "false friends" were not a search in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
125White, 401 U.S.
745.
122
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which is highly offensive to the reasonable person.12 The
requirement that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a
reasonable
person"
would
be
a
welcome
addition/supplement to the Katz analysis. Not only would
there need to be an objective and subjective expectation of
privacy, but law enforcement's actions would have to be
highly offensive and objectionable to the ordinary person.
This would make the Katz analysis more difficult to prove,
but it would limit the types of tools and actions that would
be considered a "search" requiring a warrant.
Lastly, third party database searches which are
clearly of concern to Justice Sotomayor are not a concern in
the civil context. Private investigators have access to a
plethora of information while conducting background
checks, financial and insurance fraud investigations,
workers compensation investigations, and asset/property
searches.1 27 The searches range from residential history
searches, area demographics, aliases/date of birth and other
names used, federal litigation searches, motor vehicle
ownership, watercraft ownership, aircraft ownership, real
property ownership, corporation ownership, judgment and
lien search, bankruptcy search, criminal history search,
incarceration history search, employment search, UCC
See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Companies,
Inc.,
306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002). Although the plaintiff argued that he had
a subjective expectation of privacy in Medical Laboratory's
administrative offices, he extended the invitation to the three ABC
representatives who were strangers to him. Id. at 813 His willingness to
invite strangers into the offices for a meeting and tour indicated that he
did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The
plaintiff did not reveal any information about his personal life, but
rather his business operations. Thus, the plaintiff had no expectation of
privacy in the contents of his conversations with ABC representatives.
Id. at 814. Any intrusion by ABC representatives in secretly recording
their meeting with the plaintiff was de minimis and not highly offensive
to a reasonable person. Id. at 819.
126

127

See

CRISPIN

SPECIAL

INVESTIGATIONS,

INC.,

www.crispininvestigations.com (last visited July 30, 2012).
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filings, Internet domain ownership search, driver's licenses,
FAA pilots, professional licenses, voter registration,
concealed
weapons
permits,
relative
searches,
hunting/fishing permits, sexual offender lists, etc.128 The
ability for private parties to retrieve personal information
from other third parties has become relatively easy-if one
pays for the database search.129 As citizens use more
technology and expose themselves to the collection of
additional data, their expectation of privacy decreases.
Therefore, the majority in Jones seems to identify that the
Katz expectation of privacy analysis may soon no longer
apply as citizens' privacy is lost. Technology has become a
double-edged sword. However, if private investigators have
the ability to sort through databases to collect a target's
information, law enforcement should have the same ability.
The third party doctrine that Sotomayor wants to
revisit should remain intact unless Congress intervenes and
decides to enact a consumer "privacy bill of rights."' 30 To
128Id.

Telephone Interview with Robert Crispin, CEO, Crispin Special
Investigations, Inc. Very few records can be accessed by law
enforcement via subpoena during the investigative phase that private
investigators cannot access. Database search companies such as Avent
and AutoTrack sweep millions of public records every day gathering all
sorts of data on private individuals. Bank or financial (ie, money wire
transfer) records, cell phone or cell tower records, and power bill
records are some of the few records private investigators may have
difficulty accessing (unless they conduct a series of trash pulls).
However, once the investigative phase is complete and the defendant is
charged, the defense also has subpoena power and can access those
records as well. Oftentimes, those types of records can be found within
a divorce case file in the public database, and the private investigator
no longer needs any type of subpoena power to access this type of
information.
130 Alexei Alexis, Consumer Protection - Privacy: White House
Releases Report Urging New U.S. Privacy Framework, BLOOMBERG
BNA: THE UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, Feb. 28, 2012 (also found at 80
U.S.L.W. 1164). On February 23, 2012, the Obama administration
requested that Congress pass a privacy plan which would require
129
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the extent that private entities can access, collect and
analyze sensitive third-party database information, then law
enforcement should enjoy similar unfettered access without
being subjected to scrutiny under the third party doctrine.
If some of these investigatory tools that are
currently not considered a "search" soon become a search
under the trespass analysis, this may pose a significant
burden on law enforcement. These types of tools are
utilized in order to develop sufficient probable cause in
order to obtain a warrant. These tools may fall by the
wayside as did thermal imaging devices after the Kyllo
decision.1 3 1 Agents simply did not have sufficient probable
cause before using the device; it was merely an aid to
ensure that the home indeed was a marijuana grow-house
prior to requesting a search warrant.
VI.

Conclusion

The role of trespass took precedence in Jones, a
decision which diminishes, at least temporarily, the
importance of Katz and the expectation of privacy doctrine
for future decisions on what constitutes a violation of our
Fourth Amendment rights. Until the 2 0 th century, the
businesses to be "transparent about their data-collection practices and
giv[e] consumers the right to access and correct their personal
information," "to exercise control over the collection of their personal
data and how it is used," and to have the right "to 'reasonable' limits on
the collection and retention of personal data." Id. at 1. "'While I look
forward to working with President Obama and Secretary Bryson on this
critically important issue, any rush-to-judgment could have a chilling
effect on our economy and potentially damage, if not cripple, online
innovation,' Rep. Mary Bono Mack (R-Calif.), leader of a House
Energy and Commerce subcommittee that oversees privacy issues, said
in a statement issued after the White House unveiled its report." Id. at
3.
13' Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (holding that thermal imaging is an unlawful
search as it could leave the homewowner at the mercy of advanced
technology that could discern all human acitivities in the homes).
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trespass doctrine was sufficient to determine what
constituted an unlawful search and seizure, an invasion of
our privacy. With the advance of technology, it became
clear that "an actual trespass is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation."' 32 The
Katz decision introduced the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine which supplemented the trespass doctrine.
The Supreme Court's decision on Jones upheld the D.C.
Circuit finding that an attachment of a GPS device to the
defendant's vehicle to monitor the vehicle's movements,
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment on
different grounds. Since the Jones decision was so
narrowly focused on one singular issue, future controversial
cases involving law enforcement use of technology to
monitoring citizens where trespass is not present remain
unresolved. The potential for new intrusions of privacy
absent trespass was a controversy addressed by Congress
when it enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, a comprehensive
guide to wiretapping.133
Going forward in the post-Jones era, it is highly
probable to foresee the outcome when both a trespass and a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy is triggered. It is
also highly probable to predict the outcome when a trespass
does not occur but a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy is triggered. What is most difficult to predict is the
scenario in which a trespass occurs but a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy is not triggered. Will the
open fields doctrine suffer the same fate as tracking
devices? And in the scenario in which a trespass does not
occur but a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is
triggered, will, in time, the Court surrender to the idea that
citizens are giving up their expectation of privacy in the
digital age or will the Court fight this uphill battle and
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J. concurring) (quoting United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)).
133 Id. at 963 (Alito, J. concurring).
132
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strike down the third party doctrine? As suggested by
Justice Alito in his concurrence on Jones, the difficulties
inherent in applying the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21" century
surveillance technique is problematic, and possibly best left
to Congress which has the authority to write legislation on
the topic.134
Hopefully, either the Court or Congress will also
utilize the well-developed civil case law concerning
trespass and invasion of privacy in the civil context as it
pertains to private investigators, and close the gap between
civil and criminal laws and the limitations placed on the
actions of law enforcement and private investigators. The
United States and its court system strive to uphold the
rights of individuals but not at the expense of the republic.
We strive for Lorenzetti's utopia, a city that is wellgoverned, orderly, bright, calm, joyful, hard-working, and
safe - balancing law and order with civil liberties.
Lorenzetti's depiction of a failed government wherein
Tyranny defeats Lady Justice and the "Common Good" is
allegorical and emblematic of this eternal struggle for
balance. Finding the right balance between societal order
and an individual's right to privacy is obviously difficult.
When we sacrifice some of our privacy rights, we hope we
are doing so for the "Common Good."

134

Id. at 958, 964 (Alito, J. concurring).
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ARTICLE
PRECEDENT, FAIRNESS, AND COMMON SENSE DICTATE
THAT PADILLA V. KENTUCKY SHOULD APPLY
RETROACTIVELY

William N. Conlow*
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Padilla v. Kentucky. The Padilla Court's holding
was thatfailure of counsel to advise a non-citizen criminal
defendant about the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. This
article addresses whether Padilla applies to convictions
that occurredbefore Padillawas decided, in March 2010.
First, this article provides background on relevant
immigration law, Padilla v. Kentucky, and the Supreme
Court's retroactivity case law. Then, this article considers
how lower courts have addressed the issue of retroactivity
in the approximately twenty-seven months after the Padilla
decision. This article also provides in-depth analysis of
circuit courts and state supreme courts which have
addressed the retroactivity issue. This article then critically
analyzes the common argumentsfor and against applying
Padilla retroactively. Finally, this article proposes that
Padilla apply to all non-citizens who have been deported as
a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
On April 30, 2012, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide the issue this article discusses.
Rutgers University School of Law-Camden, J.D. expected 2013.
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School of Law-Camden. May it survive the sometimes-ugly
machinations of New Jersey politics.
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Although "confused and confusing," the Supreme Court's
retroactivity case law supports a finding that Padilla
applies retroactively. Similarly, fairness dictates that noncitizens who have received ineffective assistance of counsel,
and been deported as a result, should be afforded a
remedy. Common sense also dictates that Padilla applies
retroactively. A plain reading of the Padilla case clearly
imagines the retroactive effect of the Padilla holding.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's application of the Padilla
rule to Jose Padilla was, in every sense, similar to those
who would benefit from Padillabeing retroactive.For these
reasons,precedent,fairness and common sense dictate that
Padilla should apply retroactively.
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I.

Introduction

In 2010, the Supreme Court handed down the
landmark decision of Padilla v. Kentucky.' Padilla held
that criminal defense attorneys have an affirmative
obligation to advise their clients about immigration
consequences of a plea bargain. The promise of Padilla is
great: to provide a remedy for the injustice that occurs
when an attorney falsely tells a non-citizen that he will not
be deported as a result of a guilty plea. For the many noncitizens that have been deported after receiving ineffective
assistance of counsel, successfully challenging a plea
bargain may mean that they can return to their families in
the United States. 2 However, courts have found ways of
circumventing Padilla. For example, "one unanswered
question left in Padilla'swake[,] that could have the effect
of seriously circumscribing the protection that Padilla
provides," 3 is whether Padillaapplies retroactively or not.
This article addresses whether Padillaapplies
retroactively-in other words, to cases that are brought
based on convictions that occurred before Padilla was
decided, in March 2010.4 On April 30, 2012, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide this issue.' If Padilla
' 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
2 Determining the number of people who could potentially
bring
Padilla claims is extremely difficult. But, data suggests that Padilla
will reach a large number of non-citizens. For example, "More than
128,000 noncitizens with criminal convictions were deported in 2009
[alone, and a]pproximately 95,000 noncitizens were incarcerated in
state and federal prisons and jails as of June 30, 2009." Gary Proctor
and Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla's Puzzles for Review in State and
Federal Courts, Fed. Sentencing Rep., Vol. 23, No. 3, 239, 239 (Vera
Inst. of Justice, Feb. 2011) (citation omitted).
Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy
Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims,
121 YALE L.J. 944, 947 (2012).
4Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473.
5Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
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does not apply retroactively, then the constitutional holding
of Padilla v. Kentucky applies to the pre-2010 conviction of
only one individual-Jose Padilla. 6 This article argues that
precedent, fairness and common sense dictate that Padilla
should apply "retroactively" to all non-citizens that can
show ineffective assistance of counsel.
This article will proceed in six sections. Following
this introductory section, the second and third sections will
briefly discuss relevant immigration law and "retroactivity"
case law, respectively. The fourth section discusses how
courts have decided the issue of Padilla'sretroactivity and
analyzes the bases of those decisions. The fifth section of
this article argues that courts have, generally, ignored the
fact that governing case law, fundamental fairness and
common sense dictate that Padilla should apply
retroactively to all cases on collateral review. Finally, the
sixth and last section concludes by summarizing why
Padillashould apply retroactively.
II.

Background - Immigration Law

Criminal law and immigration law, once separate
entities, now overlap in many areas. One scholar has called
the overlapping areas of criminal law and immigration law
the "crimmigration system. The history of the American
"crimmigration system" has been defined by an
"increasingly harsh treatment of criminals [which] is

6 Arguably, the Supreme Court has applied the rule of Padillaa second
time. See infra p. 25.
7Andrew Moore, CriminalDeportation, Post-conviction Relief and the
Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 667 (2008); see
also Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to DeportationCounsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1467 (2011) (calling the Padilla
decision a "recognition of the convergence between the deportation and
criminal systems").
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mirrored in the increasingly harsh treatment of non-citizens
in the United States." 8
The starting point for how immigration law
informed the result in Padilla-andthe effect that it has on
our retroactivity analysis-is the Padilla decision itself.
The Court found that over the last century there has been a
"steady expansion of deportable offenses."9 The Court also
noted that, in 1990, Congress eliminated the "judicial
("JRAD")
against
deportation"
recommendation
procedure, 0 which had previously given judges the
discretion to determine whether deportation was warranted
"on a case-by-case basis."''
The Justices who decided Padillaseem to be in
agreement that immigration law is "complex,"' 2 and that
there are "numerous situations in which the deportation
consequences of a plea are unclear." 3 Whether an offense
is deportable is often dictated by abstruse subcategories of
federal law. Further complications exist because it is often
difficult to determine whether a state law offense qualifies
under one of these subcategories.14 Therefore, when a non8 Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-conviction Relief and the

Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 667 (2008). Of
particular important in this article is the fact that, "[I]n the 1980s and
1990s, [Congress] dramatically expanded the scope of criminal
deportation grounds and, consequently, greatly expanded the number of
non-citizens deported for criminal offenses." Id. at 670.
9 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
10
Id.
" Id. at 1479.
12Id. at 1483.
13 Id. at 1477; see also, id. at 1490 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that
making "the determination whether immigration law . . . makes a

particular offense removable" is often difficult).
14 "Legal counsel, [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] attorneys,
and immigration judges must determine whether the criminal
conviction, often a state crime, qualifies as a deportable offense . . .
[and t]his analysis often requires the mastery of both criminal and
immigration law." Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?:
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citizen is convicted of a state-level offense it "raise[s] the
challenge of determining [if that] state criminal conviction
fits under a federal category that" requires deportation.15
Adding to the uneven application of the law, the
Constitution does not generally apply to non-citizens;' 6
however, recent Supreme Court decisions, such as Padilla,
have challenged this principle.
In the mid-nineties, Congress greatly expanded the
number of crimes that resulted in deportation. The result
of these changes is that "non-violent offenders with minor
criminal histories are often deported."' 8 Further, federal
Recent JudicialActions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L.
REV. CIRCUIT 1, 3 (2011).
15 Andrew

Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-conviction Relief and
the Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 672 (2008).
16 Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to

Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?,45 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 305, 311 (2011) ("If you think defending the rights of criminal
defendants is difficult (and it surely is), try working without a

constitution for a while-that is what a lot of immigration law is[.]").
7 Put differently, Congress made lesser and non-violent crimes much
more likely to result in deportation. "Harsh 1996 laws known by their
acronyms-AEDPA and IIRIRA-reflected a rather broad-brush crime
control justification for deportation and radically changed and
expanded the system." Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation
Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the
Fifth-and-a-half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1477 (2011).
"[T]he
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
[("AEDPA")]... expanded the aggravated felony category[, a provision
that requires mandatory deportation,] to include crimes such as
gambling and bribery." Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the
Punishment?: Recent Judicial Actions Expanding the Rights of
Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 1, 6 (2011). "[With the] 1996 law,
the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
[("IIRIRA")], Congress further broadened the definition of aggravated
felony to include drug offenses, thefts, burglaries, and crimes of
violence." Id.
' Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial
Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
1, 20 (2011).

51

9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 52
policymakers and law enforcement officials have
increasingly viewed the issue of immigration in the context
of national security. 19 The "U.S. Department of Homeland
Security [now] controls most of the [immigration] system
through its subagencies[.]" 20 Also, "Counterintuitively,
immigration judges are employees of the Attorney General,
not the judicial branch." 2 1 Further, immigration laws,
including those "that govern mandatory deportation," do
not weigh aggravating or mitigating factors, such as how
long a non-citizen has lived in the United States, or whether
the non-citizen has family ties in the United States. 2 2
Broadly, immigration policy places great weight on
familial relationships. 3 Therefore, when the adjudications
of criminal cases affect families, it is appropriate for courts
to consider the effect upon families. The Padilla Court
itself found that the "impact of deportation on families
living lawfully in this country" weighed in favor of the rule
that criminal defense attorneys must provide proper advice

19For example, "During the 1996 debate on the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act . . . some members of Congress equated

noncitizens with terrorist aliens." Id. at 6. In addition, the enforcement
of immigration laws has become the prerogative of the Department of
Homeland Security, where its "personnel.. .investigate and detain noncitizens charged with being deportable

. . . and represent the

government in the deportation process before the immigration courts."
Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-conviction Relief and the
Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 671 (2008).
20 Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2011).
21Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial
Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
1, 14 (2011).
22
Id. at 2.
23 See Bridgette A. Carr, IncorporatingA "Best Interests of the Child"
Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEv. L.J. 120 (2009) (discussing the relationship between familial
relationships and immigration law).
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about the immigration consequences of a plea. 24 The
immigration system, in its current form, "operates like a
blunt instrument, and in the process wreaks havoc on the
lives of noncitizens and their children, spouses, and
parents."2 5
It follows logically that if the effect of a criminal
sanction on families weighs in favor of the creation of the
rule announced in Padilla, then it also weighs in favor of
applying that rule retroactively. Families of criminal
defendants will be no less harmed by deportations of their
family members that resulted from plea agreements before
Padilla than they will by deportations of their family
members that occurred after Padilla. In fact, families are
more likely to be harmed by pre-Padillapleas, to the extent
that non-citizens are more likely to have lived in the United
States for longer and established deeper roots.
III.

Background - Padillav. Kentucky, and
Governing Case Law

Padilla v. Kentucky was a landmark decision.2 6

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010); see also
McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic
Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond
Deportation, 54 HOw. L.J. 795, 823 (2011) (finding that "[a]ny
24

analysis of the severity of a penalty . . . properly encompasses the

impact both on clients and their families").
25 Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial
Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
1, 20-21 (2011).
26 See Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea
Colloquy Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring Successful Padilla
Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 947 (2012) (calling Padilla a "landmark

decision[]"); see also McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to
"Integral": The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its
Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795, 798
(2011) (calling Padilla a "seismic event").
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Padillaheld that non-citizens who have been deported as a
result of a guilty plea where they received incorrect advice
about the deportation consequences of their plea can attack
their plea under the existing standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel27_i e. Strickland v. Washington.28
Those bringing "Padillaclaims" 29 are not challenging their
deportation. In fact, even a successful Padilla claim may
still result in the original charges being re-filed.3 0 In
addition, to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Strickland's "high bar" must be surmounted.
Prior to Padilla, a deported non-citizen had no
recourse if he relied on his lawyer's false counsel that he
would not be deported as a result of his plea bargain.

Padilla was a 7-2 decision. Justice Alito, in concurrence, did not join
the Court's opinion on the crucial issue of whether Padilla would
extend to conduct beyond affirmative misadvice. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at
1490 (Alito, J., concurring) ("I therefore cannot agree with the Court's
apparent view that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense
attorneys to provide immigration advice.").
28 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29 This article uses the term "Padilla claims" throughout
as shorthand
for a person who brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under Padilla. See, e.g., Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring
Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944 (2012). Relatedly, this
article uses the term "petitioner" to refer to the individual bringing the
Padillaclaim, unless doing so would be confusing or misleading.
30 It is important to note that all Padilla claims are challenging plea
bargains, which, by definition, contain a bargained-for benefit for the
petitioner. In other words, one possible criticism of Padilla is that it
opens the door for non-citizen defendants who would likely not have
benefited from going to trial to argue that they would have gone to trial
if they had been properly advised about the immigration consequences
of their plea. However, as the Court noted, "There is no reason to doubt
that lower courts-now quite experienced with applying Stricklandcan effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate specious
claims from those with substantial merit." Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
31 "Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Id. at
1485.
27
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Padilla came down in March, 2010.32 Some courts have
held that Padilla does not apply retroactively-that is, to
guilty3pleas3 that occurred before that date.34 in Teague .
Lane, the Supreme Court explained when rules of
constitutional procedure apply retroactively: "new rules"
generally do not apply retroactively, to a case on collateral
review;36 'old rules," which merely announce what a rule
has always been, always apply retroactively to cases on
both direct and collateral review. 37
Id. at 1473.
33 Padilla only applies to criminal defendants who enter into a plea
bargain. If a criminal defendant goes to trial and loses, then he could
not have suffered prejudice under Strickland, because the resultdeportation-would have been the same whether or not he had received
effective assistance of counsel. See e.g. Maxwell v. United States,
CIV.A. JKB-l1-3190, 2011 WL 5870041, slip op. at 3 (D. Md. Nov.
21, 2011) (holding that "relief under a Sixth Amendment
analysis.. .does not apply to [Petitioner's] case... [because u]nlike the
defendant in Padilla, [the Petitioner] did not plead guilty; thus, his trial
counsel was not remiss in failing to tell him a guilty plea could result in
his deportation").
34 The Padilla Court did not state explicitly whether their holding
would apply retroactively. 130 S. Ct. at 1473.
3 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
36 Id. at 307 (plurality opinion) (holding that, for new rules, the
"general rule [is] nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review").
n Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) ("Under the Teague
framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but
a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct
review."). It is axiomatic that old rules apply "retroactively." If a case
does not announce a new rule, there is no need for the court to
"announce" what the old rule is or state that the case is an "old rule."
Therefore, when courts are analyzing whether a case applies
retroactively they usually say that the case is an application of an old
rule to a new set of facts, as opposed to referring to the case as simply
an "old rule." See Marroquin v. United States, CIV.A. M-10-156, 2011
WL 488985 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2011) (stating that "a majority of courts
have found that Padilla is simply the application of an old rule"); but
see Song v. United States, CV 09-5184 DOC, 2011 WL 2940316, slip
op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011) (concluding "that Padilla set forth on
[sic] 'old rule"').
32
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The "old rules" category includes when "a wellestablished rule of law [is applied] in a new way based on
the specific facts of a particular case." 38 However, the fact
that a case was "not dictated by precedent," weighs in favor
of finding that a case announces a new rule. 39 Some courts
have mistakenly found that a case was 'not dictated by
precedent' if 'reasonable jurists' could have disagreed with
the result of the case that announced or applied the rule.4 0
The Supreme Court, however, stated that "the unlawfulness
of [the petitioner's] conviction [being] apparent to all
reasonable jurists" 4 1 weighs in favor of retroactivity, not
whether all reasonable jurists would agree with the result of
an appellate decision announcing the rule of constitutional
42
criminal procedure.
Courts debating retroactivity have reached different
conclusions based on their interpretation of the above
language. Every court that has held that Padilla applies
retroactively, and stated how it reached that conclusion,
found that Padilla was not "new." 43 While courts'
United States v. Hubenig, 6:03-MJ 11-040, 2010 WL 2650625, slip
op. at 5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,
228-29 (1992)).
39 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) (finding that "a case
announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final").
40 See infra pp. 26-27 (noting that courts have placed undue weight on
the split among the Justices in Padilla).
41 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997) (emphasis
added).
42 This is a technical distinction; however, it is important to note that
regardless of whether Padilla is applied retroactively, those who have
valid Padilla claims nonetheless suffered a constitutional violationand, therefore, their conviction was unlawful. See cases cited infra note
47. The only issue, then, that 'reasonable jurists' can debate, is whether
their unlawful conviction can be remedied.
43 There are two instances when a "new rule" will apply retroactively:
1) when the rule "places certain kinds of primary private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe"; and 2) if the rule's existence is "implicit in the concept of
38
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decisions have turned on their interpretations of Supreme
Court precedent, critical language has gone largely
overlooked. For example, the Teague Court admonished
that:
We [will] simply refuse to announce a new
rule in a given case unless the rule would be
applied retroactively to the defendant in the
case and to all others similarly situated ...
We think this approach is a sound one. Not
only does it eliminate any problems of
rendering advisory opinions, it also avoids
the inequity resulting from the uneven
application of new rules to similarly situated
defendants. We therefore hold that, implicit
in the retroactivity approach we adopt today,
is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be
used as a vehicle to create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure
unless those rules would be applied
retroactively to all defendants on collateral
review through one of the two exceptions
we have articulated.4 4

ordered liberty." Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion) (internal
citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, no
court has held that Padilla fits into either of these exceptions. See
Mudahinyuka v. United States, 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, slip op.
at 4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) ("This court is not aware of any decision by
a state or federal court holding that the Supreme Court recognized a
new right in Padilla that is also retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.") In other words, the basis for applying Padilla
retroactively or not has always turned on the old rule/new rule
distinction.
44 Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (plurality opinion).
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This language, and, more importantly, the
underlying declaration, has largely been ignored by courts
in deciding whether Padilla applies retroactively. 45
The Supreme Court itself has noted that the case
law governing retroactivity is "confused and confusing." 46
One possible source of the confusion is that retroactivity is
a "misnomer."4 7 In other words, as one court put it, "those
Research for this article uncovered only one reported decision which
attributes significance to the Supreme Court's self-proscription against
creating new rules that do not apply to all defendants on collateral
review. See Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL
3793691, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011) ("[W]hen a case is on
collateral review and the holding sought by the defendant would
announce a new rule that does not fit a Teague exception, the Supreme
Court will refuse to apply or announce the rule in that case. Padilla
was before the Supreme Court on collateral review and the Supreme
Court's holding (rule) was applied to Padilla. ") (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
46 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
4
Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, slip op. at 5
(referring to "retroactivity" as a "misnomer"); see also Danforth v.
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008)

45

(Not[ing] at the outset that the very word
'retroactivity' is misleading because it speaks in
temporal terms. 'Retroactivity' suggests that when
we declare that a new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure is 'nonretroactive,' we are implying that
the right at issue was not in existence prior to the date
the 'new rule' was announced. But this is incorrect.
As we have already explained, the source of a 'new
rule' is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power
to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the
our
pre-exists
right
necessarily
underlying
articulation of the new rule. What we are actually
determining when we assess the 'retroactivity' of a
new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly
announced right, but whether a violation of the right
that occurred prior to the announcement of the new
rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief
sought.)
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who suffered violations of constitutional rules of criminal
procedure that were articulated after their convictions
became final, nevertheless, suffered constitutional
violations. Therefore, the term 'retroactive' is a misnomer
because the question is really one of 'redressability."' 4 8
Perhaps because of the admittedly difficult nature of
applying retroactivity case law, courts have varied widely
in their retroactivity analysis. The result has been an
inconsistent approach-both in terms of what statements of
the Supreme Court lower courts have deemed are
controlling, and in the results those lower courts have
ultimately reached.
IV.

Analyses of Courts' Decisions on Padilla's
retroactivity

A.

Lower Courts

Whether Padilla'sholding applies retroactively is a
"hot" topic in both federal and state courts. In the twentyseven months since Padilla was decided, more than fifty
courts have reached definitive conclusions regarding
whether Padilla applies retroactively. 49 Four circuit courts

Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, slip op. at 5. While
the author of this article agrees with this court's analysis, the term
"retroactive" is still used throughout this article in conformity with the
language of the Supreme Court. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future
of Teague Retroactivity, or "Redressability," After Danforth v.
Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New
Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction
Proceedings, 46 AM. CRtM. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (2009) (discussing the
Supreme Court's use of the terms 'retroactivity' and 'redressabiltiy').
49 This includes all reported decisions that have reached a substantive
conclusion regarding Padilla's retroactive application, including
opinions that were later abrogated by a different case. Opinions that
relegate discussion of retroactivity to a footnote, or otherwise mention
the issue only briefly, were not counted. Unpublished opinions, and
48
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have directly addressed the issue, with the Third Circuit5 o
answerinp the retroactivity question affirmatively, and the
Seventh,
Tenth,52 and Fifth 53 Circuits reaching the
opposite conclusion. Arguably, other circuits have
addressed the issue-but only fleetingly, 54 or by
55
implication.
Among federal district courts that have considered
the issue, courts in California, 56 Georgia,57 Illinois, 58
Minnesota,59 MiSSissippi,60 Ohio, 6 1 and Texas62 have found
opinions that apply binding precedent, are not discussed in this article
unless they are particularly illuminating on some relevant issue of law.
50 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir.
2011).
51Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
52 United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763 (10th
Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011).
5 United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 211 (2012).
54 United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 404 Fed.Appx. 714, 716 n.1
(4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (stating that "nothing in the Padilla
decision
indicates
that
it
is
retroactively
applicable
to cases on collateral review").
5 Arguably, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have applied Padilla
retroactively without explicitly stating so. In an unpublished opinion,
on remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit stated: "[w]e find
that Padillahas abrogated our holding in Santos-Sanchez. We therefore
vacate the district court's denial of Santos-Sanchez's petition for a writ
of coram nobis and remand to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with Padilla." Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 381 F.
App'x 419, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Therefore, because the Fifth Circuit applied Padilla retroactively in
Santos-Sanchez, it could be argued that, in the Fifth Circuit, Padilla
applies retroactively by implication. Similarly, a California district
court argued that the Ninth Circuit applied Padilla retroactively in
another case. United States v. Krboyan, 1:02-CR-05438 OWW, 2011
WL 2117023, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) ("Based on the
Ninth Circuit's retroactive application of Padilla in [United States v.]
Bonilla, [637 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 2011)], Padilla applies
retroactively to Petitioner's writ of error coram nobis.").
56 Four district courts in California have found that Padilla applies
retroactively. See Jiminez v. Holder, 10-CV-1528-JAH NLS, 2011 WL
3667628, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); Luna v. United States,
IOCV 1659 JLS POR, 2010 WL 4868062, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
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that Padilla applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review. Similarly, state courts in Illinois, 63 Maryland, 64
Massachusetts, 65 Michigan, 66 Minnesota, 67 New York, 68
and Texas 69 have reached the conclusion that Padilla
applies retroactively. Among the courts that reached the
opposite conclusion, that Padilla does not apply

23, 2010); United States v. Hubenig, 6:03-MJ-040, 2010 WL 2650625,
slip op. at 7 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); United States v. Krboyan, 1:02CR-05438 OWW, slip op. at 9.
5 See United States v. Chong, CR 101-078, 2011 WL 6046905, slip op.
at 2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2011).
58 See United States v.
Diaz-Palmerin, 08-CR-777-3, 2011 WL
1337326, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2011).
59 See United States v. Dass, CRIM. 05-140 (3) JRT, 2011 WL
2746181, slip op. at 5 (D. Minn. July 14, 2011)
6 See Amer v. United States, 1:06CRI 18-GHD, 2011 WL 2160553,
slip op. at 3 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011)
61 See United States v. Reid, 1:97-CR-94, 2011 WL 3417235, slip op. at
3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2011).
62 See Guadarrama-Melo v. United States, 1:08-CV-588, 2011 WL
2433619, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2011); Marroquin v. United
States, CIV.A. M-10-156, 2011 WL 488985, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 4, 2011); McNeill v. United States, No. A-1 1-CA-495 SS A-I ICA-495 SS, 2012 WL 369471, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012)
Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL 3793691, slip
op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011); Zapata-Banda v. United States,
CIV. B:10-256, 2011 WL 1113586, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7,
2011).
63 See People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011).
6 See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 928 (Md. 2011).
65 See Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass.
2011).
66 See People v. Abbas, 794 N.W.2d 617, 617 (Mich.
2011).
67 See Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2011).
68 See People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, slip op.
at 4 (Crim. Ct.
2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, slip op. at 7 (Sup. Ct.
2010); People v. Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d 806, slip op. at 3 (App. Term
2010).
69 See Ex parte De Los Reyes, 350 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App. 2011);
see also Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722,
slip op. at 7 (Tex. App. May 26, 2011).
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retroactively, are federal courts in Alabama,70
California,n
7
72
73
the District of Columbia,
Florida,
Georgia,74
Maryland, 75 Michigan, 76 New Jersey, 7778New York, Rhode
Island, 79 South Carolina, 80 and Virginia, 8 1 and state courts

See Emojevwe v. United States, 1:10CV229-MEF, 2011 WL
5118800, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2011).
71 See United States v. Cervantes-Martinez, 10CR4776 JM, 2011 WL
4434861, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011).
72 See Ufele v. United States, CRIM. 86-143 RCL, 2011 WL 5830608,
slip op. at 3. (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2011).
7 See United States v. Garcia, 2:88-CR-31-FTM-29DNF, 2011 WL
5024628, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2011); Llanes v. United
States, 8:11-CV-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, slip op. at 2 (M.D.
Fla. June 22, 2011); United States v. Macedo, 1:03-CR-00055-MP-AK,
2010 WL 5174342, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2010).
74 See United States v. Chapa, 800 F.Supp. 2d 1216, 1225 (N.D. Ga.
2011).
7 See Zoa v. United States, CIV. PJM 10-2823, 2011 WL 3417116,
slip op. at 2 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2011).
76 See United States v. Shafeek, CRIM. 05-81129, 2010 WL 3789747
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010). See infra note 98 (discussing the Shafeek
opinion).
n See United States v. Gilbert, 2:03-CR-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL
4134286, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010);United States v. Hough,
2:02-CR-00649-WJM-1, 2010 WL 5250996, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Dec.
17, 2010).
78 See Ellis v. United States, 806 F.Supp.2d 538, 550 (E.D.N.Y. June 3,
2011).
7 See United States v. Agoro, CR 90-102 ML, 2011 WL 6029888, slip
op. at 7 (D.R.I. Nov. 16, 2011).
80 See Dennis v. United States, 787 F.Supp. 2d 425, 430 (D.S.C. 2011).
8' See Doan v. United States, 760 F.Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va. 2011);
Mendoza v. United States, 774 F.Supp. 2d 791, 798 (E.D. Va. 2011).
70
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4 Michigan,
in Arizona, 82 Florida, 83 Maryland,88485
New
86
8
York, and North Carolina.
Among courts that discussed Padilla'sretroactivity,
both the quality and quantity of analysis varies greatly. For
example, some courts have summarily stated that Padilla
does not apply retroactively, without stating a basis for that
conclusion." Additionally, many courts have noted the
issue, but decided the case without reaching it. For
example, many courts considering a collateral attack on a
guilty plea under Padilla, have found that, even assuming
Padilla applies retroactively, the petitioner could not
surmount Strickland's "high bar" 89 to show ineffective
assistance of counsel. 90

See State v. Poblete, 260 P.3d 1102, 1106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
See Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); Smith v. State, 85 So.3d 551, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012);
State v. Shaikh, 65 So.3d 539, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
84 See Miller v. State, 196 Md. App. 658, 677 (2010).
85 See People v. Gomez, 295 Mich.App. 411, 411 (2012).
86 See People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, slip op. at 4
(Crim. Ct.
2010); see also infra note 159 (discussing Kabre).
87 See State v. Alshaif, 724 S.E.2d 597, 604 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012).
88 For example, one court simply stated that "the 2010 Padilla
decision
does not apply retroactively[,]" without providing any basis for that
conclusion. United States v. Cervantes-Martinez 10CR4776 JM, 2011
WL 4434861, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011).
89 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (noting that
"[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task").
90 See, e.g., Masterman v. United States, 1:96-CR-05306-OWW, 2010
WL 4366156, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) (finding that even
"[a]ssuming arguendo that Padilla applies retroactively and thus that
Petitioner's claim is timely under section 2255(f)(3), Petitioner's claim
lacks merit") (emphasis in original); Trujillo v. State, 71AO3-l102-PC73, 2011 WL 5909637, slip op. at 6 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2011)
("assum[ing] for the sake of argument, but explicitly []not decid[ing],
that the case announcing th[e] rule, i.e., Padilla v. Kentucky, applies
retroactively to the instant case[, the court determined that it] need not
address these matters because [it could] resolve this issue on grounds of
lack of a showing of prejudice") (citation omitted).
82
83
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A number of courts have also considered whether
Padilla applies retroactively to federal habeas corpus
petitions. To find that Padillaapplies retroactively in this
context, courts would be required to make the potentially
contradictory determinations that Padilla is "newly
recognized" under federal habeas corpus law92 but not a
"new rule" under Teague.9 3 Put differently, these courts are
not giving consideration to whether Padilla is the
application of an "old rule" for Teague purposes. 94
Unsurprisingly, courts that have assumed that
Padilla is "new" for Teague purposes have determined that
Padilla does not apply retroactively 95 to cases on collateral

91
92

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008).
See id. at § 2255(f)(3) (extending the 1-year statute of limitations in

federal habeas corpus petitions when "the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review") (emphasis added).
See United States v. Estrada-Perez, CRIM. 02-403(3) DSD, 2011 WL
2965249, slip op. at n.l (D. Minn. July 22, 2011) (stating that "[i]f
Padilla did not announce a new rule, then it would be illogical to find a
right 'newly recognized' in March 2010[, when Padillawas decided]");
Asif v. Comm'r of Correction, 32 A.3d 967, 969 (2011) (stating "we
find somewhat inconsistent the petitioner's argument that Padilla
represents a new fact but does not set forth a new rule").
94 Often, these courts will say "assuming arguendo" or "assuming for
Petitioner's benefit" that Padilla is new, it does not apply retroactively.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 1:10-CV-23718-WKW, 2011 WL
3419614, slip op. at 6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2011) ("Assuming for Ms.
Rodriguez's benefit that the Padilla decision in fact announced a 'new
rule,' Ms. Rodriguez must show that the right announced in Padilla
was made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[.]")
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
95 As noted previously, the term "retroactivity" is a misnomer. See
supra, p. 10. Its definition becomes even more abstruse when courts are
applying a specific case to federal habeas petitions. Courts are, in
effect, considering retroactivity under two separate and distinct areas of
the law-federal statutory law governing habeas petitions and the
"constitutional rule" case law under Teague and its progeny.
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review.96 In other words, these courts-regardless of
whether they explicitly say so-are not analyzing whether
Padilla applies retroactively under Supreme Court
precedent, but, rather, whether Padilla's holding is
retroactive under a specific statutory provision. 97 In certain
instances, the language of a court's opinion makes it
unclear whether they are considering Padilla's potential
retroactivity under Supreme Court precedent or federal
law. 98
Under Teague, there are two narrow instances where a new rule of
constitutional criminal procedure can apply retroactively. See supra
note 43 (discussing the circumstances by which a "new" rule of
constitutional criminal procedure can apply retroactively). Cf
Mudahinyuka v. United States, 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, slip op.
at 4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) ("This court is not aware of any decision by
a state or federal court holding that the Supreme Court recognized a
new right in Padilla that is also retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.") and Haddad v. United States, CIV. 07-12540, 2010
WL 2884645, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2010) (assuming that
Padillais a new rule, and finding that "it is unlikely that Padillawill be
made retroactive to convictions under collateral attack") with
Masterman v. United States, 1:96-CR-05306-OWW, 2010 WL
4366156, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) (citing authority for the
court's proposition that "Padilla applies retroactively [under]
2255(f)(3)," but ultimately finding that Padilla was not retroactive to
the instant case because Strickland's high bar could not be
surmounted).
97 It Still may be possible that Padilla is a "newly recognized" rule
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), but not a "new rule" under Teague. In
that case, it would apply retroactively to habeas corpus petitions.
However, no court has yet reached this conclusion explicitly. Cf
Carrasco v. United States, EP-ll-CV-161-DB, 2011 WL 1743318, slip
op. at 3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2011) (assuming that Padilla applies
retroactively and still considering a 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) motion, but
ultimately concluding that the motion was untimely).
98 For example, in United States v. Shafeek, it is unclear whether the
court it is determining Padilla'spotential retroactivity under Supreme
Court precedent (e.g. Teague) or habeas corpus law. CRIM. 05-81129,
2010 WL 3789747 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010). To be sure, the
petitioner in that case is proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the
court is specifically considering "whether the Padilla decision was
96
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The above information shows that state courts are
more likely than federal courts to determine that Padilla
applies retroactively. The fact that federal courts are less
likely to find that Padilla applies retroactively is
unsurprising, considering that federal habeas law has a
strict statute of limitations. 99 By contrast, state courts are
able to conduct their own retroactivity analysis under their
state constitution; 00 moreover, there are a number of
reasons why a state court would prefer to resolve the
retroactivity issue under its state constitution.' 01
meant to be applied retroactively" under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Id. at
2. Still, however, the court's retroactivity analysis mentions only how
to apply Teague. Id. The court's ultimate conclusion is that "[b]ecause
the Padillaopinion may not be considered a 'new rule,' Shafeek cannot
show that the Padilla opinion should be applied retroactively." Id. at 3.
The court's conclusion, to the extent that it says that opinions that are
not "new rules" cannot be applied retroactively, gets a crucial portion
of Teague backwards. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (holding that "new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be [retroactive] to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced") (emphasis added). But cf
United States v. Bacchus, CR 93-083S, 2010 WL 5571730, slip op. at I
(D.R.I. Dec. 8, 2010) (calling the Shafeek opinion, "a well-reasoned
decision, [which] concluded that the Supreme Court did not announce a
'new rule' in Padillaand that retroactive application was not warranted
under Teague v. Lane").
99 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (one-year statute of limitations).
10 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008) ("States that
give broader retroactive effect to this Court's new rules of criminal
procedure do not do so by misconstruing the federal Teague standard.
Rather, they have developed state law to govern retroactivity in state
postconviction proceedings.") (emphasis in original).
o'0For example: 1) if the issue of retroactivity is being raised pursuant
to a state case (see e.g. State v. Gaitan, 206 N.J. 330 (2011) (accepting
certiorari from State v. Gaitan, 419 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011) to
decide whether State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009), applies
retroactively)); 2) a state may have its own-possibly more favorablecase law regarding the retroactivity of constitutional rules of criminal
procedures (see e.g. State v. Bonilla, 957 N.E.2d 682, 682 n.2 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011) ("We need not address the retroactive application of
Padilla, as its holding was consistent with Indiana decisions that
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Because cases on this issue are coming out so
quickly, and because of the confusion over how to apply
Teague, it is difficult to determine whether retroactive
application is the majority position. Consequently, courts
that have determined what the majority position is, have,
unsurprisingly, found that their position is that of the
majority.o Although the total number of courts that favor
retroactivity is important, the opinions of appellate courts
carry more weight because they create binding precedent in
a larger number of jurisdictions.
B.

Circuit Court and State Supreme Court
Opinions

1.

Third Circuit

In United States v. Orocio,103 the Third Circuit,
applying Teague, held that Padilla applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review. The Third Circuit was the first
circuit to address the issue. 104 Like every other court that
predated Padilla[J")); and 3) precedent (such as an unfavorable
appellate decision) may preclude a state court from finding retroactivity
under federal law.
102 Cf Marroquin v. United States, CIV.A. M-10-156, 2011 WL
488985, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2011) (finding that "a majority
of courts have found that Padilla is simply the application of an old
rule, concluding that Padilla' s holding applies retroactively") with
United States v. Abraham, 8:09CR126, 2011 WL 3882290, slip op. at 2
(D. Neb. Sept. 1, 2011) ("The weight of authority appears to favor
nonretroactivity."); see also United States v. Agoro. CR 90-102 ML,
2011 WL 6029888, slip op. at 6 (D.R.I. Nov. 16, 2011) (noting the
disagreement over what the majority position is).
103 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011).
'0 Orocio was decided on June 29, 2011. Id. The Seventh, Tenth, and
Fifth Circuit opinions were decided on Aug. 23, 2011; August 30,
2011; and May 9, 2012, respectively. Chaidez v. United States, 655
F.3d 684, 684 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chang Hong, 10-6294,
2011 WL 3805763 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); United States v. Amer
681 F.3d 211, 211 (2012).
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has reached the conclusion that Padilla applies
retroactively, the Orocio court found that Padilla was not a
"new rule" under Teague. 05
The Third Circuit's analysis was more
comprehensive than that of the Seventh, Tenth, and Fifth
Circuits-including considering the proper scope of Wright
v. West,' 0 6 Strickland v. Washington,107 and Hill v.
los Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641 ("We therefore hold that, because Padilla
followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional
norms, it is an 'old rule' for Teague purposes and is retroactively
applicable on collateral review."); see also Mudahinyuka v. United
States, 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7,
2011) ("This court is not aware of any decision by a state or federal
court holding that the Supreme Court recognized a new right in Padilla
that is also retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.")
10 See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 640-641 (interpreting Wright v. West for the
proposition that "a court's disposition of each individual factual
scenario arising under the long-established Strickland standard is not in
each instance a 'new rule,' but rather a new application of an 'old rule'
in a manner dictated by precedent" (citing 505 U.S. 277, 308-309
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). Notably, the Chaidez court also
quotes the same language from Wright and draws the same conclusion
that the Third Circuit does from that case, namely "that the application
of Strickland to unique facts generally will not produce a new rule."
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 2011). The
Chang Hong and Amer courts do not mention Wright v. West. United
States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763 (10th Cir.
Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011); United States v. Amer,
681 F.3d 211, 211 (2012).
107 See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 639 ("[T]he Strickland Court identified
certain basic duties that criminal defense attorneys must carry out to
perform competently within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,
including a duty to consult with the defendant on important decisions.
When the Supreme Court decides a Strickland case with novel facts, we
do not place emphasis on the particularduty identified by the Supreme
Court as a basis for classifying the rule as 'new' for Teague purposes.
We look instead to precedents and then-existing professional norms to
determine whether the decision broke new ground.") (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). While the Seventh, Tenth, and Fifth
Circuits acknowledge that "Padillais a Strickland case[,]" those courts
ultimately conclude that other factors lead it to conclude that Padilla is
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Lockhart.0 8 However, the Third Circuit omitted any
language from Teague which explains why cases decided
on collateral review must apply "retroactively" to other
cases similarly decided on collateral review. The fact that
the Orocio court was able to reach the conclusion that
Padilla applies retroactively without considering the
Supreme
Court's
self-proscription
from
issuing
constitutional "advisory opinions," 09 which weighs greatly
in favor of retroactivity, shows the logical strength of the
position that Padilla applies retroactively.

a "new rule." Chang Hong, 10-6294, slip op. at 5; Chaidez, 655 F.3d at
687; Amer, 681 F.3d at 214 (2012).
08 The Third Circuit considered Hill in a number of different contexts.
See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 639 ("Padilla is set within the confines of
Strickland and Hill, as it concerns what advice an attorney must give to
a criminal defendant at the plea stage."); see also id., at 638 (finding
that the argument that Padilla is new is undercut by Hill's language
that Strickland claims are governed by the "range of competence
demanded from attorneys" (citing Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 56
(1985))) (internal citations omitted). The Third Circuit also
convincingly argues that the Padilla's court "floodgates" discussion,
which compares Hill with Padilla, assumes retroactive application of
the Court's opinion in Padilla:"'[w]e confronted a similar 'floodgates'
concern in Hill, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that
counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility
before he pleaded guilty.... A flood did not follow in that decision's
wake."' Id. at 644 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 14841485 (2010). By contrast, the Seventh Circuit did not mention Hill v.
Lockart in the context of the Court's "floodgates" argument in Padilla,
although it did mention that Hill provides a similar basis for analyzing
Strickland claims. Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d at 691 (citing
Hill, 474 U.S. at 56)). Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found that, "[In
Padilla,t]he majority's characterization of Hill, suggests that it did not
understand the rule set forth in Padilla to be dictated by precedent."
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 689-690. The Amer court also interprets the
Padilla Court's discussion of Hill as evidence that Padilla does not
apply retroactively. Amer, 681 F.3d at 214; see also infra p. 20
(discussing the Amer court's characterization of Hill). The Chang Hong
court does not mention Hill v. Lockart. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294.
'0 Teague v. Lane, 489 US 288, 316 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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2.

Seventh Circuit

In Chaidez v. United States," 0 the Seventh Circuit
held that Padilla did not apply retroactively. The Seventh
Circuit offered a number of factors disfavoring retroactive
application of Padilla. For example, the court found that
"[f]ack of unanimity on the [Supreme] Court in deciding a
particular case[, and in lower court's prior determinations
of the issue,] support[] the conclusion that the case
announced a new rule.""' The Chaidez court also found
that "to the extent that [it was able to] discern whether
members of the Court understood Padilla to be a new rule,
[]the clearest indications [were found] in the concurrence
and dissent, which [left the court with] no doubt that at
least four Justices view Padilla as new." 1 1 2
Along with the Third Circuit, 113 the Seventh Circuit
correctly noted that the general rule is that a case applying
Strickland to a new set of facts does not create a new rule
for Teague purposes.1 4 En route to finding that Padillawas
a "rare exception"" 5 to this rule, the Seventh Circuit placed
undue weight on the disagreement between the Supreme
Court and lower courts,ll6 and among the Justices

"10655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
". Id.
112 Id.

at 689.
at 694.

11 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting
that "it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it
forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent") (internal citations
omitted).
114 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 692 ("recogniz[ing] that the application of
Strickland to unique facts generally will not produce a new rule" (citing
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring
in relevant part))).
1" Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693.
116 Id. at 692. (stating that the court was "persuaded by the weight of
lower court authority").
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themselves.117 Disagreement, as the dissent in Chaidez
noted, "does not alter the fact that prevailing professional
norms at the time of [a petitioner's] plea required a lawyer
to advise her client of the immigration consequences of a
guilty plea... [and, t]he concurring and dissenting opinions
do not alter the straightforward application of Strickland[,]"
in Padilla.'8
In giving too much weight to inferences from the
concurrence and dissent, the Seventh Circuit ignored the
intent of the majority in Padilla. While the Chaidez court
acknowledged "indirect language" that supports the
position that the Supreme Court meant Padilla to apply
retroactively, it fails to identify that language or give it any
weight in its determination of whether Padilla applies
retroactively. 119 In short, the Seventh Circuit relied too
heavily on its own inferences from the concurrence and
dissenting opinions and the split among the lower courts.
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Chaidez
to decide if Padilla applies retroactively.12 0
3.

Tenth Circuit

In United States v. Chang Hong,121 the Tenth
Circuit held that Padilla does not apply retroactively.
Among courts that have reached the retroactivity question
in the negative, the Chang Hong court is one of the most
ambitious in its analysis of whether Padilla qualifies as a

.17
Id. at 689 (finding that "[1]ack of unanimity on the [Supreme] Court
in deciding a particular case supports the conclusion that the case
announced a new rule").
"' Id. at 696-697 (dissent).
"9 Id. at 693.

120 Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
121 United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763
(10th Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011).
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"new rule" under Teague.122 The basis for its conclusion
that Padillacreated a new rule is that "Padillaextended the
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel and applied it
to an aspect of a plea bargain previously untouched by
Strickland."l 23 Under Teague, the holding of a case will not
be deemed to have created a new rule-and it will,
therefore, be retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review-if it applies an old rule to a new set of facts.124
Therefore, the fact that the holding of a case reaches into an
area "previously untouched" is not helpful for determining
whether it is an application of an old rule to a new set of
facts. By the Chang Hong court's reasoning, it would be
difficult to imagine a holding that merely applied an old
rule to a new set of facts.
The Chang Hong court also addressed the important
language in Padilla that implies retroactive applicationl25
"[Petitioner] argues there would be no need to discuss pleas
'already obtained' if the case did not apply
retroactively."' 26 In rejecting this argument the Chang
Hong court said that it "interpret[ed] the Court's statement
to simply recognize that past decisions enumerating the
contours of Strickland have not led to a surfeit of collateral
attacks on guilty pleas. The force of the Court's argument is
that Padilla would have a similar (lack of) effect on guilty
pleas." 27 The Chang Hong court, in other words, said that
Cf id. at 8 (stating that "Padilla is a new rule of constitutional law
not because of what it applies-Strickland-butbecause of where it
applies-collateral immigration consequences of a plea bargain") with
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693 (calling it a "rare exception" when a
Strickland case produces a new rule).
123 Chang Hong, No. 10-6294,
slip op. at 8.
124 See Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688 ("Under Teague, a constitutional
rule
of criminal procedure applies to all cases on direct and collateral review
if it is not a new rule, but rather an old rule applied to new facts.").
125Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485
(2010).
126 Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, slip op. at 9-10 (citing
Padilla, 130 S.
Ct. at 1485).
127Id. at 10.
122
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the Supreme Court's use of the past tense, "already
obtained," referred to "past decisions". However, the
Supreme Court plainly used the phrase "convictions already
obtained," not referring to past decisions.'28
Perhaps recognizing that their interpretation of the
Court's language in Padilla is unpersuasive, the Chang
Hong court also stated that "it [would be] unwise to imply
retroactivity based on dicta."l 29 However, the Chang Hong
court itself relies on the dicta of the concurring and
dissenting opinions.130 Adding to its seemingly uneven
analysis, the Tenth Circuit also failed to cite any language
from Teague, or Teague's progeny, that might indicate that
Padillashould be applied retroactively.
4.

Fifth Circuit

In May 2012, the Fifth Circuit became the fourth,
and likely final, circuit to weigh in on Padilla's
retroactivity when it decided United States v. Amer.131 The
court noted at the outset that the "issue presently is pending
before the Supreme Court." 3 2 The court ultimately agreed
with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, that Padilla was
"new" within the meaning of Teague.133 The Amer court
found that the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla was not
"dictated by precedent." 34 In making this determination
the Amer court fashioned its own test which includes three
factors:

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (emphasis added).
129 Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, slip op. at 10.
130 Id. at 6 ("We take the concurrence and dissent as support
for our
conclusion that reasonable jurists did not find the rule in Padilla
compelled or dictated by the Court's prior precedent.")
131 681 F.3d 211 (2012).
132 Id. (citing Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
133 Amer, 681 F.3d at 211.
134 Id. (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion)).
128
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1) whether the decision announcing the rule at issue
purported to rely on "controlling precedent," 35
2) whether there was a "difference of opinion on the
part of ... lower courts that had considered the

question,"'

36

and

3) whether the Justices expressed an "array of

views.
The court found that the PadillaCourt did not
"purport[] to" rely on controlling precedent because the
Padilla Court stated in a footnote that, "the Hill [v.
Lockart] Court did not resolve the particular question
respecting misadvice that was before it."1 38 However, the
Supreme Court immediately followed that statement with
the statement that, "[Hill's] import is nevertheless clear[,
and w]hether Strickland applies to Padilla's claim follows
from Hill, regardless of the fact that the Hill Court did not
resolve the particular question respecting misadvice that
was before it."' 39 Padillabuilds upon the precedents of Hill
and Strickland. The Padilla Court's reliance on these prior
cases is deep and unambiguous.
With regard to the difference of opinion among
lower courts, the Fifth Circuit makes the same error of
circular logic that the Seventh and Tenth Circuits make.
The Amer court found that "the near-universal position of
the lower state and federal courts," that failure to advise a
non-citizen that deportation will result from a guilty plea
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,
evinces that Padilla should not apply retroactively.1 40
Amer, 681 F.3d at 213 (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,
528 (1997)).
136 Amer, 681 F.3d at 213 (citing Butler v. McKellar,
494 U.S. 407, 415
1

(1990)).
137 Amer, 681 F.3d at 213 (citing O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151,
159 (1997)).
1
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 n. 12.
139 id.
140

Amer, 681 F.3d at 214.

74

9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 75
Relying on these lower courts' holdings, however, ignores
the fact that the basis of these opinions was the directcollateral consequences distinction, which was explicitly
repudiated in Padilla.141
Finally, the Fifth Circuit argues that Padilla is not
retroactive because the concurrence and dissent represent
an "array of views," which shows that Padilla announced a
new rule. Like the Seventh and Tenth Circuits before it, the
Fifth Circuit gives undue weight to the dicta of a
concurring and dissenting opinions. The Amer court's
reliance on the concurring and dissenting opinions presents
a stark contrast with its unwillingness to consider any
reason why Padillamight apply retroactively.
The court states in a footnote that it will not
consider the Padilla majority's suggestion that Padilla
should apply retroactively-or any other reason why
Padilla apply retroactively-because it does not want to
"perceive a dictate from an inference." 4 2 However, the
Amer court relies on its own inferences from the
concurrence and dissent. It is illogical to ignore the opinion
of the Court while defining the reach of a case through
inferences from minority opinions.
5.

State Supreme Courts

The opinions of state supreme courts are of great
consequence, because, like circuit court opinions, they can
be overturned only by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the
vast majority of guilty pleas occur in state court
proceedings. 143 As a result, it can be argued that state law
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482, (2010) ("The collateral
versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland
claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.").
142 Amer, 681 F.3d at
214, n. 2.
143 In 2004, for example, more than five times as many guilty
pleas
occurred in state courts than occurred in their federal counterparts. See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of
141
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precedent has a greater practical impact than its federal
counterpart.
It has been noted that Padilla-inholding that
failure of counsel to advise a client about the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel-abrogated precedent in many state
and federal jurisdictions.144 Still, there are state supreme
courts that have applied Padillaretroactively, including the

highest courts in Maryland,145 Massachusetts

46

and

47

Michigan.1 The New Jersey Supreme Court, by contrast,
found that Nunez-Valdez, a case decided under New Jersey
law that is substantially similar to Padilla, did not apply
retroactively.148 As noted above, it is within the purview of
Criminal
Justice
Statistics
Online,
tbl.5.26.2004,
http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5242004.pdf
(showing that
70,591 guilty pleas were entered in District Courts in 2004) (last visited
July, 2012); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl.5.46.2004,
http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5462004.pdf
(showing that
available data documents 553,356 guilty pleas obtained in state courts
in 2004) (last visited July, 2012). The Department of Justice estimates
that their data only shows approximately half of the actual number of
convictions that occur in state courts. Id. Because we do not have data
available for these convictions we cannot know how many were the
result of guilty pleas or plea bargains. However, if these convictions
follow the trend, then it is possible that state courts handled more than
ten times as many guilty pleas as federal courts.
144 Cf Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the majority does not cite a single case, from
this or any other federal court, holding that criminal defense counsel's
failure to provide advice concerning the removal consequences of a
criminal conviction violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel") with State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009) (finding
that, under the N.J. constitution, the right to effective assistance of
counsel applied to the immigration consequences of a plea).
145 See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 923 (Md. 2011).
146 See Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass. 2011).
147 See People v. Abbas, 794 N.W.2d 617, 617 (Mich. 2011).
148 State v. Gaitan, A-109 SEPT.TERM 2010, 2012 WL 612311, slip
op. at 20 (N.J. Feb. 28, 2012) (Padillais not entitled to retroactive
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state courts to find that Padilla's central holding is
retroactive under their own case law.' 4 9
Many state supreme courts have made statements
concerning Padilla's retroactivity without deciding the
issue. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has
addressed Padilla's retroactivity only briefly-in the
footnote of an unpublished opinion.15 0 The Delaware
Supreme Court found that "United States Supreme Court
and Delaware Supreme Court precedents suggest that the
rule in Padilla may not retroactively apply."' ' Similarly,
the Georgia' 5 2 and Maine' 53 Supreme Courts chose not to
address the issue. More important than the result of any one
court is the quality of the analysis that supports that court's
conclusion.
C.

Evaluation of Common Arguments For
Applying Padilla Retroactively

1.

The Padilla Decision Itself Would Have
Been Precluded By a Retroactivity Bar

Jose Padilla's guilty plea, from 2002, was itself on

application, [and, therefore,] we find no attorney violation
of Padilla'srequirements in this matter. As for Nuiiez-Valdit, we find
in this record no deficiency like what occurred in that matter[.]")
149 See State v. Bonilla, 957 N.E.2d 682, 682 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(finding that the court "need not address the retroactive application of
Padilla, as its holding was consistent with Indiana decisions that
predated Padilla"); see also supra note 101 (explaining when a state
may wish to find the rule of Padilla retroactive under its own case law).
Iso Ruiz v. State, 23 A.3d 866, slip op. at 3 n.19 (Del. July 6, 2011)
(unpublished).
15'

Id.

152

See Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 404 (2010).
See State v. Ali, 32 A.3d 1019, 1023 (Me. 2011).

153
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collateral review;' 54 research for this article uncovered only
one published case 155 to attribute proper significance to that
This fact is significant in understanding what
fact.
"retroactivity" truly means for Padilla.Without a doubt, all
of those bringing Padilla claims based on convictions that
occurred after 2002 are in every way "similarly situated" to
Jose Padilla.' 57 Therefore, it is nonsensical to apply Padilla
only prospectively, when that same retroactivity bar would
have precluded the result in Padilla itself. 5 8 Another way
of putting this, is that Padilla announced a rule on
collateral review, and that when a rule is announced on
collateral review, it must apply retroactively to "avoid the[]
"Final judgment was entered October 4, 2002." Com. v. Padilla, 253
S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008) rev'd and remanded sub nom. Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
1ss See Santos-Sanchez
v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL
3793691, 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011). The Santos-Sanchez court found
that, because Padilla was itself decided on collateral review, "[i]t is
incontrovertible that if Padilla is analyzed under Teague, it must be
applied retroactively to [other] cases on collateral review." Id.
156 For example, the Third Circuit opinion, holding that Padilla does
apply retroactively, contains a section on "Teague and retroactivity,"
but does not mention that Teague's statement that the Supreme Court
will apply all decisions on collateral review retroactively in fairness to
those "similarly situated". U.S. v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 637 (3d Cir.
2011); see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
1 In other words, convictions that occurred before 2012, like Jose
Padilla's 2002 conviction, occurred before the Court's decision in
Padilla.
158 Consider the case of People v. Kabre. 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, slip op. at
4 (Crim. Ct. 2010). The Kabre court held that, "Petitioner can prevail
here only if a New York court in 2005 (when the last conviction at
issue here became final) would have been required by controlling
United States Supreme Court precedent to rule that failure to discuss
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea was ineffective
assistance of counsel." Id. The Kabre court does not explain why it is
appropriate to apply the rule announced in Padilla retroactively to a
conviction that occurred in 2002, but not apply that same rule in Kabre,
when Kabre's conviction occurred in 2005.
154
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problems of rendering advisory constitutional opinions and
creating inequities resulting from the uneven application of
constitutional rules."159
2.

A Teague Analysis Necessarily Results in
Retroactive Application of Padilla

Under a Teague analysis, a rule of constitutional
criminal procedure always applies retroactively. The
plurality in Teague said that the Supreme Court will
"simply refuse to announce a new rule in a case unless the
rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the
case and to all others similarly situated."160 Teague's
statement is that the law will not allow the application of
"retroactivity" principles to result in an uneven application
of constitutional rules. Thus, the Supreme Court will apply
all decisions on collateral review retroactively in fairness to
those "similarly situated."' 6 1 By itself, this is dispositive on
the issue of whether Padilla should apply retroactively.' 62
In short, courts analyzing Padilla under Teague
should always reach the conclusion that Padilla applies
retroactively.163 In other words, "Teague establishes that
People v. De Jesus, 30 Misc. 3d 1203(A), slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2010) (unpublished disposition).
'6 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (emphasis added).
161Id. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity,
or "Redressability," After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts
Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal
Procedurein Postconviction Proceedings,46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 71
(2009) (concluding that "full retroactivity...serves the goals of
according fairness to similarly situated litigants").
162 We must remember that our analysis here is whether the Supreme
Court intended for Padilla to be retroactive. Because the Supreme
Court does not create new constitutional rules unless they will apply
retroactively to all those similarly situated, Padilla should apply
retroactively.
163That does not mean that a Teague analysis is never called for. See
supra p. 13 (showing how the Teague analysis of "new rules" affects
159
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where the Court does announce a 'new' rule of
constitutional criminal procedure in the exercise of its
collateral review powers, it will be doing so because the
new rule fits within one of the two Teague exceptions, and,
therefore, applies retroactively to all similarly situated
cases." 1 64 Therefore, even in the unlikely event Supreme
Court intended for Padilla to be considered a "new rule,"
one of the Teague exceptions necessarily applies, and the
rule applies retroactively.
3.

The Supreme Court Has Already Applied
PadillaRetroactively

Less than a week after Padillacame down, the
Supreme Court "remanded [a case back] to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further
consideration in light of Padilla[.]"1 6 5 The Supreme Court's
remand undercuts the argument that Padilla should apply
only prospectively. When the Supreme Court decided
Padilla, it announced the rule that non-citizens who are
deported as a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel
can challenge their underlying conviction. Also, in addition
to announcing the rule of Padilla, the Padilla Court also
applied the rule of Padilla to Jose Padilla's 2002

the analysis of "newly recognized" rights under federal habeas law).
Moreover, it has been noted that "Teague does a poor job" of helping
courts decide whether the rule of a case should apply retroactively.
Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL 3793691, slip
op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011).
164 People v. De Jesus, 30 Misc. 3d 1203(A), slip op. at 10-11 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2010) (unreported disposition).
165 Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 130 S.
Ct. 2340, 2340 (2010).
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conviction.166 This was the first instance of the Supreme
Court applying the rule of Padillaretroactively.167
Less than a week later, the Supreme Court applied
Padilla retroactively for a second time, to Jesus SantosSanchez's 2003 conviction.168 In other words, the Supreme
Court has itself applied Padilla retroactively on two
separate occasions: once to Jose Padilla's 2002 conviction,
and then again to Jesus Santos-Sanchez's 2003 conviction.
Only a few courts have noted the significance of this
fact.169 Considering that one of the goals of the Supreme
Court's retroactivity jurisprudence is to "avoid[] the
inequity resulting from the uneven application" of the
law,170 courts that refuse to apply Padilla to convictions
that occurred prior to the decision in Padilla do so in direct
conflict with the Supreme Court.

"Final judgment was entered October 4, 2002." Com. v. Padilla, 253
S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008) rev'd and remanded sub nom. Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
167 Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL 3793691,
slip op.
at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011) (finding that "the Supreme Court's
holding (rule) was applied to Padilla ")(emphasis in original).
168 Santos-Sanchez, 130 S. Ct. at 2340; see also Santos-Sanchez
v.
United States, 548 F.3d 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) ("[In September,
2003,] Santos-Sanchez appeared before a magistrate judge and pleaded
guilty.") cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. at 2340 (2010).
169 Research for this article uncovered only one published opinion that
explicitly stated that the Supreme Court's remand of Santos-Sanchez
was evidence that Padilla should apply retroactively. Com. v. Clarke,
949 N.E.2d 892, 904 (Mass. 2011) ("A few days after its decision in
Padilla,the Supreme Court remanded [Santos-Sanchez, id.,] for further
consideration in light of Padilla. That case, too, was on collateral
review and the conviction had become final before the Court's decision
in Padilla.")(citation omitted).
170 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (plurality
opinion).
166
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D.

Evaluation of Common Arguments Against
Applying Retroactively

1.

The Language of the Concurrences and
Dissenting Justices Makes Clear that They
Think Padilla is New.

All three circuits that held that Padilla did not apply
retroactively relied, at least in part, on the fact that the
decision in Padilla7' was not unanimous. 172 This argument
gives undue weight to the concurring and dissenting
justices, and more broadly, to the existence of dissenting
opinions as evidence that a decision should not apply
retroactively. Moreover, this argument ignores the
majority's clear intention to apply Padillaretroactively.
Implicit throughout the majority's opinion in
Padillais that it will apply retroactively. For example, the
Padilla Court stated that it was unlikely that Padillawould
"have a significant effect on those convictions already
obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past
In Padilla,Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, in which Chief
Justice Roberts joined, stating that he would have limited the holding of
Padilla to finding that a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel
required "affirmative misadvice." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1492 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring); Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, in which he argued that the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel did not cover the "collateral
consequences" of a plea bargain. Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172 See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011)
("The majority opinion in Padilla drew a concurrence authored by
Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice
Thomas. That the members of the Padilla Court expressed such an
'array of views' indicates that Padillawas not dictated by precedent.");
see also United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL
3805763, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1,
2011) ("We take the concurrence and dissent as support for our
conclusion that reasonable jurists did not find the rule
in Padillacompelled or dictated by the Court's prior precedent.").
17
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15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an
obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client's plea."17 3 Generally, those who
argue that Padilla should be applied retroactively have
noted that the Court's language implies retroactive
application.174 Similarly, courts that found Padilla to apply
retroactively have cited that same language. 175
The main tool in determining whether Padilla
applies retroactively is Supreme Court precedent.
Therefore, it is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court has
the power to determine whether cases, including Padilla,
apply retroactively. Most courts that have considered
whether Padilla applies retroactively believed that the
majority's intent regarding retroactivity warranted
discussion. However, many courts that have held Padilla
is not retroactive have seemed to give more weight to the
concurring and dissenting justices. 7 At least some of these
courts seem to think that the mere existence of concurring
173 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (emphasis added).
174 Dan Kesselbrenner, A Defending Immigrants Partnership Practice
Advisory: Duty of Criminal Defense Counsel Representing an
Immigrant Defendant After Padilla v. Kentucky, National Immigration
Project,
3
(June
24,
2010),
available
at
http://nationalimmigrationproject.orgAegalresources/cd-pa-padilla-retr
oactivity.pdf (last visited July, 2012).
17 See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011).
176 See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL
3805763, slip op. at 10 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1,
2011) (holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively, but still
discussing whether the majority intended for Padilla to apply
retroactively).
177 While courts do not generally reveal how much weight they are
giving different considerations, some acknowledge that they find the
language of the concurrence and dissent more instructive. See Chaidez
v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that "to the
extent that [it was able to] discern whether members of the Court
understood Padilla to be a new rule, []the clearest indications [were
found] in the concurrence and dissent, which [left the court with] no
doubt that at least four Justices view Padillaas new").
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and dissenting opinions evinces that Padilla is a new
rule.17 8 This ignores clear Supreme Court precedent "that
the mere existence of a dissent [fails] to show that the rule
is new."1 79
Courts holding that Padilladid not apply
retroactively gave too much weight to their own inferences
from the concurring and dissenting opinions, while
ignoring the clear intent of the majority, which was to
apply Padilla retroactively. For example, as the Chaidez
court notes, the dissenting justices-and, to some extent,
the concurring justices-clearly view Padilla as "new." 8 0
But, it is axiomatic that justices who disagree with a
decision would regard that decision as new; otherwise, a
dissenting justice would be required to argue that the result
reached by the majority was dictated by precedent, but that
they disagree with that controlling precedent.
2.

The Pre-Padilla Split Among the Lower
Federal Courts Evinces that the Padilla
Decision Announces a "New" Rule.

The argument that the pre-Padillasplit among
lower federal courts demonstrates that Padilla is new
ignores the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in
Padilla. In holding that the direct-collateral consequences
distinction was inappropriate under Strickland, the Court
undermined the basis for the lower courts' holding; Padilla
did not create a new constitutional rule. In fact, in Padilla,
the Supreme Court noted that it had "never applied a
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to

See id. at 694 (finding that the concurrence and dissent "leave no
doubt that at least four Justices view Padillaas new").
179 Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 n.5 (2004).
180 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d
684, 693 (7th Cir. 2011).
'7
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define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable
professional assistance' required under Strickland."'8 '
Because the lower courts' decisions not to apply the
6 th AmendmentlStrickland to immigration consequences of
a guilty plea were based on the erroneous direct-collateral
consequences distinction, courts' reliance on these earlier
opinions was misplaced.182 Even if we accept, arguendo,
that the pre-Padilla split among lower federal courts was
evidence that Padilla created a new rule, there is no
precedent which gives that split any significant weight.
Contrarily, for example, courts considering whether the
holding of Roe v. Flores-Ortegal83 applied retroactively
found that "[d]espite the existence of conflicting authority
prior to the Court's decision, and the relative specificity of
the rule that the Supreme Court laid out.. .Flores-Ortega
did not announce a new rule[,]" and therefore applied

retroactively.184
"[T]he mere existence of conflicting authority does
not necessarily mean a rule is new."
In short, courts
should not place any significant weight on the pre-Padilla
split among lower federal courts in their retroactivity
analyses because there is no precedent to do so.
181Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).

182 See Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (dissent); but see
United States v. Chang Hong, 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763d, slip op. at
7 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011) ("lower courts
had adhered to this direct versus collateral dichotomy. The departure
from that longstanding legal distinction, and the application of
Strickland to immigration consequences of a guilty plea, was an
extension of Strickland into previously untread [sic] grounds");
Chaidezs, 655 F.3d at 689 (finding that "lower courts were split on the
issue[, which is evidence that] the outcome of the case was susceptible
to reasonable debate . .. [, and] that Padillaannounced a new rule").
183 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476 (2000) (obligations of
counsel to inform their clients about their appellate rights).
184 Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892,
901 (2011).
185Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
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3.

Applying
Padilla is New Because
"Collateral Consequences" of a Plea to the
6"' Amendment/Strickland Test Has Never
Been Done Before

When considering retroactivity under Teague, the
general rule is that application of an old rule to a new set of
facts will not create a new rule.186 However, some courts
have found that the Supreme Court's expansion of
Strickland into the area of "collateral consequences" of a
guilty plea, which had previously been "outside the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment," weighed against
applying Padilla retroactively. 187 By contrast, courts in the
past have considered other expansions of Strickland to new
factual situations to have not created a new rule for Teague
purposes. 1 Courts that have reached the conclusion that
Even the Chiadez court, which held that Padillacreated a new rule,
acknowledged the general rule that ordinarily new applications of an
old rule does not create a new rule for Teague purposes. Chaidez, 655
F.3d at 692 (noting that "the application of Strickland to unique facts
generally will not produce a new rule" citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in relevant part)).
187 United States v. Chang Hong, 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, slip op.
at 6 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011); see also
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 691 (finding that "prior to Padilla,the Court had
not foreclosed the possibility that advice regarding collateral
consequences of a guilty plea could be constitutionally required. But
neither had the Court required defense counsel to provide advice
regarding consequences collateral to the criminal prosecution at issue")
(internal citation omitted).
188 See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding
that "[Williams] and Rompilla are not new law under Teague." (citing
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) and Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374, (2005) (holding that there was an obligation of counsel to
conduct reasonable investigation to determine mitigating factors to
present at penalty phase of capital murder case))); Com. v. Clarke, 949
N.E.2d 892, 901 (2011) (finding that the Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits all found the Flores-Ortegaexpansion of Strickland not to be a
186
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Padilla does not apply retroactively have not cited an
example of a case that created a new rule under Strickland.
In determining whether the application of Strickland to a
new set of facts constituted a new rule for Teague purposes,
many courtsl89 cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Wright v. West: "[where, as with Strickland, you have] a
rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a
myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case
that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one
not dictated by precedent."' 90
The Seventh Circuit found that Padilla was a "rare
exception" to the rule that a case does not announce a new
rule if it is merely applying a new set of facts to an old rule
(Strickland).191 In so holding, the Chiadez court said that
Padilla's holding "requir[ing] a criminal defense attorney
to provide advice about matters not directly related to their
client's criminal prosecution.. .was sufficiently novel as to
qualify as a new rule."' 92 However, the Supreme Court had
"never applied a distinction between direct and collateral
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally
'reasonable professional assistance' required under
Strickland[.]" 9 3 Additionally, the Supreme Court
recognized, nearly a decade before Padilla, that "alien
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea

new rule, but that the Fifth Circuit assumed Flores-Ortegato be a new
rule without explanation (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,
476 (2000) (obligations of counsel to inform their clients about their
appellate rights)) (internal citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 692; United States v. Orocio, 645
F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011); Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135,
1144 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hubenig, 6:03-MJ-040, 2010
WL 2650625, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010).
190 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'9' Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693.
id.
193 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (internal citations
192

omitted).
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agreement are acutely aware 1 94of
consequences of their convictions."'
V.

the

immigration

Proposal

Common sense and fundamental fairness dictate
that Padilla v. Kentucky be applied retroactively. If Padilla
is applied retroactively, the next question is should Padilla
apply retroactively to only some categories of petitioners.
For example, one court found that Padilla would apply to
"guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996[.]"'95 There is indirect support for this proposition
from Padilla:"[flor at least the past 15 years, professional
norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to
provide advice on the deportation consequences of a
client's plea."' 96 In other words, the Supreme Court's
backward-looking language, which supports applying
Padilla retroactively, can also be offered as support for
limiting Padilla to only those whose convictions which
occurred after, approximately, March, 1995.197
There are essentially three categories of Padilla
petitioners:
1) Those who pled guilty prior to March, 1995
2) Those who pled guilty after March, 1995, but before
the March, 2010 Padilladecision
3) Those who pled guilty after the March, 2010
Padilladecision
194 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (citing Magana-Pizano v.
INS, 200 F.3d 603, 612 (C.A.9 1999)).
195 Corn. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 895. The Clarke court does not rule
out the possibility that Padilla applies to convictions obtained before
the mid-1990s.
196 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (emphasis
added).
19 It should also be noted that the Supreme Court says "at least 15
years." Id. (emphasis added).
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No one disputes that Padillaapplies, prospectively,
to those in category 3). Similarly, for courts that have found
that Padilla applies retroactively, Padilla will apply to
pleas between 1995 and 2010. Therefore, the question,
which courts have generally not considered, is, if Padilla
does apply retroactively, does it apply to convictions that
occurred before 1995. For the same reasons that Padilla
applies to those that occurred after 1995-namely, that the
result is dictated by the Court's opinion in Teague, and
fundamental fairness-Padilla should apply to convictions
that occurred before 1995.
Firstly, if, as courts applying Padillaretroactively
have held, Padilla is merely an application of new facts to
an old rule, then Padilla will apply retroactively to all
In other words, Padilla merely holds that
cases.
Strickland's test for effective assistance of counsel applies
to the deportation context. Courts are generally experienced
in handling Strickland claims.199 And, in doing so, courts
are cautious in avoiding "hindsight bias." 200 With this in
mind, the question becomes how can Padilla/Strickland
apply to a conviction that occurred when, perhaps,
"professional norms [did not]... impose[] an obligation on
counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences

See, e.g., Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 903 (finding that Padilla"is
the definitive application of an established constitutional standard on a
case-by-case basis, incorporating evolving professional norms (on
which the standard relies) to new facts. It is not the creation of a new
constitutional rule").
199 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 ("There is no reason to doubt that
lower courts-now quite experienced with applying Strickland-can
effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate specious
claims from those with substantial merit.").
200 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (finding that
"hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to 'counsel's perspective
at the time' investigative decisions are made, and by giving deference
to counsel's judgments" (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668,
689 (1984))).
19
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of a client's plea." 20 1 The answer is that pre-1995 Padilla
claims will be limited.
Applying pre-1995 professional norms, Padilla
claims may be limited to affirmative misadvice; Justice
Alito's concurrence, highlighting his dispute with the
majority in Padilla, said "that a criminal defense attorney
who refrains from providing immigration advice does not
violate prevailing professional norms."202 In other words,
the main difference between the majority and concurring
Justices, in Padilla, is that the latter would have limited
Strickland violations, in the immigration context, to when a
lawyer gives his client affirmative misadvice.2 0 3 In this
context, the Court's statement that, "For at least the past 15
years, professional norms have generally imposed an
obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client's plea," 204 exists as a justification
for faulting attorneys who are silent about their client's
inevitable deportation-as opposed to faulting only those
attorneys who give affirmative misadvice-and does not
exist to limit Padilla claims to those convictions that have
occurred in the past fifteen years. Therefore, the Court's
opinion should not be used to limit Padilla'sreach to pleas
occurring within a certain timeframe.
Secondly, fundamental fairness dictates that Padilla
apply to anyone who can surmount Strickland's high bar.
However, courts considering whether Padilla applies
retroactively have not considered fundamental fairness-or
even a balancing approach.20 5 It is understandable that
201 Padilla, 130

S. Ct. at 1485.

202 Id. at 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).

Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1480 (2011) ("Justice Alito and
Chief Justice Roberts concurred, but only as to misadvice.").
204 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
205 While courts have failed to consider fundamental
fairness, there is
much scholarly literature devoted to considering how fairness affects
203
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courts do not take into equitable considerations in their
retroactivity analysis because nothing in Teague or its
progeny permits such considerations. But the merits of
Teague as a basis for determining retroactively is, at best,
questionable; at worst, the admittedly "confused and
confusing"206 case law governing the retroactive
application of constitutional rules creates an uneven, unfair
and unjust basis for determining whether a rule applies
retroactively.2 0 7
Consequently, as, perhaps, Padillademonstrates,
fairness should play more of a factor in whether a newlyrecognized constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies
to a class of petitioners. In determining whether Padilla
applies retroactively, courts should follow the Supreme
Court's lead in Padilla, and refrain from "engaging within
the traditional frames of formalism [and] the institutional
concerns of courts[;]" 208 instead, courts should consider
fundamental fairness in their retroactivity analysis.
The Supreme Court does not create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Therefore, noncitizens who were not given appropriate advice regarding
the immigration consequences of their plea have
necessarily had their constitutional rights violated. As such,
the plight of non-citizens within the criminal justice system. See, e.g.,
Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1465 (2011) (concluding that
"[d]eportation... must comply with [the] constitutional requirements of
fundamental fairness and due process").
206 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
207 See Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL
3793691, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011) (finding that "Teague
does a poor job" of helping courts decide whether the rule of a case
should apply retroactively).
208 McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic
Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond
Deportation,54 How. L.J. 795, 798 (2011).
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courts should find that Padilla applies retroactively to all
cases on collateral review, so that non-citizens who have
had their rights violated, and have been deported as a result,
have redress.
VI.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's "retroactivity" case law
dictates that Padilla v. Kentucky apply retroactively.
However, the courts that have considered whether Padilla
applies retroactively have reached mixed results. Courts
have generally failed to mention the Supreme Court's own
statement that, to avoid issuing constitutional advisory
opinions, it will not apply a rule to a case on collateral
review unless that rule applies to all others similarly
situated. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself applied
Padilla retroactively. Therefore, properly considering the
Supreme Court's "retroactivity" case law, Padilla should
apply retroactively.
Absent from the Supreme Court's retroactivity case
law is consideration of fundamental fairness. Fairness
requires that the rule of Padilla be applied retroactively to
any petitioner who can surmount Strickland's high bar to
show ineffective assistance of counsel. To bring successful
Padilla claims, petitioners must show that they received
ineffective assistance of counsel, and that they were
deported as a result. Petitioners who can make such a
showing have necessarily suffered a constitutional
violation. The question then is whether they will have
redress. Fundamental fairness requires that Padilla apply
retroactively so that those who were deported as a result of
their constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel have
a remedy. In short, Padilla v. Kentucky should apply
retroactively. 209
-

Just weeks before this article was published, the Supreme Court
of
the United States decided Chaidez v. United States. In a 7-2 decision,
209
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the Supreme Court decided that Padilladid not apply retroactively.
Both the Opinion of the Court and the dissent provide a comprehensive
"Teague" analysis. However, the Court did not distinguish Jose
Padilla's 2002 conviction and Roselva Chaidez's 2004 conviction. Nor
did the Court explain why the former warranted retroactive application
but the latter did not. In short, the Court's analysis ignored fairness and
common sense. Although Padilla'sretroactivity is now settled, the
approach to retroactivity offered in this Article can be applied, by
analogy, to future retroactivity cases.
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ABSTRACT
The First Amendment historically has been interpreted to
provide greater and greater protection to more and more
forms of expression. The notion of an originalist First
Amendment has never commanded a majority of the
Supreme Court and is unlikely to do so. Instead the
development of the First Amendment has followed a
common law trajectory. As the reach of its protections
expands, so to do its attractiveness for arguments that may
be more accurately located elsewhere in the Constitution's
text. Such opportunism is a predictable, even necessary
consequence of the First Amendment's common law
development, and the Supreme Court tacitly endorses such
opportunism by consistently declining to issue saving
constructions to laws that implicate the First Amendment.
While both Justice Thomas and Justice Alito have recently
offered anti-opportunism readings of the First Amendment,
neither is likely to garner a majority. The common law First
Amendment-and the opportunistic use of it-will
continue apace.
The common law approach that focuses on the
evolution of precedent over time has much to recommend
as a critique of originalism and a defense of interpreting the
U.S. Constitution as an evolving document.' This approach
argues against the possibility of a completely faithful

1 This essay draws mostly on the common law approach developed by
David A. Strauss. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
(2010) [hereinafter STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION]; David A.

Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law]; David A. Strauss,
Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter Strauss, Freedom of

Speech].
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originalist approach.2 This is especially true regarding the
development of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment over time, which, this approach claims, is
marked by three central principles: recognition of the core
importance of the right to criticize the government, the
distinction between high-value and low-value speech, and
distinguishing among differing regulations on speech. 3
Indeed, many of the arguments on behalf of the common
law view are formidable.
However, even if agreed upon, these principles are
not self-executing in their case-specific applications. While
there does exist a widely shared general narrative of the
First Amendment's development, it is not the product of
only one perspective. 4 Instead, it is imperative to
understand the presence of two competing traditions of
First Amendment interpretation: one libertarian in
orientation, the other egalitarian.5 Thus, in spite of the
2 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION,

supra note 1, at 58 (noting that "the
evidence we have of the original understandings of the First
Amendment does not support the idea that the framers mean to
establish protections of free expression comparable to those with which
we are familiar today," and mentioning the specific categories of
seditious libel, blasphemy, and defamation).
' Id. at 53-55.
4 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech,
124 HARv. L. REV. 143, 144-46 (2010).
5 Id. at 144 ("In the first [egalitarian] vision[,] ...
free speech rights
serve an overarching interest in political equality. Free speech as
equality embraces first an antidiscrimination principle: in upholding the
speech rights of anarchists, syndicalists, communists, civil rights
marchers, Maoist flag burners, and other marginal, dissident, or
unorthodox speakers, the Court protects members of ideological
minorities who are likely to be the target of the majority's animus or
selective indiffer-ence."). See also id. at 145 ("The second [libertarian]
vision of free speech, by contrast, sees free speech as serving the
interest of political liberty. On this view[,] . . . the First Amendment is

a negative check on government tyranny, and treats with skepticism all
government efforts as speech suppression that might skew the private
ordering of ideas. And on this view, members of the public are trusted
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desirability of a single overarching narrative, the common
law approach must contain enough narrative richness to
credit the contributions of each tradition.
Additionally, proponents of the common law
approach must pay special attention to considerations of
scope. The common law approach provides a more accurate
reading of the significant expansion of free speech rights in
the United States over time than does any originalist or
textualist account. This fact, however, also raises questions
of what limits should exist on what is covered by the Free
Speech clause. Both the libertarian and egalitarian
traditions can provide coherent responses. However, where
these traditions agree, one may still argue that free speech
arguments are being used opportunistically precisely
because of the high success rate of speech-protecting
arguments. 6
Part I of this essay provides a brief overview of the
common law approach. This overview will outline
arguments for the common law approach and note the
reasons why this approach is particularly useful in
examining the First Amendment. These reasons are both
prudential and philosophical.
Part II examines the differences between the
libertarian and egalitarian visions of the First Amendment.
Of special concern are the subtle differences in how each
vision would characterize the classical narrative of
development from World War I era cases to the Supreme
Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.7 While each
perspective notes the important contributions of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, the
libertarian vision tends to stress Hand's influence on
to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and government is
forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons.").
6 Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. Bollinger &

Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002).
7See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Holmes' shift in perspective from his opinion for the Court
in Schenck v. United States8 to his dissent in Abrams v.
United States9 Further, the libertarian vision tends to focus
more attention on pre-World War I "libertarian
radicalism."o In each example, egalitarians hew more
closely to Supreme Court decisions and prefer a more
streamlined narrative generally.
Part III engages the notion of "First Amendment
opportunism" and its compatibility with the common law
approach." Implicit in the opportunism argument - and
explicit in other critiques - is the idea that a common law
approach leads to an untethered First Amendment, one that
can be utilized to bolster the prospects of positions whose
more obvious defenses come from outside the parameters
of the First Amendment.12 This examination will focus on
recent dissents where a majority of both the libertarian and
egalitarian wings of the Court were in agreement.
Taken as a whole, the common law approach is
superior practically and theoretically. The evolution of how
the Supreme Court addresses free speech claims is
testament to this superiority. A level of First Amendment
opportunism does exist, but this need not be a problem so
long as both the libertarian and egalitarian visions are given
their due.

8 See

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

9 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
10DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 15 (1997).

1 Schauer, supra note 6, at 196-97 ("But if instead we see the First
Amendment as intrinsically, fundamentally, or even just largely as an
artifact of a constitution that is itself a common-law document, then it
would be hard to make sense of the idea of the First Amendment, and
arguably of the idea of free speech, apart from what the courts have
made of it, and apart from the necessarily and nonproblematically
opportunistic way of the common law.").
I2 Id. at 192 ("[T]he First Amendment appears to be, in the United
States in the last thirty years, the argument of choice for those who find
that their intrinsically preferred argument is unlikely to prevail.").
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I.

The
Common
Law
Approach
Constitutional Interpretation

A.

Practical Arguments for the Common Law
Approach

to

One prudential argument on behalf of the common
law approach is that it does a better job of explaining our
actual practices than any other perspective.' No single
judicial approach to constitutional interpretation has
consistently held sway, and any accurate historical
treatment must accommodate this reality. Even in a
normative debate, room remains for differences of opinion
within any broad interpretive approach over how to treat
existing precedent.14 The common law approach, by giving
precedent its due, better explains how the Constitution is
interpreted in actuality.
A related argument in favor of the common law
understanding is that it is more workable in practice.'5 By
emphasizing the process of interpreting and applying
precedent, the common law approach stresses the skills
most would expect judges to possess. This is preferable to
approaches, such as originalism, that claim only to be
humbly following the intentions of the framers of the text,
but asks judges to perform complicated acts of historical

13 STRAUSS,

LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 44 ("[T]he

governing principles of constitutional law are the product of
precedents, not of the text or the original understandings. And in actual
practice of constitutional law, precedents and arguments about fairness
and social policy are dominant.").
14This is true of originalism as well. For a recent example, see Justice
Thomas's concurrence in McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring), where he argues that originalist
incorporation of the Second Amendment should occur under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than
under the Due Process Clause.
15 See STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 43.
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interpretation for which they are not suitably trained.16 The
workability of the common law approach reinforces a
further argument on its behalf: The common law approach
is more justifiable.17 The common law view provides the
best justification for the existing and common practice for
valuing precedent so highly.
A final argument on behalf of the common law
approach is that, contrary to the views of originalists, it
actually does a better job of restraining judges.18
According to the common law approach, arguments linking
non-originalist approaches to judicial activism fail to note
that it is judicial review that is undemocratic, not any given
interpretive approach.' 9 Interpreting original intent (or
meaning) is no less an interpretive enterprise than
interpreting precedents. In fact, the plausibility of the
former typically depends on established precedent serving
as a boundary marking the limits of acceptable
interpretation.20
The arguments for common law constitutionalism
are particularly relevant regarding the First Amendment.
Proponents of the common law approach point to the
1d. at 18-21.
Id. at 43-44.
18Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 879.
1

'9 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 47.

20 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 926-27 ("The notion that the
text of the Constitution is an effective limit on judges is plausible only
if one assumes a background of highly developed precedent. Within the
limits set by precedent, paying more attention to text might indeed limit
judges' discretion. The appeal of textualism as a limit on judges - as
the argument was made, most famously for example, by Justice Black stems entirely from the assumption that the text will be used to resolve
disputes within the gaps left by precedent. If we assume that the various
clauses of the Constitution are to be interpreted in something like the
current fashion, then judges may indeed be more 'restrained' if they
insist on some relatively explicit textual source for any constitutional
right. But that is primarily a demonstration of the restraining effect of
precedent, not of text; the bulk of the restraint by far is provided by
precedent").
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practical impossibility of following any originalist
understanding of the First Amendment.2 1 For example, the
approach of Justice Black, the most explicitly textualist
understanding of the First Amendment, never garnered
majority support in any Court holding.22 The contemporary
understanding of the First Amendment, including now noncontroversial applications of the First Amendment, cannot
be explained in an originalist manner.
B.

Conceptual Arguments on Behalf of the
Common Law Approach

Aside from noting the practical reasons why an
originalist understanding of the First Amendment is
problematic, proponents of the common law view also
allude to its philosophical grounding. This is not to say that
common law constitutionalism is presented as a selfcontained system. However, the common law approach
possesses elements of a philosophical architecture meant to
indicate its adaptability and to parallel the prudential
arguments made in support of it.
For example, one defense of the common law
approach against the charge of indeterminacy is to note
how well its account of the development of First
Amendment law tracks with John Rawls' notion of
"reflective equilibrium." 23 The introduction of this concept
is intended as a description of the outcome of the accretion
of precedent over time insofar as it accurately characterizes
STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 8-9, 29-31.
22 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, 519 (1965)
(Black, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for a textualist reading of the First Amendment).
23 Strauss, Common Law supra note 1, at 888 ("The common law
approach captures the central features of our practices as a descriptive
matter. At the same time, it justifies our current practices, in reflective
equilibrium, to anyone who considers our current practices to be
generally acceptable - either as an original matter or because they are
the best practices that can be achieved for now in our society.").
21
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cases where different perspectives on the First Amendment
are in agreement. To the extent that the evolution of
precedent has guided the understanding of relevant
constitutional language, then this understanding is
something that is arrived at, and a condition that may be
changed by a future decision, much like how Rawls
characterized reflective equilibrium.24 In this manner,
reflective equilibrium is a useful concept to describe the
actual practices of constitutional interpretation.
Common law constitutionalism emphasizes that the
current generation should not be beholden to previous ones,
including the founding generation.25 With adherence to
precedent playing the reflective role, the evolution of First
Amendment standards over time is not to be feared.
Indeed, it is sensible to speak of an established tradition of
expanding First Amendment standards and of the common
law approach as marked by "rational traditionalism." 26
This traditionalism limits overreach by stressing
"humility about the power of individual human reason." 2
By acknowledging the limitation of abstract reasoning and
focusing instead on the solid grounding provided by past
precedent, the common law approach is a traditionalist
account. This emphasis on previously established workable
interpretations is consistent with what is called "bounded
24 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20-21 (1971)

("But this
equilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is liable to be upset by further
examination of the conditions which should be imposed on the
contractual situation and by particular cases which may lead us to
revise our judgments."). Id. at 48 ("As we have seen, this state is one
reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and
he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held
fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception).").
25 STRAUSS,

LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 18 ("Most

fundamental of all, originalists have yet to come to grips with the most
obvious and famous issue, one raised by Thomas Jefferson among
others. The world belongs to the living, Jefferson said.").
26 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 891-94.
27STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at
41.
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rationality,"-recognition that reliable outcomes are best
reached by treating some elements of the present
controversy as already settled.2 8
Another theoretical concept is used to explain the
virtue of the common law approach's conventionalismRawls' notion of an overlapping consensus. 29 The notion of
an overlapping consensus refers to the sort of agreement
over basic political principles that are possible even among
individuals who have different beliefs on notions of the
good, or differing comprehensive moral views.3 0 The
common law approach is compatible with the idea of an
overlapping consensus in that both imply a core area of
agreement that is possible even given substantially different
interpretive perspectives. This core provides stability that is
not possible through a simple agreement to respect
differences.31 While disagreements inevitably arise over
how to apply a given precedent, or even over whether or
not a particular precedent applies, this should not distract
from the role of precedent in constitutional interpretation,
an essential component to the core of the constitutional
approach.
Id. at 894 ("In modem terms one might say that traditionalism is a
recognition of bounded rationality. Humans are not perfect computing
machines. People do not have the resources, intellectual and otherwise,
to consider every question anew with any hope of consistently reaching
the right result.") (footnote omitted).
29 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 907 ("Conventionalism is a
generalization of the notion that it is more important that some things
be settled than that they be settled right. The text of the Constitution is
accepted (to adapt a term used in a related way by its originator) by an
'overlapping consensus': whatever their disagreements, people can
agree that the text of the Constitution is to be respected."). For Rawls's
28

usage, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
30 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 29, at 134-40.

31 Id. at 148 ("The test for this is whether the consensus is stable with
respect to changes in the distribution of power among views. This
feature of stability highlights a basic contrast between an overlapping
consensus and a modus vivendi, the stability of which does depend on
happenstance and a balance of relative forces.").
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Further, in arguing on behalf of his notion of an
overlapping consensus, Rawls stressed the need for
"reasonable pluralism." 32 Reasonable pluralism is
compatible with the notion of an overlapping consensus to
the extent that the substance of the overlapping consensus
is a set of commitments that are common to all reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. Such a perspective is useful in
making sense of fundamental aspects of the evolution of
First Amendment law, such as the commitment to
protecting core political speech. There is a clear line
connecting the reasonable baseline assertion that the First
Amendment protects core political speech with the reality
that the boundaries of that commitment have been marked
differently at various times.
In short, the common law approach makes two
important contributions. First, it provides a historically
grounded way of understanding how the First Amendment
has been interpreted. Second, it offers a theoretically rooted
basis justifying such a precedent-heavy method of
determining its meaning.
At the same time, each contribution is open to
challenge. The historical development of First Amendment
law may feature a settled general narrative but also
possesses room for important differences in which details as in whose contributions - are emphasized. Even the broad
historical narrative will be related differently depending on
whether it is related by one who sees the First Amendment
through a libertarian or egalitarian lens. 33
The theoretical argument for the common law
approach draws heavily on the historical reality but also
notes inherent benefits to seeing the First Amendment as
properly understood as the consequences of decades of
precedent. However, this view is open to the frequently
made critique that this developed precedent has warped the
32

Id. at xviii-xix.

33 Sullivan, supra note 4, at 144-46.
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actual meaning of the First Amendment. Of particular
potency is the argument that the First Amendment has
become a repository for arguments that are likely to fail if
rooted in other parts of the Constitution that more naturally
match the controversy at hand and thus, grabbing at the
heightened reputation of the First Amendment, are framed
as First Amendment controversies. 34 Each of these critiques
will be taken up in turn.
II.

Competing Narratives of the Development
of the Common Law First Amendment

The common law approach rightly notes that the
First Amendment, as presently understood, is exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with a textualist
understanding of the First Amendment.3 5 However, this
alone does not vindicate the common law description. A
careful reading of the common law approach shows that it
permits differing narrative characterizations of how the
First Amendment has evolved.
At one level, judgments regarding the extent to
which a particular case (Abrams, Masses,: or Whitney 37) or
Justice/judge (Holmes, Hand, or Brandeis) is stressed affect
how the overall narrative is constructed. Additional
important questions that color and shade the emerging
narrative of the evolutionary process by which the First
Amendment developed exist within this framework. For
example, when considering Justice Holmes' sizable role,
how should the relationship of his Schenck opinion to his
Abrams dissent be characterized?
Schauer, supra note 6, at 191 ("The arguments selected, however, are
less likely under these circumstances to be selected for their intrinsic
merit than for the likelihood that they will succeed.").
3 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 8-10.
36 See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd,
264 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
n See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
34
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Further, should the common law narrative focus
solely on Supreme Court decisions, or ought it take account
of lower-court decisions such as Learned Hand's opinion in
Masses? Emphasizing Masses opens the door to
considering pre-WWI activity in a way that most
proponents of the libertarian view find favorable. In a
similar vein, should the narrative include the contributions
of important legal scholars? For example, an analysis of
Zechariah Chafee's influence on Justice Holmes might
bolster the egalitarian argument on behalf of Holmes'
contributions.
Questions such as these counsel caution in
accepting a given narrative as settled; they do not prove the
futility of the common law approach. In fact, a common
law narrative that wrestles with such questions in good
faith serves as the best reminder that the common law
approach is justified roughly to the extent that it avoids the
originalist assumption that a single, unimpeachable
characterization exists.38 A proper common law narrative
requires a balance between putting forth a shared history
that can shoulder the weight of serving as precedent and
noting the joints that lead different groups (libertarians and
egalitarians in this telling) to emphasize different aspects of
the narrative. Several specific examples will help to make
this clear.
A.

The Importance of Pre-World War I Activity
to the Libertarian Narrative

A typical version of the common law approach
focuses on the twentieth century and almost exclusively on
the Supreme Court. 39 It combines the core political speech
narrative that began with Schenck and Abrams and
culminated with Brandenburg with other key decisions
38 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 7-31.
39

Id. at 62-76.
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roughly contemporary with Brandenburg such as New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan40 and New York Times Co. v. United
States4 1 that expanded the reach of the clause's
protections.4 2 Nothing that happened prior to World War I
is examined in any detail.4 3
While the common law historical narrative can
plausibly begin with the World War I era, libertarians view
this narrative of the First Amendment's development as
historically truncated in its failure to acknowledge other
actors who sought to begin the historical narrative earlier.
By limiting itself only to a few important Supreme Court
cases that advanced the understanding of the First
Amendment, it erroneously treats the Supreme Court as the
sole source of this evolutionary process. While
contemporary understandings of the First Amendment's
development justifiably focus on the Supreme Court as a
leading protector of free speech rights, the Court's role is
the culmination of the evolutionary process that the
common law approach stresses and is neither a permanent
nor an exclusive feature of it. The common law narrative
tends to evince little skepticism of the Supreme Court's
role, even though the Court, pre-WWI, showed little
interest in hearing from those who sought to expand the
reach and understanding of the Free Speech Clause."
Thus, both on their own terms, and for the influence that
they had on subsequent arguments centering around more
40
41
42

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53-56.

Strauss, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 44 ("The American
system of freedom of expression, as we know it, did not begin to
emerge as a coherent body of legal principles until well into the
twentieth century - in opinions written in a series of cases decided just
after World War I.").
44 RABBAN, supra note 10, at 15 ("Most dramatically, no group of
Americans was more hostile to free speech claims before World War I
than the judiciary, and no judges were more hostile than the justices on
the United States Supreme Court.").
43
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mainstream First Amendment disputes, the contributions of
so-called "libertarian radicalism" of the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century should receive greater attention in
the common law narrative. 45
For example, while the Comstock Act finds few
defenders today, at the time of its implementation, the most
vociferous opposition came from libertarian radical
thinkers such as Theodore Schroeder and Gilbert Roe,
whose arguments were focused less on a framework of core
political speech than on opposing obscenity prosecutions. 46
The libertarian radical perspective was heavily influenced
by the abolitionist movement and was thus less inclined to
understand the Free Speech Clause as limited by a notion of
the public good.47 In this sense, libertarian radicals treated
the First Amendment "opportunistically."4 8 This desire to
expand the scope of the First Amendment, and the refusal
to defer to any established notion of the public interest, ran
counter to the Court's own preferences at the time. In short,
libertarian radicals presented a vision of the value of the
First Amendment different from the standard common law
account of the time, yet one that ultimately came to be
viewed as largely conventional.
Additionally, while Schroeder and Roe were outside
the mainstream that appealed to influential Justices such as
Holmes and Brandeis, the scholars who influenced these
Justices were, in fact, influenced by strains of the
libertarian radical perspective. 4 9 Furthermore, Schroeder
4 Id. at 23.
46 Id. at 27-74.
47 Id. at 28 ("For some social purists, including Anthony Comstock,
expressions of libertarian radical views about religion and sex were
examples of blasphemy and obscenity that should be suppressed in the
public interest.").
48 Schauer, supra note 6, at 191-93.
49 As Rabban demonstrates, Ernst Freund called Zechariah Chafee's
attention to Schroeder's work in a personal letter. See RABBAN, supra
note 10, at 303 n.13.
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and Roe helped advance what evolved to become a core
principle of free speech that seems not to have received
much attention from the common law perspective:
protection for free speech as a fundamental principle and
not just for specific parties, content areas, or manners of
expression.o This commitment found fullest expression in
Schroeder and Roe's work with the Free Speech League, a
forerunner to, and influence on, the American Civil
Liberties Union. 5 ' This advocacy included challenging the
era's standards for criminal libel through the Masses case,
well in advance of Sullivan, the case stressed by the
common law approach.5 2
These early stirrings helped shape the direction of
subsequent debates, both by expanding the range of profree speech arguments offered and by influencing the
generation of scholars who most influenced Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, Justices who are central to the more
standard common law narrative. An accounting of the
development of the First Amendment that fails to note
these contributions is one that risks misconstruing the
evolutionary process.
B.

Holmes, Hand, and Getting to Abrams

Just as the common law narrative can be too limited
when it excludes early work such as the contributions of
libertarian radicals, it can also be too confined when
It should go without saying that the common law approach should be
read to endorse this view, and the reason it goes unmentioned may well
be because it is so uncontroversial at the present. However, the point
remains that well before the Court came to enshrine this view, it was
being advanced by these libertarian radicals and that departures from
this broad principle are usually justified in egalitarian language.
5' RABBAN, supra note 10, at 57-76.
52 For a discussion on Masses, see id. at 71. For a discussion on
Sullivan, see STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53-54,
73-75.
5o
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providing a reading of its own standard narrative, which
starts with Schenck and Abrams and ends with
Brandenburg and New York Times Co. v. United States.
Most specifically, by seeing the decisions in these latter
two cases as featuring a version of the clear and present
danger test, the common law perspective risks
oversimplifying what happened in between the former
two. 5 3 Even when the common law approach steps back
from too clean of a narrative, such as when it acknowledges
that there exists no single moment of inspiration for
defining what is protected free expression, it quickly
qualifies that claim by noting that this is true only because
Holmes' Abrams opinion was in dissent.5 4 However, the
reality is more contingent than this. Even if Holmes had
been writing for the Court, other moments, such as
Brandeis' subtly different celebration of First Amendment
values, might be favored from another narrative direction.
Furthermore, even if one were to accede to the
necessity of finding a single statement of free speech's
value to anchor the narrative account, and even if one were
to agree that Holmes' Abrams dissent is that statement, the
common law approach still must confront what appears to
be a significant shift in Holmes' own position, from writing
53 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 64 ("Holmes's

opinion asserted that the clear-and-present-danger test required the
government to show a high-probability risk of harm that is both
immediate and serious . . . . Versions of this test appear in the Pentagon

Papers case and in Brandenburg.").
54 Id. at 64-65.
5s Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH INTHE MODERN ERA, 73 (Lee C. Bollinger &

Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) ("Notwithstanding the magisterial
articulations of Justices Holmes, Roberts, Jackson, Black, Harlan, and
Brennan among others, if there is a single passage in the United States
Reports that best captures why the freedom of speech might be
considered the linchpin of the American constitutional regime, it is the
following paragraph from Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California")(footnotes omitted).
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for the Court in Schenck to his dissent in Abrams.56 In
Schenck, Holmes was troubled enough by the anti-war,
anti-conscription pamphlet that the defendants had been
handing out to invoke his famous example of "falsely
shouting fire in a theatre, and causing a panic . . . .";57
whereas in Abrams - mere months later - Holmes was

minimizing the threat posed by "the surreptitious
publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man." The
common law narrative may note the incongruity between
Holmes' statements, but it still tends to treat each as a step
in a logical progression.59
This retrospective view rationalizes Holmes'
statements, but it misses an opportunity to fully examine
the influences that may have led him to reconsider what he
wrote for the Court in Schenck. 60 While the common law
perspective never claims that Schenck and Abrams are
continuous, it minimizes the extent to which Schenck
represents a false start.6 1 It also ignores the extent to which

56

See, e.g.,

GEOFFREY STONE,

PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN

192-211 (2004).
5 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
5 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919).
59 Strauss, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 49 ("But as it happens,
the principle Holmes called for in the Abrams dissent is essentially
impossible to square with Schenck[,]" and "[i]n retrospect, it is possible
to understand what Holmes and Brandeis were doing, even though they
were not explicit about it at the time, nor even, probably, fully
conscious of it.").
60 STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 208 (2004) ("Although
the explanation for Holmes's sudden passion for the freedom of speech
remains a wonderful mystery, there can be little doubt that his reading
in the summer of 1919 and his discussions with [Learned] Hand,
[Zechariah] Chafee, and [Harold] Laski sparked a change in his
thinking.").
61 HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN AMERICA 138 (1988) ("We confront therefore a benign conspiracy.
With the advent of the Holmes eloquence in Abrams, Schenck is
infused with new vitality and Debs is conveniently forgotten. The
WARTIME
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Holmes' views announced in Schenck were consistent with
what Holmes had previously written, especially his opinion
in Patterson v. Colorado.62 Patterson is notable for how
narrowly it read the First Amendment, closely adhering to
Blackstone's view that the only significant restriction on
the government was a prohibition on prior restraints. 63
Thus, a less constrained narrative reveals that
Holmes, while still a major figure in the evolution of our
understanding of the First Amendment, was viewed as
advocating a cramped understanding of the First
Amendment by libertarian radical activists, numerous
scholars influenced by these activists, lower court judges
such as Learned Hand, and fellow members of the Supreme
Court, such as Justice Harlan in Patterson.64 Hand's
opinion in Masses is of particular relevance, both because it
offers a well-developed alternative to Holmes' viewpoint,
and, insofar as contemporary free speech standards are
viewed, as somewhat of a Holmes-Hand hybrid.
Just as Holmes would two years later in Schenck,
Hand was dealing with a prosecution under the Espionage
Act of 1917. However, Hand chose to focus more directly
and explicitly on what the illustrations and language in
question stated and not on any bad tendency that could be
imputed to the challenged expression. Hand combined this
emphasis on actual assertion - rather than estimating
consequences - with a careful construction of the statutory
language and reached an "extraordinarily speech-

tradition is read as though the Abrams dissent had in fact been the
opinion for the unanimous Court in Schenck.").
62 See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454
(1907).
63 RABBAN, supra note 10, at 130-34.
6 Id. at 134 ("Justice Harlan's dissent in Patterson contained a
vigorous, if undeveloped, defense of free speech under the First
Amendment. Harlan explicitly opposed Holmes's conclusion that the
First Amendment prevents only prior restraints."). See Patterson , 205
U.S. at 465.

113

9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 114
protective" interpretation of the 1917 law. 65 Hand's
decision distinguished between speech that could be
viewed as disloyal or unpatriotic but nonetheless
constitutional, and speech that expressly advocated illegal
activity which was not:
Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as
such, with direct incitement to violent
resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all
methods of political agitation which in
normal times is a safeguard of free
government. The distinction is not a
scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought
acquisition in the fight for freedom, and the
purpose to disregard it must be evident when
the power exists. If one stops short of urging
upon others that it is their duty or their
interest to resist the law, it seems to me one
should not be held to have attempted to
cause its violation. 66
Hand chose such a speech-protective approach at great
potential risk to his own career.67 Unlike Holmes, who was
firmly ensconced on the highest court in the land, Hand
was hoping for a promotion to the court of appeals but was
passed over shortly after his Masses opinion was reversed
by the Second Circuit.68 It is easy to conclude that the

65 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND
THE JUDGE 128

(1994) [hereinafter GUNTHER , LEARNED HAND: THE MAN].

See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1917),
rev'd, 264 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
66

STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 165-66.
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN, supra note 65, at 161; STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 169. See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten,
67

68

246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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progress of free speech was slowed both by the reversal of
Masses and by Hand's being passed over. 69
Also worth noting is that this emphasis on Hand's
Masses decision is not a recent phenomenon. Hand's
importance, and the distinctiveness of his approach
compared to that of Holmes, has been noted for some
time.7 0 Indeed, in correspondence with and about Holmes,
Hand himself sought to articulate the specific differences
he saw between his and Holmes' approaches.'
Hand feared that more context-dependent tests
would lead to an interpretive morass born of the challenge
of offering precise boundaries to terms such as bad
tendency or clear and present danger. From this
perspective, the debate over whether Holmes announced a
new, stricter reading of clear and present danger in Abrams,
or whether the context of the fact pattern in Abrams explain
Holmes' decision to switch and vote to strike down a
conviction, is beside the point.72 What mattered to Hand
was that reliance on such standards permitted such
confusion. Instead, in his Masses opinion, Hand offered up
a clearer and more strongly speech-protective standard, one

The open judgeship went instead to Martin T. Manton, who viewed
Ulysses as obscene and was ultimately convicted of accepting bribes.
See GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN, supra note 65, at 335-43,
503-13.
70 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719 (1975) [hereinafter Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins].
69

71 See RABBAN,

supra note 10, at 293-97; STONE, PERILOUS TIMES,

supra note 56, at 198-203; Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins,
supra note 70, at 732-50.
72 See STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 192-95; GUNTHER,

supra note 65, at 140-41. As noted, such an argument also meshes well
with the similarities between Holmes' opinions in Schenck and
Patterson.

115

9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 116
that has been widely hailed, even if it is muted in standard
common law accounts.7 3
C.

The Common Law First Amendment is Both
Egalitarian and Libertarian

The current First Amendment standard Brandenburg's requirement of both the intent and
likelihood of producing "imminent lawless action" combines elements of both Hand and Holmes in a way that
is more speech-protective than the standards announced by
either individually. In this way, the culmination of the
common law evolution of the First Amendment contains
both egalitarian and libertarian components.
Even taken on its own, Holmes' perspective
combines egalitarian and libertarian elements. Insofar as his
Abrams dissent was consistent with the view of First
Amendment as "a negative check on government
tyranny," 74 it sought libertarian consequences. Thus,
viewed retrospectively, it is narrowly accurate to see in
Holmes a commitment to the libertarian vision.
However, Holmes' emphasis on the "competition of
the market" as the "best test of truth" is paired with his
understanding of the Constitution as "an experiment." 75
This view, consistent with the pragmatic strain of
progressive thought, treats free speech as crucial insofar as
a fair competition is crucial to societal advancement, and
not as a fundamental liberty possessed by individuals.
73 For accounts that acknowledge the importance of Masses, see
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN, supra note 65, at 151-163;
KALVEN, supra note 61, at 126-30; RABBAN, supra note 10, at 26166;WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN WARTIME 175-178 (1998); STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56,
at 165-70.
74 Sullivan, supra note 4, at 145.
7 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting).
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Compared to the libertarian radicals of the time, or even to
Hand's more absolute First Amendment standard, it is hard
to view Holmes' yosition as libertarian in any broader
sense of the term. Holmes' focus on the societal over the
individual is consistent with the general deference to
legislative enactments that marked his jurisprudence. 7
When combined with the contingencies implicit in his more
contextual clear and present danger standard, it is clear that
in a broader historical context, Holmes' approach was more
egalitarian than available alternatives.
Thus, while Brandenburg is among the most
absolute, speech-protective, libertarian statements of the
purpose of the First Amendment, it can still be placed in
notably different contexts depending on how its place in the
overall narrative is presented. Consider two different
statements of Brandenburg'simportance. The first implies
that Hand's Masses opinion is an equal partner to Holmes'
clear and present danger standard and proclaims
Brandenburgto be:
[The] clearest and most protective standard
under the [F]irst [A]mendment .

. .

. In one

sense, Brandenburg combines the most
protective ingredients of the Masses
incitement emphasis with the most useful
elements of the clear and present danger
Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN
AMERICA 65 (2001) ("The key to Holmes's civil liberties opinions is
76

the key to all his jurisprudence: it is that he thought only in terms of
aggregate social forces; he had no concern for the individual.").
77 Id. ("It is easy to see Holmes's concern for allowing democracy to
work its way, without peremptory restriction by courts, in his opinions
in cases involving economic issues... .But that concern is also at the
bottom of his opinions in the civil liberties cases . . . . Those were

ostensibly First Amendment disputes; but their real grounds were
economic. For in every case, the defendant was some kind of
socialist.").
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heritage . . . . Brandenburg is the most

speech-protective standard yet evolved by
the Supreme Court.7 8
The second opts not to mention Hand or Masses by
name and paints a picture of the core of clear and present
danger remaining, but being augmented by later decisions
with the following result:
Brandenburg was the product of two strands
of well-developed twentieth-century legal
evolution . . . . In Brandenburg, the Court

concluded that, although the HolmesBrandeis test captured something important
about the First Amendment, that test was not
sufficient by itself . . .. So in Brandenburg,

the Court combined the Holmes-Brandeis
line of precedents with Chaplinsky and
Yates-cases that emphasized the distinction
between high- and low-value speech.7 9
There is a broad commonality in these accounts, but
also significant differences. While the former attributes the
incitement element in Brandenburg to Hand's Masses
opinion, the latter derives it from later Supreme Court cases
and characterizes it as a distinction regarding the inherent
value of the speech. Thus, the first statement portrays
Brandenburg as a robust, maximally speech-protective
standard, whereas the latter presents Brandenburg as
substituting a better context-based consideration - highversus low-value speech - for Holmes' somewhat outdated
version. For a number of reasons - the relative dormancy
78 Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins,supra note 70, at 754-55.

79 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 72-73.
8o Id. at 73 ("The evidence for that conclusion [that clear and present
danger was insufficient] was the product of trial and error: specifically,
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of Chaplinsky's "fighting words" standard, 81 the expansion
of libel protections beyond Sullivan (another case stressed
by the common law approach 82), and the historical
importance of Hand's contributions 83 --there is, at least, a
compelling case to be made that the first account does a
better job of communicating the range covered by the
evolution of First Amendment doctrine in all of its fits and
starts. 84
Thus, while there is a shared core to varying
accounts of the First Amendment's common law
development, it can be presented with significant degrees
of libertarian-or egalitarian-directed emphasis. This is
also true with respect to free speech controversies outside
the range of core political speech. In their advocacy against
the Comstock Act, libertarian radicals invoked the First
Amendment in appealing obscenity convictions.ss
However, from a more egalitarian direction, obscenity is
low-value speech. 86 Of course, what was held to be obscene
under the Comstock Act is a far cry from the Warren
Court's line of obscenity cases. The common law account
needs to be augmented with a consideration of the
necessary opportunism of the First Amendment.

the use to which the test had been put in Dennis. In the crucible of
common law testing, clear and present danger collapsed too easily into
simple balancing of costs and benefits.").
8' See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
82 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53-54, 73-75.

83 See Gunther, Learned Handand the Origins,supra note 70; Geoffrey
R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A
Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 335 (2003). See also KALVEN,
supra note 61, at 125-30.
84 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53 ("The story of

the emergence of the American constitutional law of free speech is a
story of evolution and precedent, trial and error-a demonstration of
how the living Constitution works.").

85 RABBAN, supra note 10, at 28-44.
86 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 54,
69.
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III.

The Necessary Opportunism of the Common
Law First Amendment

An oft-made criticism of the common law approach
is that it can wind up, by intended outcome or as the
consequence of rigid adherence to precedent, justifying
outcomes that never were intended by the original drafters
of the relevant text. While this taps into a much larger,
well-worn debate over constitutional interpretation, there is
a specific critique that is of particular relevance here. The
charge of First Amendment opportunism consists in the
claim that, likely owing to the reverence with which it is
held and its high likelihood of success, the First
Amendment has come to serve as a convenient lifeline for
arguments that may be more accurately anchored in other
legal theories, though likely with a lowered chance of
victory.8 7
This charge is made with some ambivalence.8 8 On
the one hand, opportunistic use of the First Amendment
raises several concerns, notably: potential negative
repercussions for the First Amendment as present, 89
misunderstandings of the First Amendment's intended
Schauer, supra note 6, at 175 ("In many respects, the culture of First
Amendment discourse and argument, both in the courtroom and in the
larger culture, exhibits many of the same features as being faced with
driving a nail with a pipe wrench. With surprising frequency, people
and organizations with a wide array of political goals find that society
has not given them the doctrinally or rhetorically effective
8

argumentative tools they need to advance their goals . . . . And in

looking for these imperfect but usable tools, they often find that the
leading candidate is the First Amendment. Like the pipe wrench, the
First Amendment is frequently called on to do a job for which it is
poorly designed.").
Id. at 176 ("When people make do with whatever happens to be
available to them we call them 'opportunistic,' a word that hovers
precariously between the pejorative and the complimentary.").
9 Id. at 175 ([Under such opportunistic usage,] "the job gets done
poorly and the tool is damaged in the process.").
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purpose, 90 and weaknesses with the common law
approach. 9 1 On the other hand, such concerns would prove
ill-founded if no agreed upon understanding of the First
Amendment's intended purpose exists 92 and, thus, the
common law approach offers an accurate description. 93
When specific examples of First Amendment
opportunism are offered, the potential ambiguity is only
compounded. For instance, the example of campaign
finance reform may be opportunistic,94 but it may also be a
logical implication of the libertarian vision of the First
Amendment. 95 Or, more likely, it may be both.
As a strictly logical matter, one might temporarily
concede that there is an intended purpose of the First
Amendment. At the very least, this means that either the
libertarian or the egalitarian vision of the First Amendment
is opportunistic in a damaging way. In fact, such a
concession would likely imply that both visions are
Id. at 195 ("If First Amendment opportunism is as widespread as I
suspect, and as some of the documentation here may suggest, then the
First Amendment, precisely because of its cultural salience and
consequent empirical persuasiveness, may be especially vulnerable to
the kind of misuse and consequent distortion that I am suggesting ....
[It] may over time lose its ability to perform the function for which it
was originally designed.").
9' Id. at 192 ("All of this is of course the armchair sociology of
doctrinal evolution.").
92 Id. at 195 ("It may turn out that in the final analysis none of the
justifications for a distinct free-speech principle is sound, and the that
the First Amendment is revealed to be merely the raw material of
opportunism and nothing else.") (footnote omitted).
9 Id. at 196-97 ("[I]f instead we see the First Amendment as
intrinsically, fundamentally, or even just largely as an artifact of a
constitution that is itself a common-law document, then it would be
hard to make sense of the idea of the First Amendment, and arguably of
the idea of free speech, apart from what the courts have made of it, and
apart from the necessarily and nonproblematically opportunistic way of
common law.").
94 Id. at 188-90.
9 See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 157-58, 161-63, 167-77.
9
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negatively opportunistic. For example, one who believes
the First Amendment has an intended purpose is likely to
be suspicious of attempts to expand it to the realm of sexual
expression, whether it be in the service of libertarian
arguments on behalf of nude dancing,96 or egalitarian
arguments against First Amendment protection of
exploitive, objectifying pornography.
A narrower evaluation of opportunism in its
negative connotation should steer clear of controversies
that can better be described divided along libertarian versus
egalitarian lines. Such disputes are often framed by both
sides as arguments over which vision is truer to the
intended purpose of the First Amendment. To declare a pox
on both houses in such situations is to declare the necessity
of First Amendment opportunism on the cheap. There are
more sustained arguments against First Amendment
opportunism that must be addressed on a deeper level, ones
that are made against both visions of the First Amendment
and expressly in situations where those visions appear to

converge. 97
In recent years, two different anti-opportunism
arguments have been put forth by members of the Supreme
Court. One, Justice Thomas' concurrence in Morse v.
Frederick,98 fits comfortably within the view that
opportunism leads to the First Amendment being extended
beyond its intended purpose. The other, Justice Alito's
dissent in United States v. Stevens, 99 is less direct in citing
an original intended purpose of the First Amendment.
However, he still provides a considered argument against

96

Id. at 180-83, 191.

See id. at 163-67 (providing examples of points of convergence
between the libertarian and egalitarian visions).
98 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-22 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
99 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592-1602 (2010)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
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the opportunism, or, frankly, the meta-opportunism he sees
in the Court's usage of the overbreadth doctrine.
While Alito's Stevens dissent is not the
first
instance of such an argument, it merits specific attention for
two different reasons. First, Alito's critique of a too lenient
application of the overbreadth doctrine is a part of his
general uneasiness over what he sees as the ever-expanding
scope of the First Amendment. In this way, his more recent
dissent in Snyder v. Phelps'00 further announces a
developing anti-opportunism distinct from either the
libertarian or egalitarian vision. Second, the logic of Alito's
Stevens dissent played a conspicuous role in Justice
Breyer's dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association,01 suggesting that there exists an antiopportunism argument that could potentially appeal to
justices otherwise associated with competing First
Amendment visions. Each anti-opportunism argument will
be examined in turn.
A.

Justice Thomas' anti-opportunism

Justice Thomas' anti-opportunistic view of the First
Amendment develops out of his interpretive methodology,
which stresses the original public understanding of a
document.102 This view is consistent with his overall
100See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222-29 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
10'See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Assn., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2761-71 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
102 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410-11, 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("In my view, the history of public education suggests that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech
in public schools . .

.

. In my view, petitioners could prevail for a much

simpler reason: As originally understood, the Constitution does not
afford students a right to free speech in public schools."). See also
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2751, 2759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
decision today does not comport with the original public understanding
of the First Amendment

. . . . Admittedly, the original public

123

9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 124
constitutional jurisprudence and not limited to First
Amendment considerations.1 03 Thomas' approach leads
him to view appeals to stare decisis with considerable
skepticism and to express a readiness to overturn even
long-standing precedent if he believes it to be poorly

grounded.104
Such was the case in Morse v. Frederick, where
Thomas, in concurrence, announced his view that he would
go further than the Court's opinion and vote to overturn the
precedent set in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.105 To Thomas, Tinker
conflicted with the original understanding of the First
Amendment, which simply could not have been conceived
to protect free speech rights in a public education setting
given what the historical record reveals.106 Thomas'
opinion applies the common law doctrine of in loco
parentis, concluding that free speech rights in a public
school setting are virtually nonexistent.' 07
Though rather brief by contemporary standards,
Thomas' opinion has far-reaching implications. The fact
that respondent Frederick was not a minor at the time of the
controversy was "inconsequential" to Thomas because
understanding of a constitutional provision does not always comport
with modem sensibilities.").
103 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3072
(2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and in the judgment) ("When interpreting
constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most likely public
understanding of a particular provision at the time it was adopted.").
I Id. at 3062-63 ("I acknowledge the volume of precedents that have
been built upon the substantive due process framework, and I further
acknowledge the importance of stare decisis to the stability of the
Nation's legal system. But stare decisis is only an 'adjunct' of our duty
as judges to decide by our best lights what the Constitution means.")
(citation omitted).
105 Morse, 551 U.S. at 417-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
o Id. at 416-19.
1o7 Id. at 413-19.
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"courts have applied the doctrine of in loco parentis
regardless of the student's age."o Further, though not
directly implicated by the case at hand, Thomas'
interpretation would potentially uphold denial of free
speech rights at the college level,109 imposition of corporal
punishment in public school settings," o and compelled
speech in public school settings.'i' Because of the absence
of constitutional protection for such speech, courts would
have less of a basis to scrutinize the rationale behind any
actions taken against students, and school administrators
would be free to punish students based on their readings on
the intent behind the speech.112
Concurrent with the specific elaboration of Thomas'
in loco parentis-based understanding, of the original public
understanding of the First Amendment in a public
education setting, is his view of the proper avenue for relief
should one find his opinion overly restrictive of free speech
rights in such a setting. In announcing that overlyrestrictive rules "can be challenged by parents in the
political process," Thomas is drawing a contrast with the
common law approach evidenced in Tinker, which
"substituted judicial oversight of the day-to-day affairs of
public schools."" 3 Clearly, regardless of how described,
whether as opportunism or adherence to common law
development, Justice Thomas forcefully opposes such an
approach. He believes the First Amendment has a "function

08

See id, at 413 n.3.
109 Id. at 412 n.2.
" 0 Id. at 414 n.4.
." Id. at 415 n.5.
112 Id. at 415, 419. (discussing Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915)).
113 Id. at 420. See also id. at 421 ("Historically, courts reasoned that
only local school districts were entitled to make those calls. The Tinker
Court usurped that traditional authority for the judiciary.").
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for which it was originally designed"ll 4 and he is prepared
to limit its application accordingly.
Indeed, Thomas continues to apply his in loco
parentis-based reading outside of a public education
setting. In Brown v. EntertainmentMerchants Association,
Thomas declares that the First Amendment does not
include "a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to
access speech) without going through the minors' parents
or guardians."" 5 Going into more detail than he does in
Morse, Thomas lays out a detailed analysis of the historical
evidence regarding "the founding generation's views on
children and the parent-child relationship."" 6 This survey
leads Thomas to reiterate the conclusion he reached in
Morse, namely that "the Framers could not possibly have
understood 'the freedom of speech' to include an
unqualified right to speak to minors." 1 7
Consequently, as applied to the California ban on
video games sales to minors, Thomas would uphold the law
as exactly the type of action through the political process
that he believes to be the appropriate way of navigating the
contours of in loco parentis. The ban in question did not
seek to completely prohibit minor possession of violent
video games. Instead, it sought only to make sure that such
possession occurred only if a parent or guardian purchased
the game on the minor's behalf. Such a law, to Thomas, is
consistent with in loco parentis, and therefore, cannot be a
violation of the First Amendment.
Viewed together, one can see in Justice Thomas'
Morse and Brown opinions a clearly drawn understanding
of the original public understanding of the First
Amendment. This understanding would significantly limit
Schauer, supra note 6, at 195.
11 See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751(2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2752.
" Id. at 2759.
114
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the current reach of the First Amendment in cases
involving minors owing to the doctrine in loco parentis.
However, in cases not involving minors, Justice Thomas
can still support an expansive understanding of the First
Amendment's scope, one that can accurately be referred to
as libertarian when discussing Citizens United, for
example. The point is not that Thomas favors a broader or
narrower reading of the First Amendment, but rather that he
has announced a specific principle that can be characterized
as anti-opportunistic. His is not the only such principle,
however; and if Brown is any guide, it may well be Justice
Alito's approach that would have the best chance of
mustering a majority that counters the more typical
common law view.
B.

Justice Alito's Anti-opportunism

Justice Alito's approach is less rooted in the original
public understanding of the Framers." 8 Rather, Alito's
view, though anti-opportunistic in application, proceeds
from a distinction critical to the common law approach, the
distinction between high- and low-value speech."l 9 While
not a tacit endorsement of an egalitarian approach, Alito's
dissents in United States v. Stevens and Snyder v. Phelps
are strong critiques of a libertarian vision that would almost

"8 Indeed, Alito's concurrence in Morse v. Frederick endorsed the
value of Tinker as precedent and drew a clear contrast with Thomas'
concurrence. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito,
J., concurring) ("When public school authorities regulate student
speech, they act as agents of the State; they do not stand in the shoes of
the students' parents. It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents
simply delegate their authority - including their authority to determine
what their children may say and hear - to public school authorities. It is
even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of authority
somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the
State.").
Il9 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 54.
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reflexively strike down any enactment on First Amendment
grounds.
In Stevens, Alito notes that the specific intent of the
law in question was to prohibit "a form of depraved
entertainment that has no social value."' 20 He is particularly
critical of the majority's use of the overbreadth doctrine in
striking down a federal statute that prohibited the
production, sale, or possession of depictions of animal
cruelty. In his dissent, Alito makes a sustained criticism of
using overbreadth to strike down laws that he believes
would be upheld under an as-applied standard. In making
this criticism, Alito relates an excerpt from Board of
Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox that serves as a useful
one-sentence distillation of the anti-opportunism viewpoint:
"Ordinarily, the principal advantage of the overbreadth
doctrine for a litigant is that it enables him to benefit from
the statute's unlawful application to someone else."l21
Overbreadth has its applicability; it ought to be used as a
last resort, only in cases of "substantial" overbreadth
evidenced from "actual facts" showing a "realistic danger"
of the First Amendment being compromised.1 22
To heighten his low-value argument, Alito draws
most heavily on New York v. Ferber, the 1983 case in
which the Court held that child pornography, regardless of
whether the material is actually obscene, was of
"exceedingly modest, if not de minimis" value and not
entitled to any First Amendment protection.123 Alito
provides several arguments as to the low value of the
depictions targeted by the statute and concludes that the
logic of Ferber should extend to the case in question.
120

See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (Alito, J.,

dissenting).
121 Id. at 1593 (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 483 (1989)).
122 Id. at 1594.
123 Id. at 1599 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63
(1982)).
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Alito extends this argument in Snyder v. Phelps.
Alone among the Justices, Alito believes the intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IlIED) tort in question does
not run afoul of the First Amendment. Alito again
emphasizes the distinction between high- and low-value
speech, seeing no constitutional basis to protect speech that
"intentionally inflict[s] severe emotional injury on a private
person at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by
launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution

to public debate."l 24
Of particular note is Alito's contention that the
majority picks and chooses which expressions of the
Westboro Baptist Church to consider. He is chagrined that
the majority declined to consider an online account of the
church's picketing of Matthew Snyder's funeral.125 While
the Court claimed that is was a separate event from the
picketing itself and, therefore, not part of the HED tort,
Alito countered by noting that the Court had considered
previous protests by the church to further the majority's
view that the church's activities merited First Amendment
protection. Given that the online account "addressed the
Snyder family directly,"l 26 Alito notes that consideration of
it significantly strengthens that argument that a claim of
IED is justifiable. Implicit in Alito's dissent is the
assertion that the majority is being opportunistic in how it
determines which statements to consider and that their
opportunism is in service of extending First Amendment
protection beyond its proper scope. In contrast, Alito states
that he "fail[s] to see why actionable speech should be
immunized simply because it is interspersed with speech
that is protected." 27
See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
125 Id. at 1225-26
n.15.
126 Id. at 1226.
127 Id. at 1227.
124
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Contrary to Thomas' anti-opportunism, Alito does
not attempt in either of his solitary dissents to announce
just what the original expectation of the First Amendment
was with respect to the particular controversy under
consideration. However, each dissent makes clear his
displeasure with the majority for inappropriately stretching
the First Amdendment-whether through application of the
overbreadth doctrine or through selective consideration of
statements-beyond its logically necessary range of
application. Perhaps because his criticism is not tethered to
an exact reading of the First Amendment's original
function, it has been subsequently adopted by another
justice in a way that Thomas' has not.
In his dissent in Brown v. EntertainmentMerchants
Association. Justice Breyer favorably cites Alito's Stevens
dissent when arguing that the Court has over-expansively
applied the First Amendment in striking down a California
prohibition on the sale of violent video games to minors.12 8
As noted previously, Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting
opinion in this case; one rooted in his in loco parentis view
of the original understanding of the First Amendment's
application with respect to minors. When Justice Breyer
announces that "the special First Amendment category I
find relevant is not (as the Court claims) the category of
'depictions of violence,' but rather the category of
'protection of children"' 1 29 he appears to concur with
Thomas' understanding of the specific issue. However, by
citing Alito's Stevens dissent, he is declining to endorse the
specific logic of Thomas' approach.
Also noteworthy about Breyer's dissent, however, is
that it directly responds to Justice Alito's concurrence.
128Brown

v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2762 (Breyer,
J.,
dissenting) ("A facial challenge to this statute based on the First
Amendment can succeed only if 'a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."') (citing Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587)).
129 Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus, we are faced a situation where Breyer is tacitly
arguing that Justice Alito is not being faithful to his own
views. Certainly, this could be attributed to gamesmanship
on Breyer's part. However, Alito's concurrence also
indicates discomfort with the more expansive approach
taken by the Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court and is at
pains to stress that "[a]lthough the California statute is well
intentioned, its terms are not framed with the precision that
the Constitution demands, and I therefore agree with the
Court that this particular law cannot be sustained."l 30 Alito
shares Breyer's view that the majority is too quick to rely
on an expansive application of the First Amendment.
Rather than the "broad ground adopted by the Court,"
Justice Alito relies on the "narrower ground that the law's
definition of 'violent video game' is impermissibly
vague."'31
Nonetheless, the fact remains that Alito felt required
to concur, albeit on narrower grounds. While Breyer argued
that the California legislature acted appropriately in using
the Miller v. California'32 obscenity test as a guide in
crafting its law, Alito disagreed. The California law is a
regulation of "expression related to violence," a type of
prohibition with no long-standing history behind it. On the
other hand, Alito argues that "obscenity had long been
prohibited" by the time the Court turned its attention to it in
the 1960's.133 In other words, Alito's distinction is
predicated on there existing a common law understanding
of obscenity being outside the scope of First Amendment
protection in a way that violent expression is not.
Alito may introduce an anti-opportunism argument
in Stevens, but he does not believe it can override a settled

Id. at 2742.
131Id. (citations omitted).

130

132 See

generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

133 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2746 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at

484-85).
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common law understanding in the present case. Breyer
declined to join Alito's dissent in Stevens, joining instead
the majority's application of the overbreadth doctrine.
Thus, while barely a year old, Alito's anti-opportunism
argument in Stevens is already susceptible to the claim that
it is open to being used opportunistically. The problem of
First Amendment opportunism may be compared to using a
pipe wrench to drive a nail, but in reality it is not so simple
to identify. 134 Less a matter of using the wrong tool because
it is the only tool present, the various criticisms of the
Court's approach in Morse, Stevens, Snyder, Phelps, and
Brown is more akin to the claim that the Court used a
paring knife when it had a scalpel at its disposal. The
consequence is less that the First Amendment is misshapen
than that its boundaries are imprecise. However, under a
common law understanding, this is necessarily so, and not a
significant cause for despair.
Conclusion
The common law understanding of the First
Amendment is firmly entrenched. Brandenburg casts a tall
shadow and virtually any remotely controversial free
speech case turns on whether the contact is or is not located
within a proscribed category of speech and therefore
regulable. In other words, there exists a well-accepted
framework for talking about what free speech is. This is
appropriate.
Within this agreed upon framework, however, more
than one compelling narrative can operate. Egalitarian and
libertarian accounts will reach different conclusions about
when a category threshold has been breached. Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,135 ChristianLegal

134
13

Schauer. supra note 6.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Society v. Martinez,13 United States v. Williams, m and
United States v. Alvarezl38 are recent examples where these
accounts have led to a closely and strongly divided Court.
It is entirely likely that the common law First Amendment
will continue to evolve. However, there is little reason to
expect that evolution to alter the fundamental postBrandenburgunderstanding of the Free Speech Clause.
This is true in large part because the most
contemporary understandings of the First Amendment are
welcoming of opportunistic arguments that seek to add to
the range of communication and conduct that fit within its
protection. Where a case does not cut along explicit
libertarian/egalitarian lines, the Court has shown a clear
tendency to find in favor of the speaker. Put differently,
questions of whether the First Amendment has become too
opportunistic are judge-refereed and there is scant evidence
of a critical mass existing that would call into question the
present consensus as announced in cases such as Stevens,
Snyder, and Brown.

See Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010).
137 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285
(2008).
138 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
136
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STUDENT POLICY NOTE
VIEWING TENNESSEE'S NEW PHOTO IDENTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTERS THROUGH HISTORICAL AND
NATIONAL LENS

DanielSullivan
I.

Introduction

In 2011, Tennessee became only the fifth U.S. state
to strictly require photograph identification as a
prerequisite to voting.' Over the past decade, a nationwide
battle has been brewing over voter identification laws. In
fact, "[s]ince 2001, nearly 1,000 bills have been introduced
in a total of 46 states," with 21 states passing "major [voter
identification] legislation between 2003 and 2011.,,2
2011 alone, 34 states took up the issue, either "proposals
for new voter ID laws in states that didn't already require
voter ID at the polls (considered in 20 states), [or]
proposals to strengthen existing voter ID requirements in
order to require photo ID at the polls (considered in 14
states)." 3 Despite its prevalence in state legislatures last
year, the debate shows no signs of slowing down, as

1Michael
in

a

Lollar, Law Requiring Photo ID Puts Some Tennessee Voters
Tizzy,

THE

COMMERCIAL

APPEAL,

July

29,

2011,

http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/201 I/jul/29/identity-crisis/.
See 2011 Tenn. Pub. Ch. 323; 2011 Tenn. SB 16. Governor Bill
Haslam signed the 10 7 th General Assembly's Senate Bill No. 16 into
law on May 30, 2011.
2 Voter IdentificationRequirements, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES

http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx
visited July 17, 2012).
3
id.

(last
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4

legislation is pending in 32 states this year.
Despite the majority of states taking on voter
identification laws, only 14 states have passed strict photo
identification measures,5 with five blocked by governor
veto.6 Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, and Pennsylvania
currently join Tennessee in requiring strict voter
identification. 7 Meanwhile, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Texas are awaiting preclearance from the Department
of Justice and/or the Federal District Court of Washington,
D.C. under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
4 Id.

These new proposals include "new voter ID proposals in 14 states,
proposals to strengthen existing voter ID laws in ten states, and bills in
nine states to amend the new voter ID laws passed in 2011."
5 "Strict" voter identification laws refer to provisions that state a ballot
cannot be cast by a voter without first showing photo identification.
"Voters who are unable to show ID at the polls are given a provisional
ballot. Those provisional ballots are kept separate from the regular
ballots. If the voter returns to election officials within a short period of
time after the election (generally a few days [Three days in Tennessee])
and presents acceptable ID, the provisional ballot is counted. If the
voter does not come back to show ID, that provisional ballot is never
counted." Non-strict voter identification laws allow voters to cast a
regular ballot with a signed affidavit of identity or having a poll worker
vouch for their identity due to a personal and previous relationship.
Voter Identification Requirements, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES

http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx (last
visited July 17, 2012) .
6 Id (Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, and North
Carolina).
7
Id.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006). Section 5
is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, outlining the procedures
when voting qualification standards have been altered, particularly the
preclearance procedure from the Department of Justice, and the
subsequent appeal process, including the initial hearing by a three judge
panel and the final appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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before their voter identification laws can go into effect.9
Lastly, Alabama passed a law requiring strict photo
identification starting in 2014 and will also have to receive
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act prior to the
effective date. 'o

It is not merely state legislatures who are shaping
voter identification requirements across the country, but
also the executive branch, through the Department of
Justice, and the judiciary. The Supreme Court recently
provided guidance on the issue in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board when it held that an Indiana law
requiring photo identification to vote was constitutional.
Consequently, most states, including South Carolina and
Texas, carefully crafted the language of their laws to
conform to Indiana's constitutional model.12 Despite the
deference to the Supreme Court's decision, the Department
of Justice has denied preclearance to both South Carolina
and Texas.' 3 As Texas' appeal reaches the courts, as "part
9 Horace Cooper, Justice Department Plays Fastand Loose with Facts
and Constitution in Challenging Texas Voter ID Law, THE NATIONAL
CENTER

FOR

PUBLIC

POLICY

RESEARCH

(2012),

available at

http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA633.html. See
Also
Voter
Identification Requirements, supra note 2 (Explaining South Carolina's
and Texas' appeals following denial of preclearance from the
Department of Justice).
'0 Voter IdentificationRequirements, supra note 2.
" Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
12 Cooper, supra
note 9.
13Letter from Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Dep't of Justice,
to Keith Ingram, Dir. of Elections, Office of the Tex. Sec'y of State
(Mar.
12,
2012)
(available
at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/fe6a21493d7eclaafc-vym6b9Idt.pdf);
Letter
from Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to C.
Havird Jones, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen., Office of the S.C.
Attorney
Gen.
(Dec.
23,
2011)
(available
at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/594b9cf4396be7ebc8 Opm6i2fx6.pdf).
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304022004577516953
618032404.html.
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of a flurry of legal action in the past two years surrounding
the Voting Rights Act,"' 4 it is a real possibility that the
Supreme Court may revisit the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
particularly Section 5.15
The recent push for more stringent voter
identification requirements has been widely debated, with
strong convictions on both sides,' 6 and not surprisingly,
down party lines.17 While voter fraud concerns may be
valid, all citizens' right to vote must be fiercely protected,
14Devlin Barrett, U.S., Texas Clash Over Voter-ID Law, WALL ST. J.,
July 9, 2012,
15See generally Barrett, supra note 14 (stating "The... cases represent

part of a flurry of legal action in the past two years surrounding the
Voting Rights Act, raising expectations among some experts the
Supreme Court will review the law after the November election.");
Charles P. Pierce, A National Campaign vs. Voting Rights... Goes
National, ESQUIRE, The Politics Blog (July 9, 2012, 10:00 AM),
http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/voting-rights-act-dc-circuitcourt-I 0487202?hootPostlD=2f4807fl 0b2b65f6c70beb69aa71 bddb
("Texas is challenging Section 5 and, through it, de facto, the entire
enforcement mechanism of the VRA...."); Drew Singer, Texas Says
Voter ID Law Needed to Combat Election Fraud, CHI. TRIB., July 9,
2012,
http://articles.chicagotribune.con2012-07-09/news/sns-rt-ususa-texas-voterbre8681 h7-20120709 _ voter-id-law-texas-votersvoter-fraud (stating "Texas hopes the case will eventually lead to a U.S.
Supreme Court ruling that the Voting Rights Act, passed in 1965 amid
civil rights protests to protect minority voters, has outlived its
usefulness.").
16Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of
the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter
Identification Requirements, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1737, 1738-39 (2008)
("When critics point to the lack of prosecutions or reported incidences
of voter impersonation fraud, defenders of such laws reply, in part, that
successful fraud goes undetected. When defenders of voter ID argue
that such laws lead to very few people being turned away from the polls
or having their votes uncounted, critics respond that even a violation of
the voting rights of a few is constitutionally impermissible....").
17 WENDY R. WEISER AND LAWRENCE NORDEN, BRENNAN CENTER FOR

JUSTICE, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN2012 8-9 (2011).
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especially in light of voting rights' evolution in America.
Most states that have enacted new voter identification laws
have included provisions in their laws to alleviate
opponents' concerns of disenfranchising voters and to
maintain constitutionality.' 8 However, these protections
often do not go far enough, or are omitted from some
states' laws. On its face, the requirement to show photo
identification before voting should not be controversial.
Yet the United States has struggled to provide voting
equality since its inception, often having to overcome overt
racism and fluid barriers to voting. With political
undertones, disproportionate disenfranchisement, and a
statistically weak justification, the new photo identification
laws are not sound policy.
H.

Historical Development of Voting Rights

A.

Voting Rights Expansion

With identification widely required in every day
transactions of the American citizen and the legitimate state
interest to assure authentic elections of public officials, 1 9
the fears present during the voter identification debate
cannot be truly understood without a historical
understanding of the United States voting rights evolution.
When the United States' Constitution was adopted and
ratified in 1787, it remained silent on voter qualifications
20
and rights. Instead, those decisions were left to the states,
with the predominant qualifications being a white male
with property. With all remaining Colonial religion18See Voter
19 Crawford

Identification Requirements
v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,191 (2008)
("The State has a valid interest in participating in a nationwide effort to
improve and modernize election procedures that have been criticized as
antiquated and inefficient.").
20

See U.S. CONST.
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based voting requirements eliminated by 1790, "60 to 70
[%] of adult white men could vote," and in six states freed
African Americans were allowed to vote as well.2 1 It would
take over 60 years for the next progression of voting rights
to conclude, as North Carolina eliminated property
requirements for white male voters in 1856, "effectively
extending the right to vote to all white men within the
United States." 22
As this tremendous expansion of white male voting
occurred, African Americans were being denied the right to
vote consistently as "[e]very new state that joined the
Union after 1819 explicitly denied blacks the right to
vote."23 Even as North Carolina ended property restrictions
for white males, only Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont freely allowed
African Americans the right to vote without "significant
restrictions." 24 Often overshadowed by the struggle by later
Jim Crow laws, it was not only African Americans who
were disenfranchised at the time; Mexican Americans
living in western states were given U.S. citizenship in 1848
as the Mexican American War ended, but their newly
acquired voting rights were effectively barred with property
and literacy restrictions.25
21

Steven Mintz, Winning the Vote: A History of Voting Rights,

GILDER

LEHRMAN

INSTITUTE

OF

AMERICAN

THE
HISTORY,

http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/government-andcivics/essays/winning-vote-history-voting-rights (last accessed July 10,
2012) (Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont).
22 Voting Rights Act Timeline, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION I
(Mar.
4,
2005),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/voting-rightsacttimeline20l1l222.p
df.
23 Mintz, supra note 21.
24 Id.
25 See Voting Rights Act Timeline, supra note
22 ("The Treaty of
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Despite the expansion of citizenship and voting
rights that occurred in the early 1 9 th century, a larger battle
was brewing in the country, and it was not until the Civil
War ended that the United States began to truly assimilate
minority groups into the voter pool. A year after the war
concluded, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted,2 6
granting citizenship to "all persons born in the United
States," 27 regardless of race or color,28 and "without regard
to any previous condition of involuntary servitude...."29
This language provided the basis for the citizenship clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, included, in part, to quell
fears that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would be repealed or
limited. 30 Despite this vast expansion of rights for African
Americans and other minorities in the wake of the Civil
War, the right to vote was not included. Hence, in 1869
Congress passed the last of the Reconstruction
amendments, the Fifteenth Amendment, which states: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
Guadalupe-Hidalgo end[ed] the Mexican American War, giving
Mexicans in Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas U.S.
citizenship... Property and literacy requirements are imposed to keep
them from voting, along with violence and intimidation.").
26 Law Library of Congress, Fourteenth Amendment and Citizenship,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS
(Apr.
30,
2012),
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/citizenship/fourteenthamendmentcitize
nship.php. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was originally passed in 1865
but was defeated by presidential veto.
27 Civil Rights Acts of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current
version at 42 U.S.C.S. § 1982 (2012)). This did not include persons
"subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed."
28 Id.
29 id.

30 Law Library of Congress, supra note 26. See also U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV § 1.
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account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." 3 '
Nearly a hundred years after the birth of the United
States of America, men of all races were constitutionally
guaranteed the right to vote. It would be another fifty years
before women, of all races, were given the right to vote. 32
However, as time would tell, there is a vast difference
between the right to vote and being able to vote; following
a wave of expanded voting rights through Reconstruction, a
coming contraction of voting rights, capped by the
infamous Jim Crow laws, threatened to nullify the progress
made in the century after the birth of America.
B.

Contraction of Voting Rights and the Rise of
Disenfranchisement

As opponents argue strict photo identification will
do, the events of the late 19th and early 20th centuries did
not rescind voting rights per se, 33 but instead restricted
§ I (emphasis added). The requisite number
of states ratified the Fifteenth Amendment less than a year after
passing, on February 3, 1870.
2 See U.S. CoNsT. amend XIX § 1. See also Voting Rights Act
Timeline, supra note 22 ("Voting rights for women were first proposed
31 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV

in July 1848, at the Seneca Falls Woman's Rights Convention .... It

took 72 years of protest and activism for the Nineteenth Amendment to
become law. The measure was ratified by a single vote margin in the
Tennessee state legislature on August 18, 1920, and became national
law eight days later.")
33 See Voting Rights Act Timeline, supra note 22. While most of the
efforts only placed restrictions and encumbrances on the voting
process, some citizens did lose their right to vote. In 1882, the Chinese
Exclusion Act denied citizenship, and therefore voting rights, to
Chinese Americans. Meanwhile, Native Americans faced their own
challenges to voting. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1984), held that
Native Americans were not citizens without approval by the United
States, and that the Fifteenth Amendment was not applicable to Native
Americans. The Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887 went as far to
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them to the point of de facto rescission. 34 It began with the
the "election" of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876,35 when the
Hayes-Tilden compromise ended Reconstruction and "thus
guarantee[d] home rule - meaning white control - in the

South."36 With the end of Reconstruction, state legislatures
in the South began to employ various measures to
disenfranchise African American voters, including "district
gerrymandering, purposeful closing of black polling places,
poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and above all
else, waves of Ku Klux Klan terrorism in the form of
lynchings and vigilante violence against blacks and white
demand that Native Americans renounce their tribes to gain citizenship
and the right to vote. Even after the Indian Naturalization Act of 1890,
creating a process for Native Americans to gain United States
citizenship, Native Americans were restricted from voting in state and
local elections, thanks to rulings such as Opsahl v Johnson, 163 N.W.
988 (1917), which held that the Native Americans had not sufficiently
adopted the language, customs, and habits of civilization.
34 See, e.g., Karyn L. Bass, Are We Really Over the Hill Yet? The
Voting Rights Act at Forty Years: Actual and Constructive
Disenfranchisement in the Wake of Election 2000 and Bush v. Gore, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. I 11, 116-17 (2004).
3

See Richard Wormser, Hayes-Tilden Election (1876), Jim Crow

Stories,

PUBLIC

BROADCASTING

SERVICE

(2002),

http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories-events-election.html
(Democrat candidate Samuel J. Tilden received 184 electoral votes, one
shy of the majority, and Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes
received 165 electoral votes in 1866. Twenty electoral votes were still
in dispute, with 19 of those coming from southern states controlled by
Democrats, although Republicans maintained control of the election
boards in all three states. The election was marred with fraud, violence,
and intimdation, particularly in the southern states. Enough votes were
thrown out to guarantee a Hayes victory, however Southern Democrats
would not accept the result until a compromise was struck.)
36 Id. Accord Bass, supra note 34, at 116 ("In direct response to the
post-Civil War amendments, the South enacted a number of 'legal and
extralegal' reforms to limit the political power of freed black men and
to enable the Southern Caste system to continue.").
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civil rights activists in the South." 37 While each of these
hindered the ability of African Americans to exercise their
newly acquired right to vote, this paper will only discuss
the most analogous to the photograph identification
requirement now required in Tennessee, poll taxes, despite
other "Jim Crow Laws" present in the South, such as
literacy tests, and new registration systems, 38 and those
alike in northern and western states.39
The
most infamous
form of historical
disenfranchisement may be the poll tax,4 0 as there would
eventually be a constitutional amendment ratified in 1964
to prohibit its use in federal elections. 4 1 The use of poll
taxes as a form of disenfranchisement began in Georgia in
1871.42 An even more severe form of the tax, the
cumulative poll tax, was introduced in Georgia in 1877,
forcing "white and black men between 21 and 60 years of
age [to] pay a sum of money for every year since their
twenty-first birthday, or since the law took effect." 43 The
effects of the poll tax were sudden and immediate, with
overall voter turnout reduced by 16-28%. Within the
African American community turnout was nearly cut in
37 Bass, supra note 34, at 116 (citing Alexander Keyssar, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE 105-27 (2000)).
38 White Only: Jim
MUSEUM

OF

Crow in America,
AMERICAN

SMITHSONIAN

NATIONAL

HISTORY

1,

http://americanhistory.si.edulbrown/history/I -segregated/white-only1.html (last visited July 14, 2012).
39 Mintz, supra note 21.
40 A poll tax required prospective voters to pay a tax in return for the
ability to vote.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV § 1.
42 Elizabeth Anderson & Jeffrey Jones, Race, Voting Rights, and
Segregation:
Direct
Disenfranchisement
(Sept.
2002),
http://www.umich.edu/-lawrace/.
43 Clarissa Myrick-Harris & Norman Harris, Atlanta in the Civil Rights
Movement, ATLANTA REGIONAL COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

(2005),
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half." The poll tax spread quickly as an effective way to
disenfranchise African American voters and by 1904 every
former confederate state had adopted either the poll tax or
the cumulative poll tax. 45 The continued use of the poll tax
was not solely the work of southern legislatures, as the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the poll tax
as a "legitimate device for raising revenue', 46 in Breedlove
v. Suttles.47 However, following the ratification of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court protected
voters from the same tax, declaring unconstitutional a
Virginia law that forced voters to choose between a poll tax
or a "burdensome" 48 certificate of residency six months
before the election. 49 It would not be until the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and an independent declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Supreme Court in 1966,0 that the
poll tax would finally meet its demise.5 '
C.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965

Despite all the advances made in the voting rights
movement by constitutional amendment, perhaps the most
tangible protections came through the Voting Rights Act of
1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson's uncompromising

http://www.atlantahighered.org/civilrights/essay-detail.asp?phase=1.
44 Anderson, supra note 42 (citing J. Morgan Kousser, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN
POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY

RESTRICTION
AND
SOUTH, 1880-1910

THE

67-68

(1974)).
45 Anderson, supra note 42.
46 Id.
47 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
48 Anderson, supra note 42.
49 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
5o See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
st Anderson, supra note 42.
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initiative. 52 The bill was the culmination of over 100 years
of struggle for equality, and the landmark legislation helped
to wind down the Civil Rights movement, legislatively and
practically. Upon signing, President Johnson delivered a
powerful speech and foreshadowed the fight over voter
identification requirements today: "This law covers many
pages. But the heart of the act is plain. Wherever, by clear
and objective standards, States and counties are using
regulations, or laws, or tests to deny the right to vote, then
they will be struck down." 54 The Voting Rights Act has
been amended and renewed four times since its passage, 55
most recently in 2006 when it was extended through

2031.56
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was primarily
passed as an extension of the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil
Rights Acts57and as an enforcement tool for the Twenty-Fourth amendment. The previous ten years provided new
enforcement powers for the executive branch, judicial
oversight of voter rights implementation, and the limitation
See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights
Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 87-88
(2009).
5 See Generally, Voting Rights Act Timeline, supra note 22 (Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), ending racial segregation in
schools, was decided in 1954. Congress passed Civil Rights Acts in
1957, 1960, and 1964 to further reduce race based discrimination in the
country. )
54 Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights
Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 409 (August 6, 1965).
ss History of Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Voting Rights Act of
1965,
DEPT.
OF
JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro-b.php
(last accessed
July 14, 2012).
56 Bush signs Voting Rights Act extension, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 27,
2006,
11:27
PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14059113/#.UARrq44yHww.
5 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 55.
58 Ackerman, supra note 52,
at 87.
52
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of both the poll tax and literary tests. 59 However, the latest
example of terror and violence,60 the fiercest of
disenfranchisement tools available to those opposed to
voting equality that underlies the whole evolution of civil
rights,61 provided the catalyst needed for President Johnson
and the legislative body he previously ran to produce a bill
that marks the pinnacle of voting rights expansion.
While the Act of 1965 was ambitious in all respects,
Section 2 and Section 5 enabled the pivot towards true
voting equality. Section 2 barred any "voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure" that denied or abridged the right to vote due to
race or color.62 This proclamation is so integral that it does
not require reauthorization.63 Section 5, however, was
originally enacted for only five years and applied only to
certain states according to a formula laid out in Section 4 .6
At the time of enactment, six states were subject to Section
5, all former Confederate states.65 Three additional states
1. See Introduction To Federal Voting Rights
Laws: Before the Voting Rights Act, DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro-a.php (last accessed
July 14, 2012) (The Civil Rights Act of 1957 created the Department of
Justice's Civil Rights Division and granted injunctive relief powers to
the Attorney General. The 1960 Act "permitted federal courts to
appoint voting referees to conduct voter registration following a
judicial finding of voting discrimination.").
6 History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, supra note 55.
59 U.S. CONsT. XXIV §

61See id.

62 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006).
63

Section 2

of the

Voting

Rights Act,

DEPT. OF JUSTICE,

http://www.justice.gov/crtlabout/vot/sec_2/about-sec2.php
(last
accessed July 14, 2012) ("Section 2 is permanent and has no expiration
date as do certain other provisions of the Voting Rights Act.").
64 About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, DEPT. OF JUSTICE,

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php
July 14, 2012).

(last

accessed

65 Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
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were subjected in 1975, Alaska and Arizona as the first two
outside of the South.66 Currently, seven additional states
have counties or towns subjected to Section 5 as well.6 7
Section 5 barred changes to voting procedures and/or
registration in the covered areas and suspended all practices
in place in the states originally covered by the law until
there was administrative review or a judicial decision.68
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided immediate
results, both in voting and representation.69 Most
importantly, it withstood multiple legal challenges to its
constitutionality. 70 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the
expansion of voting rights came full circle, as the Court
found that the Fifteenth Amendment granted Congress "full
remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
against racial discrimination in voting., 71 Additionally, it
upheld Section 5 of the Act, stating: "Congress had found
that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat
widespread and persistent discrimination in voting," 72 and
that Congress acted "in a permissibly decisive manner." 73
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last accessed
July 14, 2012). The states are Alabama, Georgia, Lousiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Virginia. Section 5 became applicable on
November 1, 1964 in each of the states by 30 FR 9897.
66 Id. Alaska and Arizona each have their own large minority voting
bloc, Native Americans and Hispanics, respectively. Texas was also
added in 1975.
67 Id. California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota
have multiple counties covered by Section 5. Michigan and New
Hampshire have particular townships covered by Section 5.
68
About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 64.
69 See Voting Rights Act Timeline, supra note 22.
70 See
id.
71 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966); Voting
Rights Act Timeline, supra note 22.
72 Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
at 328.
n Id. At 335. In full, the Court stated: "Congress knew that some of the
States covered ... had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of
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The Supreme Court further expanded the scope of Section
5 in Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections,74 when it read the Act
broadly, finding "the legislative history on the whole
supports the view that Congress intended to reach any state
enactment which altered the election law of a covered State
in even a minor way."75
However, the Court has limited the Act as well. In
Beer v. United States, the Court held that changes affecting
minority communities could receive preclearance under
Section 5 when they do not "lead to retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise." 76 Additionally, the
Court held in Mobile v. Bolden that parties seeking relief
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act must prove
discriminatory intent instead of merely discriminatory
results. 7 However this decision was invalidated in the 1982
amendment and reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act.7 8
One of the more recent cases has provided the opening
needed for the recent surge in voter identification law
proposals; Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, which
held "that § 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a
redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but
contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court
decrees. Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try
similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for
voting discrimination contained in the Act itself. Under the compulsion
of these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly
decisive manner."
74
Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
71 Id. At 566.
76 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); Voting
Rights Act
Timeline, supra note 22.
n Voting Rights Act Timeline, supra note 22; See Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980).
7 Voting Rights Act Timeline, supra note 22.
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nonretrogressive purpose." 79
The past decade has seen many changes in voter
identification requirements, as discussed in the
introduction. Like Tennessee, many states decided to
require strict photo identification to vote. Unlike
Tennessee, some states are subject to Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. One such states, Texas, has
taken an aggressive approach and is currently challenging
the continued constitutionality of Section 5 and the Voting
Rights Act.so Texas maintains that Section 5 creates a "twotracked system of sovereignty" for states subject to Section
5 and those that are not. 8 Meanwhile, the Department of
Justice, through United States Attorney General Eric
Holder Jr., challenges Texas' and other strict photo
identification requirements as unconstitutional poll taxes in
a different form.82 Texas' suit is one of many recent
challenges to the Voting Rights Act; in the past two years
there have been more lawsuits filed than "in the previous
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000). The 2006
Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 redefined § 5's
"purpose" as "any discriminatory purpose. See also Voting Rights Act
Timeline, supra note 22
80 Amended Complaint at 26, Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cv-00128
(D.D.C. argued July 10, 2012) ("The State of Texas is entitled to a
declaratory judgment authorizing the immediate implementation of
Senate Bill 14 because section 5 of the Voting Rights Act violates the
Constitution.")
(available
at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edulelectionlaw/litigation/documents/amendedcom
plaint_006.pdf). See, e.g., Drew Singer, Texas to Test 1965 Voting
Rights Law in Court, REUTERS (July 8, 2012, 11:52 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/201 2/07/08/us-usa-texas-voteridUSBRE86706W20120708.
8' Amended Complaint, supra note 80, at 25.
82 Eric Holder Jr., U.S. Attorney General,
Department of Justice,
Address at the NAACP 103' Annual Convention (July 10, 2012);
Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Texas' Poll Tax in Disguise, L.A.
7

TIMES, July 15, 2012,
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45 years combined."8 3 It is expected that the Supreme
Court will hear arguments concerning the continued
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act as early as next
term. 84
III.

Viewing Tennessee's New Law Through a
National Lens

The courts will decide whether strict photo
identification requirements are analogous to poll taxes. If
they are, then the Twenty Fourth Amendment will bar the
new laws. However, Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board suggests that strict photo identification requirements
like Indiana's will withstand constitutional challenges.8 5
As in Indiana, Tennessee will provide photo identification
for free, provided voters can show roof of citizenship and
two proofs of Tennessee residency.6 Tennessee's law also
shows some leniency, allowing multiple forms of
government issued photo identification, including expired
driver licenses.87 Furthermore, Tennessee retained an
affidavit of identity as an avenue for indigent citizens to

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-ackermantexas-poll-tax-20120715,0,668465 1.story.
83 Barrett, supra note 14.
84 See, e.g., id.; Richard L. Hasen, Holder's Voting Rights
Gamble,
SLATE
(Dec.
30,
2011,
1:09
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/20 11/12
/the obama administration s risky-voterid-move threatens the voti
ng-rights-act.html; Singer, supra note 80.
85 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
86

Voter Photo ID,

TENNESSEE

DEPARTMENT

OF SAFETY

AND

HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.tn.gov/safety/photoids.shtml

(last

accessed July 17, 2012).
87 Id. See also Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 2 (Other
strict photo identification states do not allow expired documents.
Kansas only accepts expired documents if the bearer is 65 or older.
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vote.88
Tennessee's new law only recently became
effective, making it difficult to measure the impact it has
had in the state. Therefore, it' is easier to view the law's
effects through a national scope. It is estimated that
nationwide roughly "11 percent of American citizens do
not possess a government-issued photo ID; that is over 21
million citizens," 89 and "up to 10 percent of registered
voters nationwide lack valid photo ID cards."90 Estimates
for Tennessee specifically range anywhere from 126,000 to
675,000 citizens. 9 1 As of 2010, it was estimated that
Tennessee has a voting-eligible population of 4,621,705.92
At the end of 2011, only 3,882,129 of these eligible voters
Pennsylvania only allows expired licenses if it has been less than 12
months since expiration. Rhode Island's law, effective in 2014, will not
permit any expired documents. South Carolina does not accept expired
documents. Texas' proposed identification laws only allow expired
certificate of citizenship.).
88 Tenn. Code Ann. 2-7-112(f) (2011).
89 WENDY R. WEISER AND LAWRENCE NORDEN, BRENNAN CENTER FOR

JUSTICE, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN2012 2 (2011).

Nick Wing, Tennessee Voter ID Law Could Disenfranchise
Thousands As State Program Fails to Reach Voters, THE HUFFINGTON
PM),
12,
2012
6:38
POST
(July
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/12/tennessee-voter-id-lawrogram n_1669323.html.
Bill Dries, PartisansDebate State Voter ID Law, MEMPHIS DAILY
NEWS,
Nov.
2,
2011,
http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=63369
(State Democrats estimate that more than 675,000 Tennesseans do not
have a driver's license or have a license with no photo. Tennessee
Elections Coordinator, Mark Goins, estimates there are only 126,000
citizens that are of voting age and don't have a driver's license with
photo identification.). See Also Wing, supra note 90 (Mark Goins
estimate is likely based on reports that 126,000 registered senior voters
have received driver's licenses issued without photographs.)
92 Dr. Michael McDonald, 2010 General Election Turnout Rates,
9

UNITED STATES ELECTIONS PROJECT, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY,

Dec. 28, 2011, http://elections.gmu.edulTurnout_2010G.html.
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were registered.9 3 Applying the ten percent national
estimate and combining it with the average of state specific
estimates, there could be roughly 421,000 Tennessee
citizens,or approximately 10.8% of the electorate, directly
affected by the new voter identification laws. 94 Assuming
voter turnout is similar to that for the 2008 Presidential
election, 95 279,291 likely voters could be deterred from
voting by the new law. Despite a Tennessee program
designed to help eligible voters obtain the requisite voter
identification, early returns show it has hardly made a dent
in the affected poeulations, issuing only 20,923 photo
identification cards.
Subjecting approximately seven percent of likely
voters to burdensome voting processes should never be
accepted in a country that values the power of voting and
treasures the constitutional right to vote so dearly. 97
9

TENNESSEE DivIsION OF ELECTIONS, VOTER REGISTRATION:
DECEMBER 1, 2011 Six MONTH SUMMARY REPORT at 2 (available at

http://www.tn.gov/sos/election/data/reg/20 11-12.pdf).
94 (126,000+675,000+462000 (roughly 10 percent of estimated eligible
voters))/3= 421,000. 421,000/3,882,129 (figure from VOTER
REGISTRATION: DECEMBER 1, 2011 SIx MONTH SUMMARY REPORT,
supra note 93)= .0.108445649z 10.8%.
95 TENNESSEE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
VOTER TURNOUT FOR THE NOVEMBER 4, 2008 ELECTION at 2 (available

at http://www.tn.gov/sos/election/data/turnout/2008-11 .pdf).
96 Chris Kromm, Tennessee Program to Provide Photo IDs Missing
Most Voters Who Need It, THE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES (July

12,
2012,
11:11
AM),
http://www.southernstudies.org/2012/07/tennessee-program-toprovide-photo-ids-missing-most-voters-who-need-it.html (In an email
to Facing South, Jennifer Donnals of the Tennessee Department of
Safety and Homeland Security stated, "As of Monday, July 9 our
department had issued 20,923 state IDs for voting purposes to citizens
in Tennessee."). Based on the likely voter number calculated in the
prior sentence, over 258,000 eligible, likely voters remain without
groper identification.
7 Show where 7% number comes from.
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If there were a compelling reason to do so, however, it
would be to deter fraud and ensure that no illegitimate
votes dilute the value of legitimate ones. 9 8 Nationwide,
though, there has been no significant data to indicate
widespread voter fraud, particularly the kind of fraud that
photo identification requirements address. 99 According to a
former member of the Commission on Federal Election
Reform, "a photo ID requirement would prevent over 1,000
legitimate votes (perhaps over 10,000 legitimate votes) for
every single improper vote prevented."' u More troubling,
studies consistently show that the most likely to be
disenfranchised by photo identification requirements are
minorities, the elderly, the poor, and young adults.' 01
While at least ten percent of eligible voters do not have
valid photo identification for voting, "25 percent of African
98 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
99 See Policy Brief on Voter Identification, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
2006),
(Sept.
JUSTICE,

http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/policy-brief on-voter_
identification/ (In Ohio there were "four instances of inelible persons
voting or attempting to vote... a rate of .00004%. Georgia's Secretary
of State "could not recall one documented case of voter fraud relating
to the impersonation of a registered voter at the polls during her tenyear tenure." Finally, since 2002, there have only been "86
individuals.. .convicted of federal crimes relating to election fraud
(including several offenses not remedied by identification
requirements), while 196,139,871 ballots have been cast in federal
general elections."); Judith Browne Dianis, Five Myths About Voter
7,
2011,
WASH.
POST,
Oct.
Fraud,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-voterfraud/2011/10/04/gIQAkjoYTLstory.html ("An investigation of fraud
allegations in Wisconsin in 2004 led to the prosecution of 0.0007
percent of voters. From 2002 to 2005, the Justice Department found,
only five people were convicted for voting multiple times. In that same
period, federal prosecutors convicted only 86 people for improper
voting.").
'0 Dianis, supra note 99.
01 Id.
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Americans, 15 percent of those earning less than $35,000,
18 percent of citizens age 65 or older and 20 percent of
voters age 18 to 29" do not.'o2 Coincidentally,
perhaps,
03
Democrat.'
vote
to
tend
groups
these
IV.

Conclusion

The Tennessee law is not as restrictive as other
states' similar measures. It retains the affidavit of identity
Id. See also Policy Brief on Voter Identification, supra note 99
("The impact of ID requirements is even greater for the elderly,
students, people with disabilities, low-income individuals, and people
of color...Fewer than 3 percent of Wisconsin students have driver's
licenses listing their current address. The same study found that African
Americans have driver's licenses at half the rate of whites, and the
disparity increases among younger voters; only 22% of black men aged
18-24 had a valid driver's license. Not only are minority voters less
likely to possess photo ID, but they are also more likely than white
voters to be selectively asked for ID at the polls."); Weiser, supra note
89 at 1 ("These new restrictions fall most heavily on young, minority,
and low-income voters, as well as on voters with disabilities. This wave
of changes may sharply tilt the political terrain for the 2012 election.")
103 See Jonathan Chait, 2012 or Never, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Feb. 26, 2012,
http://nymag.com/news/features/gop-primary-chait-2012-3/
(Discussing the changing demographics in America that shows "[e]very
year, the nonwhite proportion of the electorate grows by about half a
percentage point-meaning that in every presidential election, the
minority share of the vote increases by 2 percent, a huge amount in a
closely divided country." Meanwhile, "The Republican Party had
increasingly found itself confined to white voters, especially those
lacking a college degree and rural whites...."); Mark Lopez & Paul
Taylor, Dissecting the 2008 Electorate: Most Diverse in U.S. History,
102

PEW

RESEARCH

CENTER

(Apr.

30,

2009),

http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/dissecting-2008-electorate.pdf
(showing 95% of African-Americans, 67% of Latino voters, and 62%
of Asian voters voted Democrat in the last election. Furthermore,
whites made up the lowest percent of the electorate in history, while
African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians each "accounted for
unprecedented shares of the presidential vote in 2008." A combination
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for those with religious objections or indigent citizens.' 0
Additionally, it allows expired forms of identification to be
used. Its trial run, the 2012 Republican primary, showed
mixed results with 154 ballots being blocked. 05 Despite the
relatively low number of blocked ballots, it may not be
indicative of the effects in the 2012 Presidential election, as
the demographics of the electorate will be entirely
different. Tennessee's law does provide some protections
for two of the most affected groups most likely to be
affected, the elderly, with the free conversion of non-photo
driver's licenses, and the poor, through the identity
affidavit.107 Yet it does not address minority voters and
expressly burdened young voters, recently a more active
voting bloc, especially among minorities, by omitting a
provision allowing university identification to serve as
proper identification to vote. os Finally, it does not affect
of two of the most affected groups, African Americans aged 18 to 29
"increased their voter turnout rate by 8.7[%]".)
104 Voter Photo ID, supra note
86.
105 Mike Baker, Voter ID Laws Could Block
Thousands From Voting,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
July
8,
2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/08/voter-idlaws n 1657027.html (Keesha Gaskins, senior counsel at the Brennan
Center, stated, "These are still people who attempted to vote and who
were unable to do so. When you compare that to the actual evidence of
fraud, the difference is exponential.").
10 Tennessee Election Officials Optimistic About Voter ID Law,
Despite Criticism, Fox NEws LATINO
(Mar. 4, 2012),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/03/04/tennesseeelection-officials-optimistic-about-voter-id-law-despite-criticism/
("How many Latinos and African Americans do you think are voting in
the Republican presidential primary in Tennessee (on Tuesday)?"
Vanderbilt University political science professor Bruce Oppenheimer
asked. "How many poor people? The groups who are voting in the
Republican primary ... are not the people who are expected to be
particularly disenfranchised by the new voter ID law.").
107 Voter Photo ID, supra
note 86.
1os Id. See also Emily Schultheis, Students Hit
by Voter ID Restrictions,
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absentee voting, the most likely form of voter fraud."
In light of the changing electorate in 2008,110 the
success of the Republican Party with a much different
electorate makeup in 2010,111 and the pursuit of photo
identification laws nearly exclusive to Republican led state
governments,"l 2 the political undertones of the voting
identification changes
are troubling.
With
the
disproportionate effect of the new laws on growing and
increasingly active minority populations, the new push
becomes questionable. When viewed in conjunction with
the historical barriers to voting and the struggle for
expanded voting rights, seemingly innocuous identification
measures are easily tied to nefarious intentions. It is not
until the statistics of fraud are added to the equation,
especially the type that these laws address, that the new law
becomes
practically
indefensible.
While
photo
identification requirements are pervasive in America today,
whether it is for bank transactions, airline travel, or even
POLITICO
(Nov.
30,
2011),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1 111/69465.html ("Many college
students don't have a valid ID from the state where they're attending
school. In order to vote on or near campus, those students would need
to apply for and get new state-issued IDs well in advance of primary
day or Election Day."); Lopez, supra note 103 at 6 (Showing that voter
participation was 2.1% higher for all 18-29 year old. Of that age group,
Black voter turnout rose 8.7%, Hispanic 5.2%, and Asian 10.5%).
109 See Weiser, supra note 17.
110 Lopez, supra note 103.
1 Chait, supra note 103 ("During the last midterm elections, the
strategy succeeded brilliantly. Republicans moved further right and
won a gigantic victory. In the 2010 electorate, the proportion of voters
under 30 fell by roughly a third, while the proportion of voters over 65
years old rose by a similar amount-the white share, too.").
112 Weiser, supra note 17, at 9-10 ("This year, in every case but one,
strict voter ID bills were introduced by Republican legislators... With
the exception of Rhode Island, every state that enacted stricter voter ID
requirements this session had both houses and the governor's office
controlled by Republicans.").
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conferences denouncing photo identification requirements
for voters,113 this country has a complicated past dealing
with voting rights. When the small amount of voter fraud is
balanced with the large population that may be
disenfranchised by the new laws around the country, voter
photo identification laws are unsound policy, like "trying to
kill a fly with a bazooka.""14
113 Sean Higgins, Hey, They Can't Let Just Anybody
In: Proper ID
Needed to See Eric Holder Speech Denouncing Voter ID Laws, WASH.
EXAMINER, July 10, 2012, http://washingtonexaminer.com/hey-theycant-let-j ust-anybody-in-proper-id-needed-to-see-eric-holder-speechdenouncing-voter-id-laws/article/2501792.
114 Amy Bingham, Voter ID: Poll Tax or Common Sense?, ABC NEWS
(July 12, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/voter-id-polltax-common-sense/story?id= I6758232#.UAY7HI4yHww
(Quoting
Nathaniel Persily, "a voting law expert at Columbia Law School," and
co-author of Vote Fraudin the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public
Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, supra
note 16.).
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